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ABSTRACT
DEMAND-SIDE INTERVENTIONS TO PROMOTE RESIDENTIAL ENERGY
CONSERVATION
BY
FLORIAN RUNDHAMMER
AUGUST 2018

Committee Chair: Dr. Michael K. Price
Major Department: Economics

This dissertation consists of three essays that evaluate the effectiveness of interventions promoting residential energy conservation. I study three programs that were implemented as natural
field experiments by energy utilities in the United States. In the experiments, households were
randomly assigned to a control group that was not exposed to the program or to treatment groups
that participated in the program(s). The main objective of this research agenda is to generate insights that help design effective energy policy.
In the first chapter, I study a program that provided weekly emails containing information
about a customer’s natural gas expenditure to more than 150,000 households in California. I find
that exposure to the emails caused significant reductions in natural gas use. Additional analyses
suggest that households changed their heating behavior in response to the program. Furthermore,
reductions in usage persisted over a 20-month treatment period.
The second chapter focuses on the interaction between a voluntary financial rewards program
for reductions in energy use and the Home Energy Report (HER), a repeated mailer that compares a recipient’s consumption to that of similar households. We test whether the introduction
of financial incentives increased energy savings by households that also received the HER. Our
findings show that the two programs complemented each other in several important ways and
promoted larger energy savings by a broader set of customers than the HER alone.

Finally, the third chapter investigates whether social nudges, such as the HER, are subject to
crowd out effects. Crowd out occurs when the effectiveness of a new social nudge is negatively
affected by previous exposure to an existing social nudge. We use two distinct social nudges in an
experiment in which households are exposed to no nudge, one nudge in isolation, or both nudges
in combination. To determine the extent of crowd out, we compare the effect of the combined intervention to the summation of the effects of each nudge in isolation. We do not find evidence of
crowd out. In contrast, the combined effect was marginally larger than the sum of the individual
effects, although the difference is not statistically significant.
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I

Introduction

Energy conservation is a key component of modern climate policy. Motivated by a range of welldocumented inefficiencies in the energy markets, policy makers and economists have considered
different approaches to improve market outcomes for decades. Traditionally, economists have advocated for market-based regulation to promote efficiency, such as imposing appropriate taxes
(Kahn, 1970; Montgomery, 1972; Baumol and Oates, 1988) or better aligning wholesale and
retail prices (Boiteux, 1960; Borenstein, 2002, 2005; Joskow, 2012). In recent years, however,
policy makers have shown an increasing interest in alternative approaches. Many conservation
efforts now rely on non-traditional program designs and incentives, ranging from the application
of concepts from behavioral economics to information and education campaigns.
This policy environment has proven a fertile ground for academic work. Supported by the
rich consumption data provided by modern metering infrastructure, recent conservation programs
are the backdrop for a thriving research agenda. The insights from this literature go well beyond
providing new ways of addressing inefficiencies in the energy market. In addition, the diverse
incentive structures, program implementations, and careful empirical designs—often in the form
of randomized controlled trials—have afforded us a deeper understanding of human behavior
more generally.
The current state of the literature provides robust evidence on whether and how well specific
programs work. Across different incentive types and dozens of programs, studies generally document substantial and economically meaningful reductions in energy consumption (Gillingham
et al., 2009; Price, 2014; Brent et al., 2015; List and Price, 2016). Compared to traditional regulatory tools, the new generation of programs often achieves energy savings at a lower cost per unit
of energy conserved (Allcott and Mullainathan, 2010; Benartzi et al., 2017).
Despite improvements in our understanding of how households consume energy, the literature provides less guidance in terms of the mechanisms responsible for changes in behavior. Perhaps the most important omission is the lack of a unifying framework that can usefully organize
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findings and generate predictions for the effectiveness of a program (Price, 2014). The main challenge for establishing such a framework is that programs use a wide range of incentives that may
operate through one or more distinct channels. These channels are often difficult to isolate in empirical work. Furthermore, programs differ in terms of seemingly small implementation details
that may affect how customers respond to an intervention (Saez, 2009; Bertrand et al., 2010; Kamenica, 2012).
The mechanisms through which an intervention works are important for several reasons.
First, we need to understand the underlying mechanisms to provide predictions about the effectiveness of a program in other settings. The direction of an effect, the effect size, and the impact
on different customer groups may all depend on what is driving changes in consumption. Two
simple examples can illustrate this point. First, we have growing evidence that households are
uncertain about the current marginal price of energy (Jessoe and Rapson, 2014; Ito, 2014). If an
intervention provides better information to households, the expected direction of the program’s
effect crucially depends on whether households initially under- or overestimate the correct price
(Kahn and Wolak, 2013; Davis and Metcalf, 2016). If the intervention works through other channels, such as making energy consumption more salient to the customer, the directional difference
may not arise. Second, an intervention that informs households about how their consumption
compares to the use of neighbors may work because it imposes a “social tax” on usage above
the reference level or because it provides useful information about relative energy-efficiency (Ferraro and Price, 2013; Dolan and Metcalfe, 2015; Brent et al., 2017b). If the former channel is
more prominent, we would expect households who are far from the comparison level to respond
stronger to treatment; if information is the driving force, the prediction is less clear.
Second, the welfare effects of an intervention can depend on the underlying channel. Allcott
and Kessler (2018), for example, show that the delivery of neighborhood comparisons increases
the welfare of the average recipient. At the same time, however, the intervention imposes substantial costs on customers that are often unaccounted for in program evaluation. For example,
recipients may face time, comfort, and psychological costs (Allcott and Kessler, 2018). Bran-
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don et al. (2017) argue that welfare impacts further depend on whether customers form habits
in response to treatment or purchase more efficient technology. In either case, costs specific to
the mechanism should be accounted for. While forming habits may require costly changes in the
lifestyle of a household, new technology is costly at the time of purchase and installation.
Third, an active discussion in the literature is concerned with how the effects of conservation
programs develop over time. There are two central questions related to program dynamics. Several studies have generated insights about how energy use responds to repeated exposure to an
intervention and findings highlight important differences across candidate mechanisms. Direct
transient and lasting price changes, for example, appear to cause stable reductions in use (Jessoe
and Rapson, 2014; Ito et al., 2018). Similarly, neighborhood comparisons have been found to exhibit effects that even continue to increase with repeated treatment (Allcott and Rogers, 2014).
On the other hand, moral appeals for reductions in usage during specific time periods seemingly
only work in the short-run (Ito et al., 2018). The second central consideration is whether the effects of a program persist after the program is no longer administered. Allcott and Rogers (2014)
and Bernedo et al. (2014) show that the effects of neighborhood comparisons remain economically meaningful even years after the last treatment.
The discussion above raises another question that has been largely unexplored in the academic literature. Policy makers choose from a suite of policy tools that may rely on one or several incentive types. A sizable literature in economics suggests that incentives can interact with
each other when applied in conjunction. Assigning a “price” to a specific behavior by introducing
financial incentives for behavioral change, for example, has been found to reduce the effectiveness of non-price interventions targeting the same behavior (Gneezy et al., 2011; Bowles and
Polania-Reyes, 2012; Kamenica, 2012). Similarly, models from social psychology suggest that
different programs may interact with each other. Several theories provide reasons for why multiple programs may reinforce each other’s effects as well as reasons for why the effectiveness of
individual programs may be mitigated when they are used together (Dolan and Galizzi, 2015).
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The aim of this dissertation is to advance the literature in the direction of these open questions. I use rich energy consumption data from three conservation programs to answer several
open research questions. While the programs differ in terms of the underlying incentive structure, they share a common empirical approach. All three interventions were designed and implemented as natural field experiments by energy utilities in the United States (Harrison and List,
2004). In the experiments, residential customers were randomly assigned to a business-as-usual
control group or to one of several treatment groups that exposed households to the program(s)
of interest. Based on a successful randomization, I estimate the average treatment effect of each
program. I further use detailed auxiliary data to answer more nuanced research questions, such
as the differential effects of the programs on different customer groups, the short- and long-run
dynamics of the programs, and the interaction among different incentive types.
In the first chapter, titled Expenditure Salience and Consumer Choice: Field Experimental
Evidence from the Energy Market, I test how natural gas customers respond to the provision of
more frequent information. One concern in the energy market is that households only receive
aggregate monthly bills, which offer limited feedback about the current marginal price or quantity consumed (Borenstein, 2009; Ito, 2014; Jessoe and Rapson, 2014; Sexton, 2015). I use data
from a large field experiment that was implemented by the Southern California Gas Company. In
the experiment, households were randomly assigned to a control group or a treatment group that
received weekly emails containing current information about the household’s natural gas expenditure. I have three main findings. First, households reduced energy consumption by about one
percent in response to treatment. Second, the effect of the program was largest during the winter, when demand for natural gas peaks. I provide additional evidence suggesting that households
made changes to their heating behavior on cold days. Third, treatment effects emerged almost
immediately and persisted over a 20-month treatment period. My results show that the information available to customers is an important determinant of energy consumption and providing
more frequent feedback can promote energy savings over an extended period of time.
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The second chapter, titled Harnessing Policy Complementarities to Conserve Energy: Evidence from a Natural Field Experiment, is joint work with John List, Robert Metcalfe, and Michael
Price. In the paper, we empirically test whether two incentive types can be combined to increase
energy savings. The first program is the Home Energy Report (HER), a monthly mailer that compares a recipient’s energy usage to that of similar neighbors. Previous studies have found that this
social comparison causes reductions in electricity use of one to three percent, which are mainly
driven by households with a high level of baseline consumption (Allcott, 2011c, 2015; Ferraro
and Price, 2013). The second intervention is a financial rewards program that changes the opportunity cost of energy by providing rewards for reductions in use compared to a baseline level.
We use data from a field experiment with three groups: (i) a control group; (ii) a group that only
received the HER; and (iii) a group that received the HER and was encouraged to participate in
the financial rewards program. The analysis focuses on whether the combined use of behavioral
and financial incentives generated greater savings than the use of the HER alone. We find that the
two programs complemented each other in three important ways. First, disproportionately many
low-usage households signed up for the rewards program, precisely the household types least responsive to the HER. Second, participants in the rewards program reduced their energy consumption significantly. Third, introducing financial incentives did not negatively affect the response to
the HER of households who were encouraged but chose not to participate in the financial rewards
program. These results show that carefully combining different incentives and using a suite of
policy tools can increase energy savings.
In the third chapter, titled Testing for Crowd Out in Social Nudges: Evidence from a Natural Field Experiment in the Market for Electricity, Alec Brandon, John List, Robert Metcalfe,
Michael Price, and I study the interaction of two social nudges. One concern with the broad application of behavioral interventions is that the effectiveness of a nudge may be mitigated by previous exposure to another nudge. For example, a household who has been receiving the HER for
years may respond differently to a second nudge than a household who had never been treated
before. We use data from a field experiment in California to test this relationship empirically.

5

Households in the experiment were randomly assigned to one of four mutually exclusive groups:
(i) a control group; (ii) a group that only received the HER; (iii) a group that only received a second social nudge, the Peak Energy Report (PER), which targets peak consumption on particularly
hot summer days; and (iv) a group that received both the HER and PER. We find that both social
nudges caused significant reductions in energy use when applied in isolation. When combined,
the group of households exposed to both nudges reduced use to an extent that is statistically indistinguishable from a naïve summation of the effects of the two individual nudges. Our findings
are the first evidence suggesting that nudges may remain effective even when applied in larger
numbers.
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II

Chapter 1: Expenditure Salience and Consumer Choice: Field Experimental Evidence from the Energy Market

1

Introduction

A fundamental principle of standard economic models is that consumers are fully informed about
all product attributes when they make decisions. However, the empirical literature provides mounting evidence that consumers are not well-informed in many markets. For example, customers appear to be insensitive to important price elements (Chetty et al., 2009; Finkelstein, 2009; Hossain
and Morgan, 2006; Brown et al., 2010) and not knowledgeable about the quantity of common
goods they consume (Wisdom et al., 2010; Bollinger et al., 2011; Jessoe and Rapson, 2014).1,2
When consumers are not well-informed, their decisions can deviate from the theoretical ideal and
markets may be inefficient.3
To alleviate concerns about inefficient market outcomes, policy makers and firms increasingly
rely on the provision of information. An example of efforts to provide vital information to customers is an agreement between the Federal Communications Commission and cellular firms that
requires firms to deliver usage alerts before customers exceed a plan’s allowance (Grubb, 2015;
Grubb and Osborne, 2015). Other services may alert customers of spending thresholds, provide
general information, or make expenditure, usage, or marginal prices more salient.
1 Other

studies suggest that consumers may also not be well-informed about the quality of goods (Dranove et al.,
2003; Jin and Leslie, 2003) or the relationship between product characteristics and outputs (Larrick and Soll, 2008;
Allcott, 2011a, 2013).
2 There are several explanations for why customers may not be well-informed in many situations. Some markets
may simply not provide feedback that is sufficient to learn about important product attributes. In other situations, the
complexities of the market may make it difficult to obtain or process information: customers may not pay attention
to attributes that are not salient (Gabaix and Laibson, 2006; Bordalo et al., 2013, 2016); it may be too costly for customers to acquire information relative to the expected benefits of being well-informed (Shin, 1985; Sallee, 2014); or
consumers may exhibit biases (Allcott et al., 2014).
3 The recognition that perfect information inadequately describes many choice settings, and that imperfect information can lead to market failures, has been prevalent in economic theory for decades. For overviews of seminal
contributions to the microeconomics of information, see Stigler (1961) and Stiglitz (2000, 2002). In recent years,
there has been a resurgence of these ideas in behavioral economics. If customers fail to reach their private optimum due to inattention, behavioral biases, or misinterpretation of information, they may suffer from “internalities”
(Allcott et al., 2014). This form of market failure may require new policy approaches similar to the regulation of
traditional externalities (Allcott and Sunstein, 2015; Allcott and Taubinsky, 2015).
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We focus on the residential energy market, which poses a number of challenges for consumers. Energy is an invisible input in the production of many household services, and quantity
feedback is typically restricted to aggregate and infrequent utility bills. In this situation, it is difficult to attribute consumption to specific uses (Attari et al., 2010; Attari, 2014; Jessoe and Rapson,
2014). The literature also suggests that many customers do not respond to the correct marginal
price. Instead, decisions appear to be based on simple heuristics, such as responding to the average price (Borenstein, 2009; Nataraj and Hanemann, 2011; Ito, 2014; Wichman, 2014). When
prices and quantities are difficult to observe, customers may not be well-informed about their
consumption or expenditure throughout the billing cycle. Simple information messages may provide an attractive solution.4 With limited theory and empirical evidence on the effectiveness of
such messages, however, questions about optimal design and information content remain. A better understanding of how consumer choice in the energy sector responds to information provision
is also important for environmental policy because of the significant externalities associated with
energy use.5
This study is the first to rigorously demonstrate the effects of providing repeated expenditure
information on consumer choice in the energy sector. We assess the Bill Tracker Alert (BTA),
a weekly email that contains information about a customer’s past, current, and projected natural gas expenditure.6 This information allows customers to keep track of their gas expenditure
throughout the billing cycle and to adjust use before the final bill arrives. Using daily consumption data from a large-scale natural field experiment in California, we are able to isolate the effect
of the BTA on energy use. In the experiment, the Southern California Gas Company (SoCalGas)
assigned more than 150,000 residential customers to a control group or a BTA treatment group.
Customers in the treatment group received a weekly BTA over the course of a 20-month treat4 A similar idea is reflected by the increasing use of simple reminders to encourage different types of behavior, such as regular exercise, retirement savings, and health appointments. Altmann and Traxler (2014) provide an
excellent overview.
5 For extensive overviews of non-price interventions aimed at encouraging energy conservation, see Allcott and
Mullainathan (2010); Price (2014); Allcott (2016); Hahn and Metcalfe (2016); List and Price (2016); and Brent et al.
(2017a).
6 Projected expenditure is based on a proprietary formula that considers consumption patterns in the current
billing cycle, the pricing structure, and limited weather forecasts.
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ment period. The only difference between treatment and control was the provision of the BTA.
All other relevant factors of the decision environment, such as the pricing, technology in the
home, and the frequency and mode of payments to the utility, remained constant over time and
across treatment groups.
The experiment provides three main findings. First, customers who receive weekly expenditure messages use less energy than their counterparts in the control group. The average informed
customer reduces natural gas demand by approximately 0.8 percent, an effect that is highly significant. In general, the direction of a customer’s adjustments will depend on the type of imperfect information—if households initially underestimate prices or quantities, they will reduce demand after receiving additional information (Kahn and Wolak, 2013; Davis and Metcalf, 2016).
The direction of our results is broadly consistent with previous findings in the literature (e.g, Allcott, 2011c; Houde et al., 2013; Kahn and Wolak, 2013), although exceptions exist (Wichman,
2017).
Second, detailed consumption data allow us to better understand how and when customers
respond to the treatment. Natural gas is primarily used as a heating fuel and to operate certain appliances, such as clothes dryers and gas stoves. This usage profile leads to significant spikes in
natural gas demand in the winter, when customers require natural gas as an input for central heating, gas furnaces, and water boilers. During high demand periods, gas providers depend on peak
infrastructure and storage facilities to complement supply that is insufficient to meet demand.
Thus, reductions in peak demand may reduce the price-volatility of natural gas and could reduce
infrastructure investment (Mu, 2007; Geman and Ohana, 2009).7 To determine when reductions
occur, we present treatment effects separately by season. We find that customers reduce demand
by around 1 percent during the winter heating season, but only by about 0.5 percent during other
7 Another reason for increased interest in energy efficiency in the natural gas sector is the expansion of electricity
generation capacity that uses natural gas instead of other fuels. Residential electricity demand typically spikes in the
summer, when customers use electricity to cool their homes. Historically, these periods were used to fill natural gas
storage facilities with cheap gas. With more generators using natural gas, summer gas demand has increased sharply
in recent years (EIA, 2015b). Furthermore, extreme weather events can have substantial impacts on the availability
of natural gas. For example, natural gas demand experienced record highs during the Polar Vortex of 2014, leading
to price peaks and limited access to natural gas for electricity generation in regions like New England (EIA, 2014;
NERC, 2014).
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months. We also show that treatment effects are only statistically significant and economically
meaningful on days that are sufficiently cold to require home heating.8 This finding suggests that
consumers adjust their heating behavior in response to the treatment.
Third, we use consumption decisions over a 20-month treatment period to assess immediate
responses to treatment in the short run and the dynamics of treatment effects over time. We find
that reductions in consumption emerge within days of the first BTA. Subsequent messages do not
lead to substantial increases in the treatment effects with repeated exposure. This pattern contrasts with the effects of repeated normative conservation appeals, which appear to build up over
time (Allcott and Rogers, 2014). One reason for the difference may be that normative appeals and
pure information work through alternative channels. For example, customers may consider new
information immediately in their decision-making, but incur a social cost on resource use in the
case of normative messages (Ferraro and Price, 2013; Brandon et al., 2017; Brent et al., 2017b).
In the longer run, we show that treatment effects do not decay within a season.9 This finding contributes to a growing literature that provides conflicting evidence on the persistence of non-price
interventions.10 In our setting, repeated expenditure messages cause lasting energy savings.
We also present two auxiliary findings that complement our main results. Demand reductions
in our study are relatively invariant between the delivery of two treatment messages. Recent work
documents an action-and-backsliding pattern in response to normative interventions, where treatment effects increase after the delivery of a message, but subsequently decline until the next message is received (Allcott and Rogers, 2014; Brent et al., 2017b). The contrasting findings in this
study may reflect that more frequent treatments can help customers better retain the information
8 We

use several proxies for heating fuel demand. Our main specification shows that treatment effects are only
statistically significant and economically meaningful on days with an average temperature below 65 degrees Fahrenheit. This threshold is typically used to distinguish between days that require heating (heating degree days) and days
that require cooling (cooling degree days) in the average home.
9 Our data only allow us to speak to the persistence of treatment effects during the treatment period. A growing
literature examines whether treatment effects also persist after treatment is discontinued and finds mixed evidence
(Gneezy et al., 2011; Brandon et al., 2017). In energy economics, normative conservation appeals containing neighborhood comparisons appear to induce reductions even years after the last treatment letter was received by households (Ferraro and Miranda, 2013; Bernedo et al., 2014; Allcott and Rogers, 2014; Brandon et al., 2017).
10 Some studies show that information and behavioral appeals can lead to persistent changes in behavior (Bollinger
et al., 2011; Allcott and Rogers, 2014; Ito et al., 2018). Other studies document that the effects of such programs
decay quickly (Houde et al., 2013; Brent et al., 2017b; Ito et al., 2018).
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they receive (Allcott and Rogers, 2014; Gilbert and Graff Zivin, 2014). Lastly, we find economically meaningful but statistically insignificant differences among four subgroups of the BTA
treatment group that vary in terms of two program details. We find that supplemental materials,
which contain information about the program and energy savings tips, increase treatment effects.
We also compare a version of the BTA that uses bar charts to visualize the content of the message
to a text-based version of the treatment. Results show that customers receiving the graphical design respond more strongly to treatment than customers who are exposed to the text-based BTA.
This finding is consistent with theories of multimedia learning suggesting that graphical cues reduce cognitive load compared to other ways of presenting information (Mayer, 2002; Mayer and
Moreno, 2003).
There are many ways to provide information to customers.11 Recent studies consider several
approaches, including efforts to provide feedback technology, education campaigns, and social
information.12 Most closely related to this study is a strand of literature that explores the effects
of receiving regular utility bills, which contain expenditure information similar to the BTA, on
residential energy and water use. Gilbert and Graff Zivin (2014) show that customers reduce electricity demand by 0.6 to 1 percent in the week immediately following the receipt of a bill, but
consumption returns to the customers’ baseline quickly after the first week. The higher treatment
frequency in this study may explain why we observe reductions of this magnitude throughout the
entire billing cycle. Sexton (2015) presents evidence showing that less salient billing information
can lead to increases in energy use. Customers who use automatic bill payment services, which
arguably reduce the need to pay attention to a specific bill, consume more electricity than cus11 We

limit the discussion in this paper to studies assessing household energy consumption. The government’s
energy-efficiency policy also relies heavily on information provision, for example in the form of product labels and
energy audits (e.g., Anderson and Newell, 2004; Gillingham et al., 2006, 2009; Davis and Metcalf, 2016). Several
recent studies also focus on misinformation in the market for energy-efficient durables (e.g., Allcott et al., 2014;
Allcott and Taubinsky, 2015).
12 Examples of experimental work in the energy sector include the provision of in-home technology that allows
customers to observe usage and prices in (almost) real-time (Faruqui et al., 2010; Houde et al., 2013; Jessoe and
Rapson, 2014; Tiefenbeck et al., 2016), personalized information campaigns that educate customers about the pricing structure or their consumption patterns (Kahn and Wolak, 2013; Pellerano et al., 2015), and the comparison of
a customer’s usage to the consumption of other customers in the neighborhood (Allcott, 2011c; Allcott and Rogers,
2014).
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tomers who pay bills through other means. In contrast to Sexton (2015), we estimate how more
salient information affects energy use. In that sense, our approach is most similar to Wichman
(2017), who uses quasi-experimental techniques to document increases in water demand after
a change from bimonthly to monthly billing. However, in contrast to the constant decision environment in this study, changes in the billing frequency or payment mode may affect behavior
directly independent of the information component.
More broadly, this research contributes to a growing body of work considering the effectiveness of information provision as a policy tool. Consistent with previous studies, we show that
customers respond to feedback in situations where information is scarce or not salient (DellaVigna, 2009). Our results also support conjectures in earlier work that postulate a complementary relationship between information provision and traditional economic incentives (Ferraro
and Price, 2013; Jessoe and Rapson, 2014; Strong and Goemans, 2015; Harding and Lamarche,
2016). If customers are not well-informed about important product attributes, price changes will
likely fall short of policy objectives. We also provide insights into optimal policy design. The
existing literature suggests that a high treatment frequency may cause choice fatigue (Iyengar
and Lepper, 2000; Levav et al., 2010; Augenblick and Nicholson, 2016) or information overload with “spam” (Eppler and Mengis, 2004; Anderson and de Palma, 2009, 2012). We cannot
conclusively rule out these factors, but the persistence of treatment effects suggests that weekly
treatment delivery may not be a major concern in this setting. Finally, our experiment speaks to
an emerging literature considering details in the framing and presentation of information (Saez,
2009; Bertrand et al., 2010; Kamenica, 2012). In our experiment, small changes in the administration of the BTA have sizable impacts on energy use.
This study is not without limitations. Most importantly, the experimental design does not allow us to distinguish between competing theories that could explain the reductions in usage. We
assess an intervention that contains several distinct elements without the necessary variation in
message content to attribute behavior to specific elements. For example, customers in the treatment group may use expenditure information to re-optimize their consumption decisions (Brent
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et al., 2017b; Wichman, 2017) or the intervention may increase the salience of natural gas usage
irrespective of the information contained in each message (Chetty et al., 2009; Finkelstein, 2009).
These channels may have different implications for the welfare of treated customers. We believe
that a better understanding of why repeated expenditure messages affect consumer choice is an
important inquiry for future research.
Section 2 introduces the regulatory background, experimental design, and treatment in more
detail. Section 3 presents the average treatment effects over the course of the intervention period.
In section 4, we document the seasonal patterns of treatment effects and discuss potential mechanisms for the adjustments in energy use. Section 5 explores how treatment effects vary in the
short run and over time. We provide several additional findings in section 6 before we conclude
and suggest areas for future research in section 7.
2

Policy Background, Experimental Design, and Data

This section provides detailed information about the experiment. We first describe the policy
background. We then discuss the design and implementation of the experiment, with a focus on
the content of the treatment messages. Next, we explain our sample and data. The section concludes by providing evidence of a successful randomization.
2.1

Policy Background

We use data from a four-year conservation campaign implemented by the Southern California
Gas Company (SoCalGas). SoCalGas is the nation’s largest natural gas distribution utility and
delivers energy to more than 21 million consumers in Southern California.13,14 The campaign
was part of SoCalGas’s Advanced Meter Project, which is an effort to extend advanced metering
infrastructure, often referred to as “smart meters”, to around six million households in the service
13 The service territory reaches throughout Central and Southern California, from Visalia to the Mexican border.
The only exception is San Diego County, which is served by SoCalGas’s sister utility, San Diego Gas & Electric.
Both utilities are owned by Sempra Energy.
14 The main uses of natural gas in the residential sector are central heating, gas furnaces, water boilers, gas stoves,
and clothes dryers. About half of all U.S. homes use natural gas for heating; almost 60 percent of U.S. homes use
natural gas in some form. These numbers are larger on the West Coast, where this study took place (EIA, 2015a).
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area of the utility. In its authorization decision of the project, the regulator specified a one-percent
savings goal for the campaign.15
SoCalGas designed the core elements of the campaign as a natural field experiment in the terminology of Harrison and List (2004). Residential customers who received a smart meter were
subsequently assigned to one of several information treatments. The campaign lasted from October 2013 to March 2017 because the installation of smart meters took several years. SoCalGas
adopted a “test and learn” approach, where treatments in later years of the campaign were chosen
based on their effectiveness in earlier years.
To isolate the effects of the different information treatments, SoCalGas administered all treatments without changes to other elements of the choice environment, such as the monthly billing
cycle, payment process, accessible technology in the home, or the economic incentives. Each
customer received the same make and model smart meter free of charge. The meter was installed
and activated by certified technicians, and SoCalGas did not provide additional technology, such
as in-home displays or programmable thermostats.
2.2

Program Description and Experimental Design

This study focuses on the Bill Tracker Alert (BTA), a treatment in the third year of the conservation campaign. The BTA is a weekly email that provides information about a customer’s past,
current, and projected natural gas expenditure throughout the billing cycle: (i) the current billto-date; (ii) a projected bill assuming constant patterns of usage;16 (iii) last month’s bill; and (iv)
the bill in the same month of last year. Figure 1 provides an example. Customers receive a BTA
every Wednesday between 9 am and 6 pm year-round.17
15 The

one-percent savings goal was proposed by SoCalGas in Application A.08-09-023 and upheld by the California Public Utilities Commission in Decision D.10-04-027 without change.
16 The projections are generated by a proprietary formula that considers pricing tiers and past usage. SoCalGas
transmits data to a vendor that generates the projections. A naïve extrapolation comes close but tends to underestimate the BTA’s content slightly.
17 There are two exceptions. SoCalGas did not generate a BTA if there are less than 4 full days of usage data in
the current billing cycle or when the customer is scheduled to receive a bill in the same week. The reason for these
rules is to avoid providing inexact projections and delivery of two different expenditure signals (BTA and regular
bill) within a few days. Because of several factors, such as a sudden change in temperature, the final bill amount
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Figure 1: The Bill Tracker Alert

(a) Text BTA

(b) Visual BTA

Notes: Example Bill Tracker Alert (BTA) treatment messages. Panel (a) shows the “Text BTA”;
panel (b) the “Visual BTA”. Treated customers were randomly assigned to one version and received the same version throughout the experiment.

The BTA’s design shares important similarities with other popular information programs.
Aided by modern technology and data availability, utilities, mobile phone providers, banks, and
many other firms increasingly provide information services. Details of these services differ by
sector and firm. For example, firms may alert customers of specific usage or expenditure thresholds, provide general information that makes expenditure or usage more salient throughout the
billing cycle, or notify customers when a new pricing tier is reached. In many cases, these sercould differ significantly from the projected bill amount in the BTA. This possibility raised concerns about customer
complaints. Unfortunately, we do not observe the delivery dates of regular bills.
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vices are offered on a voluntary basis to interested customers. In other cases, information programs are encouraged by the regulator. The most prominent example is an agreement between
the Federal Communications Commission and cellular firms that requires firms to deliver usage
alerts before customers exceed a plan’s allowance (Grubb, 2015; Grubb and Osborne, 2015).18
The BTA is delivered to the primary email address of the main account holder. SoCalGas
also allowed customers to change their delivery preference to text messages. As of August 2017,
about 10 percent of customers actively changed the default delivery. 6 percent of customers only
receive text messages and 4 percent chose to receive both emails and text messages. The content of the BTA is almost identical across the two delivery channels. The only difference is that
the text message omits the days that have elapsed in the current billing cycle because of a 160character limit for text messages. Figure A1 in the appendix provides an example of the text message version.
SoCalGas also varied two details in the administration of the BTA. First, treated customers
received one of two different message designs, which we present in Figure 1. The “Text BTA”
in panel (a) describes the information verbally, whereas the “Visual BTA” in panel (b) uses bar
charts to visualize the same information. Second, some customers received supplemental materials in addition to the BTA. The materials consisted of several emails and letters that introduced
customers to the program, encouraged the use of energy tools within the MyAccount online portal, and provided energy savings tips.
Based on this design, SoCalGas assigned each customer to one of five mutually exclusive
groups: a control group and four BTA treatment subgroups. Figure 2 summarizes the treatment
assignment and the corresponding sample sizes. The timing, content, and frequency of the BTA
was identical across all subgroups and did not change over the course of the campaign. Treated
customers were automatically enrolled in the program, but could opt out through two channels:
18 Typically, data usage or calls that exceed a plan’s allowance are charged at a very high marginal price. Because
it is difficult to observe past usage, the price change may not be transparent to the user. The agreement aims to reduce “bill shock”, the receipt of unexpectedly high bills.
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Figure 2: Experimental Design and Treatment Assignment
Qualifying
Customers
(N = 154, 202)

Treatment
(N = 80, 000)

Control
(N = 74, 202)

Visual BTA
(N = 40, 000)

Text BTA
(N = 40, 000)

No
Materials
(N = 20, 000)

Supplemental
Materials
(N = 20, 000)

No
Materials
(N = 20, 000)

Supplemental
Materials
(N = 20, 000)

Notes: Qualifying customers were randomly assigned to a mutually exclusive control or treatment group. Control customers did not receive any correspondence from SoCalGas. Treated
customers received the BTA every Wednesday. Within the treatment group, customers were
randomly assigned to one of four subgroups that varied in terms of two program details: (i) two
versions of the BTA as shown in Figure 1; and (ii) the delivery of supplemental materials, including letters and emails with program information and energy savings tips. We show supplemental
materials in the appendix, Figure A3 to Figure A8. We pool all treatment groups for our main
specifications.

(i) the MyAccount online portal; and (ii) SoCalGas’s customer hotline. Less than two percent of
customers unsubscribed from the BTA.
To maximize statistical power, and because most results do not rely on a distinction between
the treatment cells, we pool customers in all four BTA subgroups for our main specifications. We
examine differences among the subgroups in section 6.1.
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Figure 3: Timeline of the Experiment
Jun2015

Nov2015

Jun2017

Begin of
Sample

First
BTA

End of
Sample
Text BTA
Visual BTA
Supplemental letter
Supplemental email

Notes: Customers in the treatment group start receiving BTAs in the first week of November
2015. Customers receive up to three types of communications: (i) short vertical lines denote the
weekly BTA for all customers in any BTA treatment group; (ii) red vertical lines represent supplemental letters that were mailed to customers; and (iii) blue vertical lines show the receipt of
supplemental emails. Only customers in the treatment groups with supplemental materials receive the additional letters and emails. The timing, frequency, and content of the BTA is identical
across treatment groups. BTAs are generated and delivered every Wednesday from 9 am to 6 pm
local time.

Figure 3 summarizes the timeline of the experiment. We begin observing daily consumption
data in June 2015. SoCalGas delivered the first BTA and a welcome email in the first week of
November 2015. Customers in the two subgroups with supplemental materials also received additional emails in January 2016 and March 2016, and mailed letters in November 2015, January
2016, and February 2016. Figure A3 to Figure A8 in the appendix present supplemental materials. We observe daily consumption until July 1, 2017.
2.3

Sample Description

Our sample consists of 154,202 residential customers who meet five selection criteria: (i) only
customers with an active smart meter by June 1, 2015, were included; (ii) customers were required to have at least twelve months of historical usage data to ensure that past expenditure data
was available; (iii) only the top two usage quartiles were sampled to maximize the savings po-
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tential of the program;19 (iv) CARE participants, SoCalGas’s low-income subsidy program, were
excluded; and (v) SoCalGas only included customers with an active MyAccount subscription at
the time of the randomization in order to have access to an active email address.20
SoCalGas assigned 20,000 customers randomly to each of the four treatment subgroups and
the remaining households to a joint control group. Figure A2 in the appendix plots the geographic
distribution of households in our sample, which are predominantly located in and around Los Angeles County in Southern California.
2.4

Data Description

We use data from several administrative sources. The main data are more than 117 million daily
observations of natural gas consumption from June 1, 2015, to July 1, 2017. Based on discussions with SoCalGas, we exclude a small number of extreme outliers. We do not use negative
reads (N = 64) or reads above 71.8 therms per day (N = 526; the 99th percentile of daily consumption is 7.18 therms). In addition to consumption data, we have access to monthly billing
data from January 2014 to June 2017. For each bill, we observe the total consumption and monthly
utility charge.
Panel A in Table 1 provides summary statistics for the pre-experiment period. Between June
1 and October 31, 2015, the average customer used about 0.7 therms per day (with a standard deviation, σ, of 0.6).21 From June 2014 to October 2015, average monthly gas usage was about 39
therms (σ = 25.8), and the average utility bill was $48 (σ = 31.7).22 The total amount of natural
19 SoCalGas

excluded low-use customers from information treatments based on insights from the first and second year of the conservation campaign and previous findings in the literature showing no responses to non-price
interventions by customers in the lowest usage deciles (Allcott, 2011c; Ferraro and Price, 2013).
20 MyAccount is SoCalGas’s customer online portal. It provides bill overviews, historical usage feedback, bill
payment capabilities, and information about ways to save energy. Another reason for requiring MyAccount participation was that the regulator mandated that information collected through smart meters had to be made available
to all customers. Fulfilling this mandate without obstructing a clean measurement of the impact of the conservation
campaign required a baseline intervention. All customers, including the control groups, were invited to use the MyAccount portal after installation of the smart meter. Our estimated treatment effects are always net of effects that
may be caused by the access to MyAccount.
21 1 therm describes a unit of heat energy equal to 100,000 British thermal units (BTU).
22 Customer are billed for three elements: (i) procurement costs based on forecasts of wholesale market conditions;
(ii) transportation costs that cover gas delivery and infrastructure investments; and (iii) public purpose surcharges,
such as fees to fund the California Alternate Rates for Energy program or R&D expenses.
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Table 1: Pre-Experiment Summary Statistics and Treatment Balance
All
(N = 154, 202)

Control
(N = 74, 202)

BTA
(N = 80, 000)

Difference
(µBTA − µC )

0.7017
(0.5989)
38.9249
(25.7722)
47.8798
(31.7329)

0.7014
(0.6022)
38.9545
(26.1115)
47.9026
(32.0809)

0.7019
(0.5959)
38.8974
(25.4535)
47.8586
(31.4068)

0.0005
(0.88)
-0.0571
(0.66)
-0.0440
(0.79)

1.0553
(0.0138)
0.0396
(0.1950)
0.6689
(0.4706)
0.1449
(0.3520)
13.2862
(10.7344)

1.0552
(0.0133)
0.0401
(0.1963)
0.6688
(0.4706)
0.1440
(0.3511)
13.3157
(10.7558)

1.0554
(0.0143)
0.0391
(0.1937)
0.6690
(0.4706)
0.1457
(0.3528)
13.2587
(10.7144)

0.0002
(0.01)
-0.0010
(0.28)
0.0002
(0.94)
0.0017
(0.34)
-0.0570
(0.30)

0.9887
(0.1059)
0.8485
(0.3586)
0.9478
(0.2224)

0.9887
(0.1055)
0.8493
(0.3578)
0.9481
(0.2219)

0.9886
(0.1062)
0.8477
(0.3593)
0.9476
(0.2228)

-0.0001
(0.77)
-0.0016
(0.39)
-0.0005
(0.70)

Panel A: Usage Behavior and Billing
Daily Usage
Monthly Usage
Total Bill
Panel B: Account Details
Billing Factor
1(Level Pay)
1(Paperless Billing)
1(Account Closure)
Account Tenure (Years)
Panel C: Property Characteristics
1(Individually Metered)
1(Single Dwelling)
1(Property in Climate Zone 1)

Notes: Summary statistics for the full sample and by treatment group in the pre-experiment
period (June to October 2015). We report means and the corresponding standard deviations in
parantheses. Column 2 reports averages and standard deviations for all customers; column 3
and 4 restrict the sample to customers in the control and pooled treatment group, respectively.
Column 5 presents differences in raw means between the control and pooled BTA group, and
the p-values of two-sample t-Tests in parentheses. Table A1 in the appendix reports the same
information by BTA treatment subgroup.
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gas delivered to a customer is adjusted by a billing factor to reflect the heat value of gas at different altitudes. SoCalGas uses two pricing tiers for residential customers: (i) a baseline allowance
with a low marginal price; and (ii) consumption above the allowance at a higher marginal price.
We also obtained customer-specific data, such as the treatment assignment, account activation
and deactivation dates, and indicators for participation in other utility programs. Panel B in Table
1 reports the corresponding averages and standard deviations. Around four percent of customers
participate in the Level Pay Plan, which is a payment plan that distributes annual energy charges
equally over twelve months. Approximately two-thirds of customers in our sample receive paperless bills in June 2017. In total, about 15 percent of customers close their account during our
sample window or around 5 percent per year.23 Most accounts were closed because the main account holder moved out of the home. The average customer has received natural gas service from
SoCalGas for about 13 years.
The third data type at our disposal is limited information about each property. This information is summarized in panel C of Table 1. Almost 99 percent of all customers live in homes that
are individually metered. The remaining one percent live in properties that are centrally metered,
such as trailer parks, condominiums, or apartments with a master meter. About 85 percent of customers live in detached single-family homes, about 7.5 percent live on properties with two to four
connected dwellings, and the remaining 7.5 percent inhabit a home with five or more connected
dwellings, such as apartment complexes. SoCalGas divides its service area into three different
climate zones. Close to 95 percent of the customers in our sample live in climate zone 1, about 5
percent live in climate zone 2, and 38 customers live in climate zone 3.24
Lastly, we collected daily weather data from January 2014 to June 2017 via NOAA’s Climate
Data Online search tool.25 Because most of our sample is from the Los Angeles metropolitan
23 We present main results after exclusion of all customers who deactivate their account during the sample period
in Table A3 in the appendix. Account closure rates match similar programs in the literature (Allcott, 2011c; Brandon
et al., 2017).
24 SoCalGas defines the three climate zones as follows. Zone 1: Basin, Valley, South Coast, Low and High
Deserts; zone 2: Central Coast and the San Joaquin Valley; zone 3: High Elevation Mountains.
25 See https://www.ncdc.noaa.gov/cdo-web/
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area, we use the average temperature reported by the Los Angeles International Airport (LAX)
weather station. Therefore, the data only vary over time but not across households.
2.5

Validation of the Randomization

Table 1 also establishes the balance of the experiment. Columns 3 and 4 present raw averages
and standard deviations for all variables by treatment group. In the last column, we compare the
means in the control group to those in the pooled treatment group and report corresponding pvalues of a two-sample t-Test in parentheses. Differences between the two groups are statistically
insignificant.26 Table A1 in the appendix provides an analogous overview for all four BTA subgroups, which are also well-balanced.
Figure 4 focuses on the main dependent variable in our analysis. We plot the average daily
consumption in the pre-experiment period separately for the pooled treatment and control group.
The figure shows that the level of consumption in the two groups overlaps almost perfectly on all
days, providing further evidence of a successful randomization. Figure 4 also highlights substantial variation in natural gas demand in the short and medium run. One reason for spikes in usage
is increased demand on weekends, when customers are more likely to be at home. To understand
the remaining fluctuations in use, we overlay the graph with the average daily temperature (gray
dashed line). We see an inverse relationship between outside temperature and gas consumption.
The reason for this relationship is that natural gas has four main uses in the average U.S. home:
(i) central heating and natural gas furnaces; (ii) water boilers; (iii) clothes dryers; and (iv) gas
stoves. The first two uses are strongly and negatively correlated with outside temperature. We
will use this observation in the analysis below.
In the lower half of Figure 4, we present the differences in average consumption between the
treatment and control group. We also report the corresponding 95 percent confidence intervals,
which include zero on all days. Considering all evidence, we find strong support for a successful
randomization.
26 The

only exception is the billing factor, which differs significantly across treatment groups. However, the magnitude of the difference is very small, and we are not concerned that this imbalance could affect our estimates.
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Figure 4: Pre-Experiment Consumption and Balance
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Notes: The top panel plots average hourly consumption for the control (µC ) and pooled treatment
(µBTA ) groups for each day in the pre-experiment period (June 1 to October 31, 2015). The gray
dashed line represents the average temperature in degree Fahrenheit on a certain day. The bottom panel plots the differences in raw means between the treatment and control group and the
corresponding 95 percent confidence intervals for the same time period.
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3

The Effect of Weekly Expenditure Messages on Natural Gas Consumption

In this section, we establish the average treatment effect of the BTA. We first describe our identification strategy, which relies on the successful randomization of customers into treatment and
control. We then estimate treatment effects using daily and monthly consumption data from November 2015 to June 2017. We conclude this section by comparing our findings to the existing literature.
3.1

Identification Strategy and Empirical Approach

We estimate a simple model of customer demand for natural gas following Allcott and Rogers
(2014) and List et al. (2017). Intuitively, we compare the consumption of treated customers after receipt of the BTA to control customers’ consumption in the same period. Because customers
were randomly assigned to treatment, consumption in the control group does not differ in expectation from consumption in the treatment group in absence of any intervention. By comparing
average use across the groups during the treatment period, we identify the average treatment effect (ATE) of receiving the BTA.27 We estimate the ATE using ordinary least squares:

Gasit = β0 + τBTAi + β1 GasPre
i + µt + εit

(1)

where Gasit is the gas consumption (in therms) by customer i in period t. Depending on the
specification, t represents daily or monthly consumption data. BTAi is a binary indicator for random assignment of customer i to receipt of the BTA. The coefficient τ is the main quantity of
interest and describes the ATE. A negative τ implies that the treatment group uses less natural
gas than the control group; a positive τ implies that treated customers increase their consumption. GasPre
is the average daily energy use of customer i in the pre-experiment period, i.e., bei
tween June 1 and October 31, 2015. We include this variable to linearly control for baseline us27 Technically,

we estimate an intent-to-treat (ITT) effect of expenditure information because we cannot observe
compliance with the treatment, i.e., we do not know whether a customer opened the email or text message and saw
the information.
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age and increase precision. Our specification also includes period fixed effects, µt , to adjust for
time-varying shocks common to all households in period t. εit is an individual and period-specific
error term. We report clustered standard errors that are robust to heteroskedasticity and arbitrary
autocorrelation within cluster i.
We estimate Equation 1 using the level of consumption (in therms) as the dependent variable
because days with zero usage are not uncommon.28 Such observations represent true information
and typically reflect warmer days for households that only use gas for heating. In our sample,
about 0.7 percent of observations show no positive usage. To provide treatment effects that are
easy to interpret, we always report the average consumption in the control group for the period of
interest and express the estimated treatment effect in percent of that baseline.
In Table A2 in the appendix, we report results of a more traditional difference-in-differences
model with household fixed effects for comparison. Point estimates and conclusions are virtually
identical. We also report estimates from a variant of Equation 1 that uses an alternative measure
of pre-experiment usage in Table A5 in the appendix. In this specification, we use billing data to
calculate the average total monthly consumption for each month-of-year from January 2014 to
October 2015. This approach provides better controls for the seasonality in natural gas consumption because of the longer time series. We then substitute this measure of pre-experiment usage
for GasPre
in Equation 1. All conclusions hold.
i
3.2

Average Treatment Effects

Table 2 summarizes the average treatment effects. Column 1 reports results from Equation 1
applied to daily consumption data. In column 2, we estimate an analogous model using total
monthly natural gas consumption from billing data. The regression results document the average
effect of receiving weekly BTAs on natural gas use over the course of the 20-month treatment period. This approach does not consider differences over time or across customer groups, a question
we return to in later sections.
28 Table

A4 in the appendix presents results from estimating a model analogous to Equation 1 with ln(Gasit ) as the
dependent variable. Quantitative and qualitative conclusions are consistent.
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Table 2: Average Treatment Effects

Consumption Data
(1)
(2)
Daily Use
Monthly Use
(therms)
(therms)
Treatment (τ)

-0.0120***
(0.0031)
Usage or Charge Control 0.8786***
(0.0101)
Control Average
Percent of Control
R2
N

Billing Data
(3)
Monthly Charge
($)

-0.4010***
(0.0725)
0.8570***
(0.0057)

-0.5116***
(0.0924)
0.8664***
(0.0061)

1.44
0.833

48.56
0.826

59.18
0.864

0.331
93,773,205

0.684
2,845,872

0.661
2,845,872

Notes: The dependent variable is daily natural gas usage (in therms) in column 1, monthly natural gas usage (in therms) in column 2, and the total monthly utility charge (in $) in column 3.
Models are defined as in Equation 1 and include day-of-sample or month-of-sample fixed effects.
The analysis is restricted to the treatment period, i.e., November 2015 and later. We control for
the average pre-experiment usage at the customer level (“Usage Control”) or alternatively the
average monthly charge between January 2014 and October 2015 at the customer level (“Charge
Control”). We report robust standard errors that are clustered at the household level for all specifications. *** denotes significance at the 1 percent level, ** at the 5 percent level, and * at the 10
percent level.

Table 2 shows substantial differences in energy consumption between treatment and control.
The average customer in the treatment group reduces daily natural gas consumption by about
0.012 therms compared to counterparts in the control group, an effect that is statistically significant at the 1 percent level. This reduction represents more than 0.8 percent of the average consumption in the control group. Using total monthly consumption as the dependent variable, we
find similar estimates.29 The average monthly treatment effect is about 0.4 therms, which corresponds to energy savings of around 5 therms per calendar year and household.
29 Bill cycles and calendar months do not coincide for most customers. Therefore, monthly billing data cannot be
mapped exactly to the treatment period. Because bills undergo additional data checks that may eliminate concerns
about misreads or problems with data transmission, we provide estimates based on these data for robustness. We also
have access to a longer pre-experiment time series of billing data, which explains why the monthly coefficient differs
slightly from the daily coefficient scaled by the number of days in a month.
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We can compare these effects to engineering estimates of the natural gas inputs required to
produce specific household services. For example, a typical range surface unit uses about 0.09
therms per hour of use, and a clothes dryer requires 0.2 therms per hour of use.30 Thus, the behavioral changes necessary to achieve the estimated reductions in natural gas consumption are
modest.31
Another regulatory objective is to help customers save money. To understand the impact of
the treatment on customer bills, column 3 of Table 2 reports results from an alternative specification of Equation 1 that uses the monthly total utility charge as the dependent variable. Intuitively,
this approach estimates the average monthly savings caused by the BTA. Results suggest that the
treatment causes average monthly savings of approximately $0.5. Relative to an average bill of
around $59 in the control group, this treatment effect corresponds to financial savings of 0.86 percent. Over the course of a calendar year, customers in the treatment group pay about $6 less for
their natural gas service than control households.
The estimates in Table 2 offer three important insights. First, informed customers respond to
the receipt of weekly expenditure messages by adjusting their natural gas consumption. Second,
the BTA encourages customers to reduce their natural gas usage. Our result is broadly consistent with other work reporting energy conservation in response to the provision of information
(Ehrhardt-Martinez et al., 2010; Allcott, 2011c; Houde et al., 2013; Kahn and Wolak, 2013). One
exception is Wichman (2017), who shows increases in water use after customers receive more
frequent information. Differences among these studies may be caused by differences in the information structure of a specific market—if households initially underestimate prices or quantities, they will reduce demand after receiving additional information (Kahn and Wolak, 2013;
Davis and Metcalf, 2016). The converse is true if customers overestimate prices or quantities. In
our case, results suggest that customers use the information contained in the BTA—or the fre30 See http://www.peoplesgasdelivery.com/home/gas_calculator.aspx for an overview of efficiency ratings for many
common appliances and uses of natural gas.
31 Importantly, this comparison assumes that all customers undertake the same adjustments. It is likely that some
customers reduce energy demand substantially, while other customers do not respond to the treatment at all.
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quent reminder about natural gas use—to reduce consumption.32 Third, the program achieves
reductions in consumption that are very close to and statistically indistinguishable from the onepercent policy objective of the conservation campaign.
Our approach shares similarities with previous work. While the literature generally focuses
on price-based interventions, several studies consider quantity and expenditure information.33
For example, Kahn and Wolak (2013) use past consumption data to educate customers about
their position on the non-linear pricing schedule typical for energy use. The authors also complement the intervention with engineering estimates used to show treated households how much
they could save on future bills by taking specific actions. Jessoe and Rapson (2014) test whether
in-home displays, which allow customers to track prices, quantities, and the current bill-to-date
in (almost) real-time, affect the sensitivity of customers to critical peak pricing events. Customers
with technology in their homes respond significantly stronger to changes in the economic incentives than counterparts who do not have access to the technology, but there is no strong evidence
of differences in use prior to price changes.34
Perhaps most closely related to this study is a set of three recent papers that aim to understand
how regular utility bills affect consumer choice. Gilbert and Graff Zivin (2014) estimate that customers reduce consumption by 0.6 to 1 percent in the week following the receipt of a standard
electricity bill. After the first week, however, usage quickly returns to a household’s baseline.
The similarities in the estimated treatment effects may reflect that more frequent expenditure
information reinforces the information contained in a regular bill. Treated customers in our ex32 The

BTA may affect behavior by acting like a “nudge” or by providing useful information that households can
use to re-optimize their natural gas consumption.
33 The magnitude of our treatment effects is also comparable to social nudges in the energy space. For example,
Allcott (2015) finds that neighborhood comparisons cause reliable reductions in electricity usage of 1 to 2 percent
across more than 100 experimental sites. Neighborhood comparisons typically compare a customer’s consumption
(in kWh) to that of similar households.
34 Similar technology has been tested in pilot studies for decades (Price, 2014). A recent summary of this work
in Faruqui et al. (2010) finds that consumption decreases by up to 7 percent after customers gain access to in-home
displays, on average. Houde et al. (2013) report effects of a similar magnitude. It is important to consider the costs to
the utility (or the policy maker) of providing such enabling technology. Conditional on the roll-out of smart meters,
an intervention like the BTA is exceptionally inexpensive because the marginal cost of delivering emails is negligible and data needed to populate the messages are collected routinely. The BTA also does not require costly training
programs or additional information to teach customers how to use new in-home technology effectively.
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periment respond to more salient information about energy expenditure. Sexton (2015) finds
increases in usage when bills become less salient because of a change in the payment method.
Customers who use automatic bill payments, a payment service that arguably reduces the need
to pay attention to individual bills, use around 4 percent more than counterparts that pay bills
manually. Wichman (2017) reports results that contrast with our findings. The author uses quasiexperimental techniques to estimate that a switch from bimonthly to monthly billing frequency
increases water demand substantially.
Our experiment provides important methodological improvements over the existing literature. Because the BTA is administered in a decision environment that is otherwise unchanged,
we can attribute changes in consumption to the receipt of the BTA. In contrast, studies that provide information through changes to the billing frequency, payment mode, or technology in the
home may confound the effects of information with changes to other parameters of the decision
environment that can affect consumption directly. For example, an increase in the payment frequency may have direct effects on consumption irrespective of the information contained in more
frequent bills. Similarly, in-home technology may reduce the cost of making specific adjustments
to energy use, such as automatically changing the temperature in the home with the help of a programmable thermostat. We can also mitigate concerns about the self-selection of customers into
information treatments that are common to other papers in the literature (Price, 2014). Finally,
we consider simple expenditure information that is inexpensive to provide and easy to process
for customers, who are used to similar data that are contained in regular bills. The BTA provides
information about overall expenditure rather than specific usage margins or targeted times for
reductions in demand (Jessoe and Rapson, 2014; Tiefenbeck et al., 2016).
We can also compare the magnitude of our ATE to traditional policy instruments. By using
estimates of the price elasticity of demand for natural gas, we can express our treatment effects in
analogous changes to the natural gas rate. The literature typically finds that natural gas demand is
highly inelastic in the short-run, with estimates of the elasticity ranging from −0.1 to −0.2 (AlSahlawi, 1989; Maddala et al., 1997; Krichene, 2002). A more recent approach in Hahn and Met-
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calfe (2017) uses a random encouragement design to induce the take-up of a low-income price
subsidy in California. The authors randomly assign customers to different incentives for take-up
and use this random assignment as an instrument for subsequent price changes. The resulting estimates suggest a price elasticity of around −0.35 for compliers with the encouragement. Based
on this range of elasticities, substantial short-run price increases of 2.5 to 10 percent would be
necessary to achieve reductions in natural gas demand equivalent to the treatment effects in Table
2.
4

Understanding Changes in Natural Gas Consumption

The average treatment effect is an important measure of the program’s success. However, it is
equally important to understand when and why treatment effects arise. In this section, we explore
the timing of reductions in natural gas consumption and aim to identify the underlying mechanisms responsible for these reductions. To determine the timing, we first present treatment effects
by season. Next, we use detailed consumption data and outside temperature to understand what
could be driving the changes we observe.
4.1

Seasonal Differences in Treatment Effects

The timing of reductions in use is important because natural gas demand in the U.S. is highly
seasonal. In the winter heating season, from November to March, demand spikes significantly because natural gas is used as the primary input for central heating, gas furnaces, and water boilers.
Customers in our sample use around 150 percent more natural gas on the average winter day than
during other months. To complement limited supply, natural gas providers rely on costly storage
facilities that dispense stored natural gas when needed.35 Similar to concerns about peak demand
in the electricity sector, natural gas providers must size pipeline and storage infrastructure to meet
peak demand (EIA, 2015b).
35 Historically,

natural gas has been stored during the summer, when prices are low. However, recent changes in
the composition of electricity generation have led to an upward pressure on natural gas prices in the summer (EIA,
2015b). This development raises concerns about the ability of natural gas suppliers to store low-cost gas (Shahidehpour et al., 2005; Brown and Yücel, 2008).
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Peak demand also raises concerns about the price level and price volatility of natural gas.
Spot market prices for natural gas and monthly futures depend on the supply and demand conditions in the market. Unfavorable forecasts of weather conditions, particularly long cold spells,
and low storage levels can cause prices to rise substantially. For example, the Polar Vortex of
2014 led to considerable price increases and pipeline constraints in some regions of the country,
such as in the Northeast (EIA, 2014; NERC, 2014).36 Because supply and infrastructure are more
likely to be constrained in the winter heating season, natural gas prices are more volatile in that
period than during other seasons (Mu, 2007; Geman and Ohana, 2009). These factors imply that
reductions in consumption during high-demand periods in the winter are valuable to the utility
and regulator.
Our data provide a natural test for when treatment effects occur. To identify the timing of
treatment effects, we estimate Equation 1 separately by season. We define a winter heating season, November 1 to March 31, and a non-winter season that captures all other months, i.e., May 1
to October 31.
We present the results of four separate regressions in Table 3. Columns 1 and 2 use daily consumption data, whereas columns 3 and 4 use total monthly use. Irrespective of the underlying
data, we find striking differences between the two seasons. The average customer in the treatment
group reduces daily demand by around 0.004 therms outside of the winter season. In the winter,
treatment effects grow considerably, and the average informed customer uses approximately 0.02
therms less than counterparts in the control group. This change represents an increase in the treatment effect of almost 350 percent. Similarly, monthly treatment effects increase by more than
200 percent in the winter heating season. All differences are statistically significant at the 1 percent level.
Our results show that reductions occur precisely when demand is highest and when policy
makers are most interested in encouraging energy conservation. One concern about this interpretation is that increases may simply be caused by a larger baseline level of natural gas consump36 Climate

scientists generally predict that the likelihood of severe weather events will increase in the future
(CCSP, 2008).
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Table 3: Seasonal Differences in Treatment Responses

Daily Consumption
(1)
(2)
Winter
Other
Treatment (τ)
Usage Control
Control Average
Percent of Control
R2
N

Monthly Consumption
(3)
(4)
Winter
Other

-0.0198***
(0.0050)
0.8682***
(0.0125)

-0.0044**
(0.0020)
0.8889***
(0.0096)

-0.5996*** -0.1956***
(0.1051)
(0.0630)
0.8776*** 0.8016***
(0.0068)
(0.0077)

2.04
0.971

0.84
0.524

67.36
0.890

29.37
0.666

0.267
46,677,359

0.191
47,095,846

0.651
1,437,735

0.554
1,408,137

Notes: The dependent variable is daily natural gas usage (in therms) in columns 1 and 2, monthly
natural gas usage (in therms) in columns 3 and 4. Models are defined as in Equation 1 and include day-of-sample or month-of-sample fixed effects. The analysis is restricted to the treatment
period, i.e., November 2015 and later. We control for the average pre-experiment usage at the
customer level (“Usage Control”). Columns 1 and 3 restrict the sample to observations in winter
months (November to March) and columns 2 and 4 to observations in all other months (April to
October). We report robust standard errors that are clustered at the household level for all specifications. *** denotes significance at the 1 percent level, ** at the 5 percent level, and * at the 10
percent level.

tion in the winter. However, we also show that effects relative to the average consumption in the
control group increase substantially in the winter. We find that treatment effects in the winter are
about 85 percent or almost 0.5 percentage points larger than in other periods (reductions of 0.97
vs. 0.52 percent). This finding suggests that customers have access to margins for adjustment in
the winter that may not be available during other periods. We explore candidate mechanisms in
detail below.
4.2

Outside Temperature and Adjustment Mechanisms

The seasonal results document stark differences in the effect of the BTA on use over time. One
of the likely reasons for this pattern is that home and water heating account for a large proportion
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of total natural gas consumption. What makes this set of uses interesting is that demand for heating fuel correlates strongly and negatively with outside temperature—an exogenous factor that
we can measure reliably (Mu, 2007; Geman and Ohana, 2009). While seasonal analysis ignores
variation within each season, we can directly link daily consumption data and daily temperature
data.
For each day, we collected temperature data from the Los Angeles International Airport (LAX)
weather station. From these data, we construct several proxies for heating fuel demand: (i) heating degree days (HDD),37 which measure the difference between the observed average temperature and 65 degrees Fahrenheit for days colder than 65 degrees;38 (ii) cooling degree days (CDD),
which provide an analogous measure for days warmer than 65 degrees; (iii) binary indicators for
days above (“warm”) and below (“cold”) 65 degrees; and (iv) binary indicators for days below
60 degrees (“very cold”) and above 69 degrees (“very warm”), which denote the 25th and 75th
percentile of average temperature, respectively.
In a final step, we estimate versions of Equation 1 that allow the treatment effect to vary with
different realizations of the proxies. In the case of degree days, we interact our binary treatment
indicator with the HDD or CDD variables. We also present results from separate estimations of
Equation 1 for each value of the indicators resulting in (iii) and (iv).
Table 4 presents an overview of the resulting estimates. Columns 1 and 2 describe the interaction between treatment responses and HDDs and CDDs, respectively. We find that each additional HDD leads to further reductions in use of approximately 0.0024 therms or 0.17 percent
of control usage. This interaction effect is statistically significant at the 1 percent level. The opposite relationship holds for the interaction between treatment and CDD, which is positive and
highly significant. This result shows that the difference between treatment and control consumption declines with increases in the outside temperature.
37 See https://www.eia.gov/energyexplained/index.cfm?page=about_degree_days for an explanation and rationale
for using heating and cooling degree days to approximate for cooling and heating needs.
38 For example, a day with an average temperature of 59 degrees Fahrenheit corresponds to 6 heating degree days.
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Table 4: Outside Temperature and Treatment Effects
Interactions
(1)
(2)
HDD
CDD
Treatment (τ)
Treatment x HDD
Treatment x CDD
Usage Control
Control Average
Percent of Control
R2
N

-0.0031
-0.0145***
(0.0019)
(0.0036)
-0.0024***
(0.0006)
0.0017***
(0.0005)
0.8786*** 0.8786***
(0.0101)
(0.0101)

Below/Above 65◦ F
(3)
(4)
Cold
Warm

Below 25th /Above 75th
(5)
(6)
Very Cold Very Warm

-0.0164***
(0.0041)

-0.0029
(0.0018)

-0.0250***
(0.0061)

-0.0028
(0.0018)

0.8945***
(0.0116)

0.8460***
(0.0088)

0.8996***
(0.0134)

0.7957***
(0.0088)

1.44

1.44

1.73
0.948

0.74
0.394

2.48
1.008

0.70
0.400

0.331
93,773,205

0.331
93,773,205

0.302
61,615,761

0.202
28,614,437

0.221
28,035,462

0.193
11,552,875

Notes: The dependent variable is daily natural gas usage (in therms). The models are defined
as in Equation 1 in columns 3 to 6 and allow for an interaction effect between treatment and
heating degree days (HDD) and treatment and cooling degree days (CDD) in columns 1 and
2, respectively. All specifications include include day-of-sample fixed effects. The analysis is
restricted to the treatment period, i.e., November 2015 and later. We control for the average preexperiment usage at the customer level (“Usage Control”). Columns 3 and 4 estimate separate
models for days with average temperature below 65◦ F (“cold”) and above 65◦ F (“warm”), respectively. Columns 5 and 6 report estimates from analogous models using 60◦ F (“very cold”)
and 69◦ F (“very warm”), the 25th and 75th percentile, respectively. We report robust standard
errors that are clustered at the household level for all specifications. *** denotes significance at
the 1 percent level, ** at the 5 percent level, and * at the 10 percent level.

We test this relationship more directly in columns 3 and 4, where we separately estimate
Equation 1 for cold and warm days, respectively. The difference between the estimates is striking. Treated customers reduce gas consumption considerably on days where the average temperature lies below the threshold. In contrast, we do not find statistically significant or economically
meaningful treatment effects on warm days—treatment and control customers do not differ from
one another when the demand for heating fuel is low. Restricting the analysis to the 25th and 75th
percentile of average temperature further strengthens our conclusion and suggests that treatment
effects grow in absolute value when temperature drops further.
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We provide a final piece of evidence by assigning each observation to one of several temperature bins based on the average temperature observed on a certain day. We then estimate treatment effects separately for each bin and plot the resulting relationship in Figure 5. A clear trend
emerges. We find the largest reductions in use in the coldest bins on the left side of the figure.
When we move to the right, treatment effects decline in absolute value with increases in the outside temperature.
Figure 5: Temperature Bins and Treatment Effects
HDD
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Notes: Average treatment effects based on separate estimations of Equation 1 for several temperature bins. We assign each day to a bin depending on the average outside temperature observed
on that day. Red diamonds represent the point estimates, gray bars the corresponding 95 percent
confidence intervals. Blue squares express effects as percentage reductions relative to the average
consumption in the control group in the same temperature bin. Dashed lines show the best linear
fit for each measure of the treatment effects. An average temperature of 65 degrees Fahrenheit
is typically used as a threshold to distinguish between days that require space heating (heating
degree days; HDD) and days that require space cooling (cooling degree days; CDD).
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Figure 5 also suggests that there is a natural threshold above which treatment effects are no
longer detectable. For all bins starting at 67 degrees and above, we do not observe statistically
significant treatment effects. All bins below 67 degrees, on the other hand, show substantial and
highly significant reductions in consumption. In relative terms, all “cold” bins achieve reductions
that are very close to or exceed the one-percent policy goal. Reinforcing this conclusion, we also
plot best linear fits for absolute and relative reductions, which are upward sloping in temperature.
The threshold provides strong suggestive evidence of the underlying adjustment mechanisms.
As described above, a cut-off of 65 degrees is typically used to distinguish between days that are
sufficiently cold to require home heating and days that require air conditioning to keep the inside temperature of a home comfortable. Based on this insight, customers appear to change their
heating behavior in response to the BTA. Informed households do not differ from counterparts
in the control group on days when natural gas use is largely restricted to cooking, clothes dryers, and other appliances. These uses may not provide much room for adjustments. The margins
for adjustment we identify are consistent with related work in the electricity sector that identifies
changes in the utilization of air conditioning systems (e.g., Gilbert and Graff Zivin, 2014; Jessoe
and Rapson, 2014).
5

Dynamics and Persistence of Changes in Natural Gas Consumption

In addition to the main treatment effects, we can also provide insights into program dynamics.
Two important questions are whether treatment effects persist over time and how the effects of
the program develop with repeated treatment. In this section, we estimate daily and weekly treatment effects to understand the short and longer run dynamics of the program. We then statistically compare the first to the second year of treatment, when customers have received dozens of
messages.
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5.1

Treatment Effect Dynamics

An important consideration for evaluating a program is how treatment effects develop over time.
For example, the effects we describe in section 2 may only reflect changes in behavior during
the first few weeks of treatment. Alternatively, treatment emails may have lasting effects on energy use. Our rich consumption data allow us to speak to two dimensions of these dynamics: (i)
contemporaneous responses to the receipt of the first treatment messages; and (ii) longer term
persistence of the treatment effects over 20 months of continued treatment.39
The literature provides mixed evidence on the dynamics of energy conservation programs. In
an influential study, Allcott and Rogers (2014) show that the effects of a social nudge increase
with repeated treatment and persist over several years. Ito et al. (2018) directly compare a moral
appeal for reductions in peak electricity demand to a critical peak pricing intervention. The authors find that moral suasion only works well in the short-run, whereas increased marginal prices
cause reductions in consumption that persist with repeated treatment (also see Jessoe and Rapson,
2014). Brent et al. (2017b) find similar differences between a treatment that provides rate information to customers and normative appeals for water conservation. In the experiment, the effects
of the information treatment persist over time and do not increase with the delivery of a second
treatment letter. On the other hand, responses to the normative appeal decrease in the period after
the first letter but increase beyond the initial response with the delivery of a second letter. Other
studies document persistent effects of in-home technology (EPRI, 2009; Ehrhardt-Martinez, Donnelly and Laitner, 2010), although some effects are short-lived (EPRI, 2009; Houde et al., 2013).
Outside of energy economics, Bollinger et al. (2011) provide an example showing that information provision can also affect other consumer choices persistently. The authors document that
customers of a coffee shop chain reduce the average calories per transaction over a 10-month period after stores began displaying the caloric content of menu items.
39 Treatment

in this experiment continues beyond the end of our sample. Thus, we cannot contribute to a growing literature that considers the persistence of treatment effects after treatment is discontinued (Gneezy et al., 2011;
Allcott and Rogers, 2014; Brandon et al., 2017).
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It is difficult to reconcile these findings without a clear theory or detailed data on customer
behavior. One explanation may be that there are important differences between financial incentives, normative appeals, and information provision (Ferraro and Price, 2013; Brent et al., 2017b).
For example, if customers lack important information when making decisions, the provision of
better information may immediately lead to adjustments. Subsequent treatment messages contain
relatively little additional information but could remind customers of the information they have
received previously. Normative appeals, on the other hand, may impose a social cost on resource
use that leads to different dynamics (Ferraro and Price, 2013; Brandon et al., 2017; Brent et al.,
2017b).
We test how customers respond to repeated expenditure messages by estimating two versions
of Equation 1: (i) daily treatment effects in the first month of treatment; and (ii) weekly treatment
effects to investigate program dynamics over the course of 20 months. Figure 6 presents the resulting estimates visually. In the top panel, we plot daily treatment effects for the last untreated
month (October 2015) and the first month of treatment (November 2015). Red diamonds represent the point estimates in therms and gray bars depict the corresponding 95 percent confidence
intervals. The blue line expresses estimated coefficients as percentage reductions relative to the
average consumption in the control group on a certain day. Finally, vertical dashed lines denote
the delivery of a BTA on each Wednesday in the treatment period. Figure A9 in the appendix reports an analogous analysis for the entire first winter heating season from November to March.
Four observations emerge. First, the average consumption in the treatment group does not
differ from the control group before treated customers receive the first BTA. This relationship
provides further evidence of a successful randomization. Second, responses to the treatment
are immediate. We see a stark drop in consumption by informed customers on day 3, the first
Wednesday in the treatment period. Within three to four days of this date, the treatment effect becomes statistically significant and approaches the one-percent policy goal. The slight delay may
be caused by customers who experiment with ways to change their natural gas consumption, such
as testing different thermostat settings. Third, treatment effects are remarkably stable during the
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Figure 6: Treatment Effect Dynamics
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Notes: The top panel plots daily treatment effects in the last untreated (October 2015) and first
treated month (November 2015). The bottom panel plots weekly treatment effects for the entire
experiment. Red diamonds represent the point estimates, gray bars the corresponding 95 percent
confidence intervals. The navy solid line expresses effects as percentage reductions relative to the
average consumption in the control group in the same period. Dashed lines denote Wednesdays in
the top panel and the beginning and end of the two winter heating seasons in the bottom panel.
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first month of treatment. Despite substantial variation in the level of baseline consumption, which
we can see by the wide range of point estimates, relative reductions fluctuate tightly around 1 percent. Fourth, we do not find evidence that additional messages lead to further decreases in natural
gas consumption. Unlike customers in Allcott and Rogers (2014), households in our experiment
appear to instantly reach a new consumption level (Brent et al., 2017b).
The bottom panel of Figure 6 expands the time frame and reports weekly treatment effects
from November 2015 (week 0) to June 2017. All elements of the figure are as described above
except for the vertical dashed lines, which now denote the beginning and end of the two winter heating seasons in our sample. This approach allows us to examine the persistence of treatment effects in the longer run. We first confirm our previous findings. Treatment effects increase
quickly and remain stable throughout the first winter heating season and well into the spring of
2016. Consistent with our findings in section 4, we fail to detect significant treatment effects during the warm summer months and treatment effects are statistically insignificant from early July
to late October 2016.
More interestingly, Figure 6 allows us to compare treatment effects over a longer time horizon. We find that effects are strikingly persistent over time. The same pattern we describe for the
first winter heating season is also clearly visible in the second year of treatment. Despite months
of insignificant treatment effects, customers in the treatment group reduce consumption substantially when outside temperature begins to decrease. The magnitude and shape of these reductions
closely follow the pattern in the first year of treatment. Figure A10 in the appendix highlights this
variation at a more aggregate level by providing the same analysis based on monthly treatment
effects. The same conclusions hold.
Overall, reductions in consumption persist throughout the treatment period except for seasonal differences. Unfortunately, our data do not allow us to disentangle between alternative explanations for how customers achieve lasting reductions. Customers may form energy-efficient
habits (Allcott and Rogers, 2014; Bernedo et al., 2014; Jessoe and Rapson, 2014) or invest in new
technology, such as more efficient furnaces (Brandon et al., 2017).
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Finally, Figure 6 also provides answers to another interesting question. Information interventions typically provide infrequent feedback. For example, Ferraro and Price (2013) use a single
normative appeal to encourage water conservation. Allcott (2011c) investigates similar monthly
or quarterly messages in the electricity sector. Other studies aim to reduce peak demand for energy on a small number of unusually hot summer or cold winter days (Jessoe and Rapson, 2014;
Ito et al., 2018). In contrast, the BTA is administered with high frequency over a long period of
time. The literature provides cautious notes of choice fatigue (Iyengar and Lepper, 2000; Levav
et al., 2010; Augenblick and Nicholson, 2016) or information overload (Eppler and Mengis,
2004; Anderson and de Palma, 2009, 2012) in such situations. If customers grow tired of receiving weekly messages over the course of 20 months, program impacts may diminish over time.
The experiment was not designed to rule out these theories but the persistence shown in Figure 6
leads us to believe that fatigue is not a major concern in this application.40
5.2

Comparison of Campaign Years

To complement the graphical analysis in Figure 6 with a more rigorous statistical comparison,
Figure 7 presents results from separate estimations of Equation 1 for each period of interest. Orange X’s describe the percentage reduction in consumption relative to the control group. Because
we do not observe two full years of treatment, we define a winter season (November to March)
and a spring season (April to June). Table A6 and Table A7 in the appendix provide the underlying regression results for daily and monthly consumption data, respectively.
We confirm the main conclusions from our previous discussions. Treatment effects are almost
identical within season across the campaign years. The reductions in consumption during the
winter season are slightly larger in the second year of the campaign than in the first—both in absolute and relative terms—but the difference is not statistically significant at conventional levels.
Consumption during the spring months follows a similar pattern. Our results also reflect seasonal
40 If

technology adoption is responsible, we may falsely attribute persistent treatment effects to weekly messages
rather than a different technology stock (Brandon et al., 2017). Unfortunately, we do not observe household data on
technology investments.
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Figure 7: Average Treatment Effects by Campaign Year and Season
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Notes: Treatment effects (in therms) based on estimations of Equation 1 by campaign year and
season. Solid bars represent the point estimate, corresponding error bars the 95 percent confidence interval. Orange X’s express effects as percentage reductions relative to the average
consumption in the control group in the same period. We observe two treated winter (November
to March) and spring (April to June) seasons.

differences. We find significantly larger treatment effects in winter months than in the spring for
both years of the experiment.41 Finally, the BTA achieves significant reductions in natural gas demand during all four periods of interest, although the treatment effect in the spring months of the
second year is only significant at the 5 percent level.
In conjunction, the evidence presented in this section shows that the BTA leads to persistent
changes in gas consumption. Treatment effects vary by outside temperature and season, but they
remain stable within each season over time. These findings suggest that repeated information
messages may cause energy savings in the long run.
41 These

differences would likely be more pronounced if we had access to a complete second year, which would
allow us to compare the winter season to all other months, including the summer months when demand for natural
gas is lowest.
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6

Additional Findings

In this section, we use additional data sources to provide three complementary results. First,
we rely on variation in the administration of the BTA to evaluate (i) how supplemental materials affect treatment responses; and (ii) whether the way information is presented influences customer behavior. Second, we exploit the constant delivery schedule of the BTA to investigate how
treatment effects develop between the receipt of two information messages. Third, we use crosssectional variation in household characteristics to assess whether treatment effects differ with
respect to important observable information about a customer.
There is one limitation common to all analyses in this section. The experiment was not designed and powered to detect differences across days or customer groups. In most cases, we discuss economically meaningful effects that are statistically insignificant at conventional levels.
Despite the lack of statistical precision, we believe that our findings paint a consistent picture that
may provide important directions for future research.
6.1

Supplemental Materials and Alert Design

Many aspects of an intervention are at the discretion of the policy maker. Decades of work in
psychology and behavioral economics suggest that seemingly unimportant details can significantly affect program outcomes (Kamenica, 2012). For example, Bertrand et al. (2010) show that
small changes in the presentation of advertising content substantially change the demand for private loans. Similarly, different ways to present incentives affect the take-up of financial subsidies
for retirement savings in Saez (2009). Another finding that has attracted considerable attention is
the difference in behavior when individuals face the same incentive framed as a loss as opposed
to a gain (Tversky and Kahneman, 1986; Ganzach and Karsahi, 1995).
This experiment provides a unique opportunity to assess the effects of two details in the administration of the BTA. First, SoCalGas administered the BTA with and without supplemental
materials. These materials provide general information about the campaign, directions on how to
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access the online tools available on the MyAccount user portal, and energy savings tips.42 Customers may use this information to learn about effective ways to reduce energy usage or access
additional information online. From the perspective of the utility, the motivation for carefully
testing the impact of the materials is clear. Mailing letters to customers is costly compared to
other program expenses. If the gains of providing these letters are relatively small, SoCalGas will
benefit from administering the BTA without supplemental materials.
Second, SoCalGas tested two different designs of the BTA. The “Text BTA” uses a text-based
presentation of the message content, whereas the “Visual BTA” presents the same information
using bar charts. A graphical design may be easier to process for customers because figures reinforce relevant information visually and reduce the cognitive load of processing the information
(Mayer, 2002; Mayer and Moreno, 2003). The literature also suggests that the attention of consumers can be guided towards particularly salient signals (Bordalo et al., 2013, 2016). In contrast
to the delivery method, the design of the BTA does not affect the marginal cost of the program.
Figure 8 explores how program outcomes differ across the four subgroups. We estimate Equation 1 separately for each group and plot the point estimates with their corresponding 95 percent
confidence intervals. The top panel presents average treatment effects and provides four findings.
First, there are substantial differences in the treatment effects across subgroups. For example,
the Visual BTA with supplemental materials causes the largest reductions in usage. However,
because coefficients are estimated with considerable noise, we cannot statistically distinguish
among all groups. Second, supplemental materials appear to induce larger treatment effects. This
relationship can be seen by comparing the first and third bar with the second and fourth bar, respectively. Third, a similar pattern suggests that the Visual BTA generates larger reductions in
consumption than the Text BTA. To reach this conclusion, we compare the first to the third and
the second to the fourth bar. Fourth, treatment causes energy savings that are statistically significant at the 1 percent level in all subgroups except for Text BTA without supplemental materials.
42 These

materials were only delivered in the first winter heating season (November 2015 to March 2016).
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Notes: Treatment effects (in therms) based on estimations of Equation 1 by treatment subgroup.
The top panel pools all observations; the bottom panel presents estimates by season. Orange X’s
express effects as percentage reductions relative to the average consumption in the control group
in the same period. The “Text BTA” presents data in pure text, whereas the “Visual BTA” uses bar
charts to visualize the information. Supplemental materials include emails and mailed letters that
contain information about the conservation campaign and energy savings tips.
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In the bottom panel, we further divide the analysis by season. Blue bars represent treatment
effects in winter months, whereas red bars describe the average effects in non-winter periods. The
most successful treatment, the Visual BTA with supplemental materials, significantly outperforms
the Text BTA without supplemental materials at the 5 percent level during winter months. We
also pool treatment groups to maximize power. We find that customers who receive the Visual
BTA reduce winter demand more than counterparts that receive the Text BTA, although the difference is only significant at the 10 percent level. The difference between customers receiving
supplemental materials and those who do not is not statistically significant at conventional levels.
Despite imprecisions in our estimates, we show the promise of carefully testing several details
in the administration of a program to identify the most cost-effective solution. Based on these
insights, SoCalGas decided to discontinue the delivery of supplemental materials in future campaigns. Furthermore, the Visual BTA has replaced the Text BTA as the default design for future
customers.
6.2

Within-Week Variation of Treatment Effects

We next estimate whether treatment effects vary between two deliveries of the BTA. SoCalGas
delivered the BTA each Wednesday between 9 am and 6 pm. One important consideration in the
design of an intervention is the frequency of treatment. Allcott and Rogers (2014), for example,
show a fascinating action-and-backsliding pattern in response to monthly and quarterly social
nudges. Similar results are reported in Brent et al. (2017b). In their experiment, customers reduce
demand substantially in the days immediately after receiving a treatment letter, but these effects
decline over time until the next nudge arrives. Similarly, Gilbert and Graff Zivin (2014) show that
electricity customers reduce energy consumption only in the first week following the receipt of
a regular bill. After the first week, behavior quickly returns to the household’s baseline. These
findings suggest that customers only retain information for a limited amount of time, which may
necessitate continued and frequent treatment.
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Figure 9: Average Treatment Effects by Weekday
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Notes: Treatment effects (in therms) based on estimations of Equation 1 by weekday. Solid bars
represent the point estimate, corresponding error bars the 95 percent confidence interval. Orange
X’s express effects as percentage reductions relative to the average consumption in the control
group on the same weekday. Customers receive BTAs each Wednesday between 9 am and 6 pm
local time.

We present regression results from separate estimations of Equation 1 for each weekday in
Figure 9. We also plot the corresponding 95 percent confidence intervals. In general, our results
indicate that treatment effects are relatively invariant across days. We only find weak evidence of
declining responses over the course of a week. However, the two largest treatment effects occur
on Thursday and Friday, the days immediately after customers have received a new BTA.43 In
the following days, treatment effects appear to diminish slightly until the next message arrives.
For example, estimated treatment effects on Sundays, Mondays, and Tuesdays are significantly
43 It

is not surprising that Wednesday’s effect is slightly smaller than treatment effects on Thursday and Friday
because some customers receive the BTA in the late afternoon, when there is limited time for adjustments in consumption.
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smaller than those on Thursdays and Fridays (at the 10 percent level). We also estimate a linear
trend from Thursday to Tuesday but do not find evidence of significant reductions in the treatment effect.
This relationship suggests that the weekly frequency of the BTA can maintain stable energy
savings. However, we cannot determine the optimal treatment frequency because SoCalGas did
not vary the frequency of delivery across treatment cells or over time. The relatively small variation in treatment effects also shows that responses are not driven by behavioral changes on a
specific weekday. This finding contrasts with Ayres et al. (2013), who find that treatment effects
of a normative conservation appeal on electricity use are concentrated on Sundays and Mondays,
with no discernible reductions in usage from Wednesday to Saturday.
6.3

Household Characteristics and Heterogeneous Treatment Effects

SoCalGas also collects limited household characteristics. To assess the impact of observable
characteristics on treatment effects, we estimate a model similar to Equation 1 that allows the
main treatment effect to vary by the realization of a specific characteristic:

Gasit = β0 + β1 chari + τbase BTAi + τint BTAi · chari + β2 GasPre
i + µt + εit

(2)

where all variables are as defined in section 3.1 and chari is a binary indicator for a characteristic of customer i. τbase is the average treatment effect for the baseline group, i.e., the group
of customers with chari = 0. τint describes the marginal treatment effect for customers with
chari = 1, whose total treatment effect is τbase + τint .
We estimate Equation 2 separately for three binary indicators: (i) an indicator for customers
with pre-experiment usage above the median usage level; (ii) customers who received paperless
bills in June 2017; and (iii) and customers who were enrolled for SoCalGas’s Level Pay Plan, a
payment plan that divides energy expenditures equally across twelve months, in June 2017.
We find three interesting relationships. Table A8 in the appendix provides the corresponding
regression results. First, customers above the pre-experiment median respond stronger to treat48

ment. The magnitude of the estimated difference is meaningful and represents around 20 percent
of the relative treatment effect. However, the difference is not statistically significant at conventional levels. Stronger responses to treatment by high-use customers are consistent with findings
in the literature on the use of social norms for energy (Allcott, 2011c; List et al., 2017) and water conservation (Ferraro and Miranda, 2013; Ferraro and Price, 2013; Brent et al., 2015). It is
important to note that only customers from the two highest usage quartiles were sampled for this
experiment. Thus, the difference reflects heterogeneity among high users in the general population.
Second, customers who receive paperless bills reduce consumption more than twice as much
as counterparts that receive traditional paper bills, although the difference is also not statistically significant. If customers pay less attention to electronic bills, the expenditure information
contained in monthly bills may be less salient to paperless customers (Sexton, 2015). Such customers likely find weekly expenditure messages more useful. Alternatively, customers who use
paperless billing may have revealed their preference for electronic communications. In that case,
these customers may be more likely to read and pay attention to the BTA, which is delivered by
email.
Third, customers on the Level Pay Plan respond stronger to treatment than other customers.
The difference is around 70 percent in absolute and 50 percent in relative terms. Level Pay Plan
customers only receive extraordinarily noisy expenditure signals in regular bills because monthly
payments are constant over time. The BTA may provide more useful information to those customers than to customer who receive informative bills. However, we fail to reject the null hypothesis that the two effects do not differ.
7

Discussion

Many standard models assume that individuals are fully informed about all attributes of a product or service when they make consumption decisions. Yet, the literature provides evidence that
consumers are not well-informed in many important markets, which may lead to inefficient out-
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comes. As a response, policy makers and academics increasingly rely on programs that provide
simple information. Messages and alerts that inform customers about their usage, expenditure, or
marginal prices are ubiquitous in many sectors of the economy. Our understanding of how such
messages affect consumer choice is limited. This paper used a large natural field experiment with
more than 150,000 residential natural gas customers in California to rigorously test the effects of
repeated expenditure messages on energy use.
We presented three main findings. First, weekly information messages encourage treated customers to reduce natural gas use compared to the control group. Second, seasonal treatment effects show that reductions are largest during the winter peak demand for natural gas. Additional
analyses suggest that customers adjust their heating behavior in response to the treatment. We
find that treatment effects are only statistically significant and economically meaningful on sufficiently cold days, when customers require natural gas to heat their homes. Third, treatment effects are detectable within days of the first information message and persist over the course of the
program except for seasonal variation.
More broadly, our findings show the potential of simple information messages in an important market with externalities. If customers are not well-informed about product attributes, traditional policies that change relative prices may be ineffective. For example, if customers do not
respond to the current marginal price of energy, corrective carbon taxes may fall short of the policy objective. Repeated messages can be an inexpensive way to provide additional information in
such markets. The provision of information may also affect important policy goals. In our setting,
weekly expenditure messages cause persistent energy savings.
We highlight three directions for future research. First, and perhaps most importantly, it would
be valuable to understand why customers respond to the information messages. The BTA may
provide useful cues that help customers improve and better align their energy consumption choices
with the predictions of standard consumer theory. Alternatively, the messages may remind customers of their gas usage and make consumption of natural gas more salient. It is also unclear
what elements of the BTA are most helpful to customers because each message contains several
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data points. Future studies could carefully vary the content of the information messages to observe differences in subsequent behavior across designs. Variation in the message content can
also help identify theories that are consistent with responses to treatment. For example, information about past expenditure could introduce a reference point to which customers compare current
expenditure (Tversky and Kahneman, 1986).
Second, more information is needed to determine whether these interventions enhance the
economic welfare of program participants. While low opt-out rates and survey evidence suggest
that customers value the program, we cannot determine the willingness-to-pay for the BTA. With
the growing impact of non-price interventions on public policy, a careful evaluation of the welfare effects of such programs is increasingly important (Allcott and Kessler, 2015; Allcott and
Greenstone, 2017).
Third, a better understanding of why our findings differ in important ways from results in the
previous literature would be informative for the future design of effective energy policy. One example is that we do not observe increases in the treatment effects with repeated delivery of the
BTA—a pattern found in response to normative appeals in the energy sector (Allcott and Rogers,
2014). Future work should carefully compare information provision to programs that harness behavioral insights for changes in behavior to understand whether the two types of interventions
work through different channels.
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III

Chapter 2: Harnessing Policy Complementarities to Conserve Energy: Evidence from a Natural Field Experiment

1

Introduction

Behavioral economics has matured to the point where policymakers are drawing upon behavioral
results to develop new instruments to influence behavior and achieve policy goals. One such instrument that has received considerable attention is the use of social comparisons to promote behavioral change. A typical social comparison intervention informs customers about how their behavior in a specific setting compares to the behavior of a comparison group, such as their neighbors. In recent years, social comparisons have been applied in a variety of settings, including attempts to influence voting participation (Gerber and Rogers, 2009), charitable giving (Frey and
Meier, 2004; Croson and Shang, 2008; Shang and Croson, 2009), retirement savings and credit
use (Beshears et al., 2015; Seira et al., 2017), tax compliance (Fellner et al., 2013; Hallsworth
et al., 2017), traffic violations (Chen et al., 2016), and water conservation (Ferraro and Price,
2013; Brent et al., 2015). In this study, we focus on perhaps the most popular application of social comparisons in the literature—the use of home energy reports to encourage residential energy conservation.44
Home energy reports (HERs) are the subject of a burgeoning literature (Allcott, 2011c; Ayres
et al., 2013; Costa and Kahn, 2013; Allcott and Rogers, 2014; Allcott, 2015; Brandon et al., 2017).
Results from this literature suggest two stylized facts. First, households exposed to the HER reduce subsequent energy usage relative to a control group. For example, Allcott (2015) uses data
from 111 distinct experimental sites across the U.S. and identifies economically meaningful average treatment effects for all experiments. Although treatment effects vary across experiments,
treated households reduce their energy consumption by approximately one to two percent. Second, treatment effects are largely driven by customers with high baseline energy use. Allcott
44 The

Home Energy Report was developed by the company Opower (now Oracle Utilities) and includes a comparison of the recipient’s energy use to that of a carefully chosen group of neighbors along with energy conservation tips
designed to help customers understand ways to reduce energy use.
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(2011c), for example, shows that treatment effects are insignificant for households in the lowest deciles of pre-intervention consumption, but exceed two percent for households in the highest
deciles. Similarly, Ferraro and Price (2013) find that high-use households experience treatment
effects that nearly double usage reductions by low-use households in the residential water sector.
We use data from a field experiment that was conducted in partnership with Opower. The experiment combined two interventions: (i) the HER; and (ii) a rewards program that offered households financial incentives for reducing their electricity consumption. Under the financial rewards
program, households earned points for reductions in use relative to an individual benchmark level
of consumption. Customers could use the rewards they earned to purchase a variety of goods in
an online portal.45 In many regards, our financial rewards program shares important similarities
with critical peak rebates (Wolak, 2010, 2011) and other energy policies providing incentives for
reductions in use relative to a predetermined benchmark, such as California’s 20/20 rebate program (Ito, 2015).
In the experiment, we randomly assigned customers to one of three mutually exclusive groups:
(i) a control group; (ii) a group that received a monthly HER; and (iii) a group that we encouraged to participate in the financial rewards program in addition to receiving a monthly HER.46
This design allows us to identify responses to the HER, investigate the types of customers that select into the financial rewards program, and assess the effect of combining both interventions on
subsequent customer behavior compared to no intervention or the HER in isolation.47
By comparing the consumption of customers in the combined treatment group who did not
participate in the rewards program to customers in the group that only received the HER, we can
further study whether the introduction of financial incentives affects how households respond to
the HER. We believe it is important to examine this possibility given prior work showing that
45 The range of goods available through the online portal include gift cards to popular companies like Starbucks
and Amazon, so-called Tango cards (a form of digital currency), and donations to charities like Habitat for Humanity. See Figure B4 in the appendix for an example.
46 The encouragements consisted of simple messages informing households of the new program and a $2 sign-up
bonus for participation. We describe the encouragement messages in more detail in section 2.2.
47 We would have preferred to implement a 2x2 experimental design with an additional group that only provides
financial rewards. However, because take-up rates in past voluntary programs were low, our partner utility was concerned that such a treatment would not generate substantial changes in electricity use.
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financial rewards can crowd out non-pecuniary motives by assigning a “price” to a previously
unpriced behavior (see Gneezy et al. (2011); Bowles and Polania-Reyes (2012); Kamenica (2012)
for overviews of this literature).
The analysis proceeds in three steps. First, we evaluate the average treatment effect of receiving the HER on energy use. Our findings are consistent with previous work and confirm the stylized facts in the literature. The average household in the group that only receives the HER reduces energy demand by about 1.1 percent relative to the control group, and these reductions are
largely driven by high-use customers. We also find that customers with a high variance of consumption in the pre-intervention period are more responsive to treatment than households with a
low variance of use.
We further document that treatment responses by customers who were encouraged but elected
to not participate in the rewards program do not differ from the group that only received the HER.
This result suggests that, in our setting, intrinsic motives are unaffected by the introduction of
financial rewards. One possible explanation for this surprising finding is that the opt-in program
allows customers to sort into their preferred incentive type(s). Our results also support Gneezy
et al. (2011), who conjecture that the tension between intrinsic and extrinsic incentives should be
less pronounced when financial incentives are provided for actions that are unobserved by others,
such as energy use within one’s home.
Second, we investigate which types of households choose to participate in the financial rewards program. We find that a disproportionate number of low-use and low-variance households
sign up for the program. This finding is noteworthy as these are precisely the customer groups
least responsive to the HER and those who one would expect to have the least to gain from participating in the rewards program.48 Participants also differ along other margins. On average,
households in the program are wealthier, have fewer household members, and are more envi48 Under the rewards program households earn points for reductions in use relative to a baseline level but face no
punishment for increases in use above this level. Ex ante, one would expect greater fluctuations in use to lead to a
greater accumulation of points; such households reap the benefits in periods when use falls but face no costs when
use increases. Similarly, we would expect higher user groups to have more margins upon which to adjust use and
thus more opportunity to earn points.
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ronmentally conscious. In this regard, the data suggest that the HER and rewards program may
influence different types of customers.
Third, we study subsequent consumption decisions of households in the combined treatment
group. By comparing the behavior of customers in this group to counterparts in the group that
only receives the HER, we can isolate the marginal effect of the financial rewards program. We
employ two estimation approaches that use the experiment’s random encouragement design as an
instrument. We first estimate an intent-to-treat (ITT) effect of being in the group that we encouraged to participate. The estimated coefficient represents the average marginal effect of exposure
to our encouragements. We then use the random assignment to encouragements to instrument for
actual participation in the rewards program and estimate a local average treatment effect (LATE)
for participating households.
Although noisy because of low enrollment rates in the program, regression results provide
three interesting insights. First, the average customer in the combined treatment group uses significantly less energy than the average customer in the group that only receives the HER. Specifically, our ITT estimates suggest that the marginal effect of the rewards program is almost thirty
percent of the average treatment effect for the group that only received the HER. Second, the
magnitude of the LATE estimate shows that the average participant in the rewards program substantially reduces consumption. Households who choose to participate experience additional reductions that far exceed the effect of the HER in isolation. Third, a broader set of customer types
respond to the rewards program than the standard HER only intervention. For example, we find
that low-variance customers, a group that is least responsive to the HER, experience statistically
significant and economically large reductions in energy use after entering the rewards program.
Viewed in conjunction with the data on enrollment, these results suggest an important reason for
the complementarity between the two programs: behavioral and financial incentives engage with
and encourage energy conservation from different customer types.
As a final piece of evidence, we evaluate the success of the program from two additional
perspectives: (i) private cost-effectiveness; and (ii) a partial welfare analysis. Depending on the
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underlying assumptions, a one kilowatt hour (kWh) reduction in demand caused by the rewards
program costs the utility between 1.82¢and 1.96¢. These numbers compare favorably with other
recent conservation efforts (Allcott and Mullainathan, 2010; Ito, 2015). We then use estimates
of marginal generation costs and marginal carbon emissions to conduct a partial welfare analysis (Graff Zivin et al., 2014). Intuitively, we compare the private cost of using one more unit of
electricity to the social cost of producing this marginal unit. Because the rewards program increases the marginal price for energy below a customer’s benchmark level, the introduction of
the program narrows the gap between private and social marginal costs in the service area of
our partner utility. Therefore, we conclude that welfare is likely to increase for any reasonable
range of marginal social costs of energy production. We should note, however, that this conclusion may not translate to other geographic regions, particularly those that rely upon a different
mix of sources for electricity generation.
Our findings contribute to several bodies of literature. First and foremost, our paper contributes to the literature on the use of social comparisons and other non-price interventions to
manage residential resource use (e.g., Allcott, 2011c; Ayres et al., 2013; Costa and Kahn, 2013;
Ferraro and Price, 2013; Brent et al., 2015; Ito et al., 2018). Unlike prior work, which studies
the impact of such interventions in isolation, our paper is the first to look at the effect of a combined intervention utilizing both behavioral and financial incentives. In doing so, we highlight
a promising way to increase conservation efforts. The reason for this increase appears to be that
the combined intervention engages customer types that are typically least responsive to social
comparisons—or even excluded from many utility efforts.
Our paper also contributes to a growing literature evaluating the use of voluntary programs
and conditional rewards to incentivize energy conservation (Fowlie et al., 2015; Ito, 2015; Fowlie
et al., 2017). More broadly, our work speaks to the literature on the interplay between intrinsic
and extrinsic incentives. Our results highlight that it is possible to combine behavioral and financial incentives to achieve policy objectives (see also Lacetera et al., 2012; Dwenger et al., 2016).
Finally, our paper contributes to a growing literature using experimental and quasi-experimental
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methods to evaluate programs targeting residential energy consumption (Davis, 2008; Wolak,
2011; Kahn and Wolak, 2013; Davis et al., 2014; Jessoe and Rapson, 2014; Houde, 2014; Allcott and Taubinsky, 2015; Davis and Metcalf, 2016; Allcott and Sweeney, 2017; Hortacsu et al.,
2017; Houde and Aldy, 2017).
Section 2 describes the setting, experimental design, and data at our disposal. Section 3 presents
the main results based on several empirical specifications. Section 4 provides a brief discussion
of policy implications before we conclude in Section 5.
2

Background, Experimental Design, and Sample

This section provides background information about the experiment. We first introduce the empirical setting and experimental design. We then describe the sample of customers before we conclude by providing evidence of a successful randomization.
2.1

Program Description

In this study, we use data from a natural field experiment designed in partnership with Opower
and implemented in the service area of a utility in the U.S. Northeast. The experiment combines
two interventions. The first treatment is Opower’s Home Energy Report (HER), a social nudge
that has been studied extensively in recent years (Allcott, 2011c; Costa and Kahn, 2013; Allcott
and Rogers, 2014; Allcott, 2015; Brandon et al., 2017). The HER is a monthly mailer that consists of three main modules: (i) a social comparison of a recipient’s monthly electricity usage to
the average usage of similar households; (ii) graphical information about the recipient’s usage
trend over time; and (iii) a tip sheet with different ways to reduce energy use in the home, such as
changing ambient room temperature or investing in more efficient appliances. Figure 10 provides
an example letter.
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Figure 10: Opower’s Home Energy Report

(b) Back Page

(a) Front Page

Notes: Example Home Energy Report generated by Opower. The front page provides a neighbor
comparison and injunctive norm; the back page includes a personal usage history and conservation tips. Our marketing module was included in the lower half of the front page in May 2013.
Source: Opower.

The main innovation in this study is the introduction of a second intervention that provides
financial rewards for reductions in usage relative to an individual, predetermined benchmark
level.49 Customers accumulate rewards points for consumption below the benchmark level and
receive one point for each kWh saved.
49 Each customer faces an individual, undisclosed baseline. Baselines are calculated based on a customer’s usage
for the same month in the previous year and normalized by weather based on heating degree days and cooling degree
days. The use of an undisclosed baselines reduces the possibility that subjects distort behavior in the pre-intervention
period to influence the baseline. Using this approach is an important lesson learned in early pilot experiments testing
critical peak pricing plans that provided rebates (Wolak, 2010).
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This program design shares important similarities with other popular policy instruments in the
energy sector, such as peak-time rebates and subsidies that are assessed relative to a benchmark
level of consumption (Faruqui and Sergici, 2010; Wolak, 2010, 2011; Ito, 2015).50
The incentive structure of the program differs from a first-best solution because customers
face asymmetric incentives (Ito, 2015). Energy consumption below the benchmark is subject to
increased marginal prices. After the introduction of the program because customers forgo the
associated reward in addition to paying the marginal price for each unit of energy used below
the benchmark level. Consumption above the benchmark level, however, remains at the original
marginal price. This asymmetry can introduce an “option to quit” or “giving up effect” that may
limit the impact of our program (Wolak, 2010; Borenstein, 2013).
Customers can exchange rewards points for several goods in an online portal.51 The portal
offers three types of goods to customers: (i) gift cards for popular shops, such as Starbucks and
Amazon; (ii) donations to several charities, which include national organizations like Habitat for
Humanity; and (iii) Tango Cards, which are a digital rewards program that can be used at hundreds of retailers, restaurants, and other stores both online and in-store.52 To purchase a good,
customers must access their rewards portal, where they can see their current tally of points. The
exchange rate between rewards points and the value of a good is approximately one cent per point
but varies as larger items are provided at a discount. For example, whereas a $1 gift card costs
100 points, a $5 gift card only costs 475 points. Compared to the residential rate of 6.963 ¢/kWh
at the beginning of the experiment, the financial rewards are equivalent to a 14.4 percent subsidy
on energy conservation below the benchmark.53
50 The

marketing literature also provides a long history of work highlighting the use of rewards and loyalty programs as part of relationship management strategies across many markets (Uncles et al., 2003; Dorotic et al., 2012).
Findings generally suggest that rewards programs increase consumer spending (Lewis, 2004; Meyer-Waarden, 2007)
and brand loyalty (Bolton et al., 2000; Verhoef, 2003; Liu, 2007). In contrast to these programs, customers in our
experiment receive rewards for reduced consumption. An additional motive for using the rewards program may be to
engage customers and make them more responsive to future utility programs.
51 Figure B4 in the appendix presents a screenshot of the rewards portal that was common to all participating
customers.
52 See https://www.tangocard.com/the-tango-card/.
53 Prices have since slightly increased, reducing the relative value of the reward to about 10 percent.
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Responses to the rewards program are likely a lower bound for effects that we would observe
in the case of direct financial rebates of the same magnitude. Customers in our experiment may
not be interested in the goods provided, despite the best efforts by Opower to offer a range of
products (Berman, 2006). If customers do not value the available options highly, the strength
of the program’s incentives is reduced. There is also evidence that consumers value gift cards
less than a cash bonus of the same amount (Pate Offenberg, 2007). Lastly, customers may face
additional costs of redeeming rewards point, such as the value of time accessing the portal and
making a choice, leading to rewards that remain unclaimed.
2.2

Experimental Design

Customers in the experiment were randomly assigned to one of three mutually exclusive groups:
(i) Control: customers who never receive any correspondence from Opower; (ii) HER Only:
customers who only receive a monthly HER; and (iii) HER+Rewards: customers who receive a
monthly HER and are encouraged to enroll in the rewards program.
We would have preferred to implement a 2x2 experimental design with an additional group
that only provides financial rewards. However, as take-up rates in past voluntary programs were
low, the partner utility was concerned that such a treatment would not generate substantial changes
in electricity use. Given these concerns and a limited sample size, we decided to focus on three
treatment cells and eschew a rewards-only group.
We summarize the outcomes of the randomization in Figure 11. Unlike the standard administration of the HER, the financial rewards program is designed as an opt-in policy. We exploit
this design feature to achieve four goals: (i) derive a clean measure of how the HER affects usage; (ii) understand how these responses are affected by the introduction of the rewards program;
(iii) study the customer types that choose to participate in the new program; and (iv) evaluate the
marginal impact of the rewards program on subsequent usage.
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Figure 11: Experimental Design and Treatment Assignment
Households
(N = 195, 826)

Control
(N = 17, 768)

HER Only
(N = 28, 061)

HER+Rewards
(N = 149, 997)

Notes: Customers are randomly assigned to one of three mutually exclusive treatment groups.
Control customers do not receive any correspondence from Opower. HER Only customers receive monthly HERs beginning in March 2013. HER+Rewards customers are encouraged to
participate in the rewards program in addition to receiving monthly HERs. N depicts the sample
size within each group. Due to administrative constraints, the experiment was implemented in
two deployment waves with identical treatments and randomization procedures. For evidence of a
successful randomization, please consult Table B1 and Table B2 in the appendix.

To encourage participation, customers in the HER+Rewards group received encouragement
messages over the course of four months. Common to all encouragements is the offer of an initial balance worth 200 points ($2) for completing the enrollment process.54 In the first month,
the encouragement message was featured on the front page of the HER. The message highlighted
the new financial rewards program and provided information about the sign-up process. Figure
12 presents an example. Except for the inclusion of the encouragement message, the HER was
identical to the reports received by customers in the HER Only group.55 In the following three
months, customers in the HER+Rewards group who had not yet signed up for the financial rewards program received a monthly email that contained the same encouragement message. These
messages were purely informational and specific to the financial rewards program—customers
in other groups were not made aware of the program. The messages also do not introduce other
energy conservation campaigns, raise awareness of the HER and strategies to conserve electricity,
or include normative appeals for energy savings.
54 The average monthly rewards points for reductions in usage are approximately 60. Hence, our signup bonus is
equal to two and a half months of savings, on average.
55 Opower routinely uses similar marketing materials in their HERs to encourage the uptake of utility programs,
such as incentives for technology adoption. Thus, customers are used to seeing slightly different versions of the HER
over time.
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Figure 12: The Encouragement Message

Notes: Example encouragement module included in the May 2013 HER for customers in the
HER+Rewards group. Customers also received emails containing the same content in June, July,
and August 2013.

As part of the encouragement design, we randomized customers into four subgroups that received different versions of the marketing messages. These versions varied in terms of how we
framed the sign-up bonus and program participation (a similar approach is used in Saez, 2009;
Bertrand et al., 2010; Hahn et al., 2016). For example, in one group we worded the sign-up bonus
as a loss instead of a gain. Across all four framings, we included the sentence “Earn points for
every kWh you save and get rewarded” and presented a sample of goods that customers can purchase with rewards points. All modules also included the web address of the sign-up website. For
this study, we pool all customers who signed up for the rewards program irrespective of when
they signed up or which behavioral framing they faced. We refer to this subset of customers as
participants throughout the paper.
Figure 13 summarizes the different elements of the experiment and its timeline. Because of
administrative constraints, the study was implemented identically in two deployment waves, i.e.,
two separate experiments. The two experiments only differ regarding pre-intervention average
usage and household characteristics. Opower randomized customers within each deployment
wave, and we include fixed effects to control for baseline differences across the experiments in
all specifications.
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Figure 13: Timeline of the Experiment
Mar2013
May2013
Sep2013
Mar2012

Rewards
Program

Apr2015

End of
Encouragement

Home Energy
Reports

Notes: The general timeline of the experiment. Vertical lines represent the begin dates of important interventions and rectangles represent the duration. We observe one year of energy usage
before the first HER in March 2013. The marketing module for the rewards program was included in the May 2013 HER and encouragement emails were delivered from June to August
2013. We observe average daily usage for each month until April 2015. The timing and content
of all interventions were identical in both deployment waves of the HER.

We begin observing consumption data in March 2012.56 In March 2013, customers in the
HER Only and HER+Rewards groups received the first HER. After two months of regular HERs,
customers in the HER+Rewards group received the encouragement message contained in the
third HER in May 2013. In the following three months, June, July, and August 2013, Opower
delivered encouragement emails to non-participating households in the same group.
2.3

Sample and Data

We observe monthly electricity usage from March 2012 to May 2015. There are two forms of
attrition in the sample. First, households can actively opt out by contacting a telephone hotline.
Only 1.05 percent of households in our sample do so. Second, some households move out of their
homes during the sample period. Overall, approximately 14 percent of accounts become inac56 Opower

only sampled households that have at least twelve months of pre-intervention data. This requirement is
necessary to provide baseline usage for the randomization and to populate the content of the HER.
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tive due to move, or about 5 percent per year. For these homes, we observe monthly consumption
data only until the account is deactivated. Regression analysis shows that move-out is uncorrelated with treatment assignment and pre-treatment usage is perfectly balanced across groups. We
include homes that become inactive in the main specifications to maximize power. Exclusion of
movers and households that opt out of the program does not affect our main conclusions.
Overall, about 196,000 residential customers participated in the experiment. Appendix Figure
B1 presents the geographic distribution of households within the service area of our partner utility. We observe close to seven million household-month reads of energy consumption, which we
translate into average daily usage. In addition to usage data, we observe a limited set of household characteristics for most customers, such as binary indicators for property owners, a proxy
for the income level of the household, and the number of adults who live in the home. Both deployment waves are perfectly balanced across consumption data and demographics, as we show
in Table B1 and Table B2 in the appendix.57
3

Experimental Results

This section presents our main results, which rely on three empirical approaches. First, we examine customer responses to the receipt of the HER and relate treatment effects in our experiment to
stylized facts in the literature. Second, we study the extensive margin and document the characteristics of customers selecting into the rewards program. Third, we exploit the random encouragement design to estimate the impact of financial rewards on subsequent usage—the intensive
margin—using both intent-to-treat and instrumental variables estimation.
Before presenting the evidence, we summarize the success of the encouragement campaign.
About 7,600 customers in the HER+Rewards group, or slightly more than five percent of the eligible sample, voluntarily participated in the rewards program. Participation rates of this magnitude are not uncommon in the literature. For example, in a study that provides free weatherization worth more than $5,000 to the average household, even a very elaborate encouragement
57 Figure

B2 and Figure B3 in the appendix provide a graphical representation of usage behavior before and after
treatment in the different treatment groups. The graphical evidence also suggests a successful randomization.
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campaign only achieved a participation rate of six percent (Fowlie et al., 2015, 2018). In our experiment, about 16 percent of participants sign up in the first 31 days after receiving the HER
marketing module. The remaining customers sign up after receiving at least one email encouragement.
The difference in the participation rates following receipt of the marketing module and the
subsequent email reminders is not surprising. The marketing module was only included in one
HER, whereas emails were sent over the course of three consecutive months. Further, the behavioral framings that were tested with the marketing module had differential impacts on sign-up
rates. To maximize participation in the rewards program, the email campaign relied solely upon
the two most successful frames. In the following discussion, we pool all participants to maximize
statistical power.
3.1

Impact of the Home Energy Report on Use

Home Energy Reports (HERs) and similar programs using social comparisons to promote behavioral change are the subject of a growing literature (Allcott, 2011c; Costa and Kahn, 2013; Ferraro and Price, 2013; Allcott and Rogers, 2014; Allcott, 2015; Brent et al., 2015). Two stylized
facts have emerged from this literature. First, the HER causes significant reductions in energy
consumption that typically range from one to two percent, with few outliers beyond this threshold. Second, energy savings are mainly driven by households with high baseline usage. Treatment effects for low-use households tend to be substantially smaller and sometimes insignificant
(Allcott, 2011c; Ferraro and Price, 2013).58 This observation suggests that the HER fails to engage substantial parts of the customer distribution.
Driven by the second stylized fact, Opower has excluded households from the lowest deciles
of the pre-intervention distribution of consumption in many of their most recent trials. Similar ex58 Allcott

(2011c) finds that customers in the first decile of the pre-treatment usage distribution do not respond to
treatment. After the second decile, responses weakly increase in decile of use. Ferraro and Price (2013) categorize
customers as high-use or low-use depending on whether a customer’s usage was above or below median usage prior
to treatment. High-use customers respond almost twice as strongly to the social information treatment than low-use
customers, although low-use customers also show significant reductions.
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clusion rules have also been used by utilities to maximize the returns of conservation campaigns.
For example, the Southern California Gas Company tested several information treatments over
the course of four years in conjunction with the roll-out of smart metering technology. Based on
small treatment effects for low-use customers in the first two years of the campaign, later years
focused on the top two quartiles of baseline usage only.59 Thus, it is important to identify policy
instruments that may encourage conservation by low-use households
We first assess the effectiveness of the HER in our sample. We do so by performing an ordinary least squares estimation in the spirit of Allcott and Rogers (2014). Technically, we estimate
a model of electricity demand in the treatment period only, i.e., after customers received the first
HER in March 2013:

Pre
Pre
Yim = α + δT HERTi + β1Yim
+ β2Yim
· ωi + ωi + µm + εim

(3)

where Yim is electricity demand in average kWh per day by customer i in month-of-sample
m. HERTi is a binary indicator for assignment of customer i to receipt of the HER in treatment
group T ∈ {HER Only, HER+Rewards}. δT is the coefficient of interest that captures the avPre denotes the average daily use in the
erage treatment effect (ATE) of receiving the HER. Yim

pre-intervention period by household i in the same calendar month as month-of-sample m.60
We allow the impact of this control variable to vary by deployment wave, with ωi = 1 indicating that customer i is part of the second experiment. We also include month-of-sample fixed effects, µm , to control for common shocks affecting all customers in month m, and a fixed effect for
the second deployment wave, ωi , to account for different baseline usage across the experiments.
We cluster heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors at the household level in all specifications
(Cameron and Miller, 2015).
59 See

semiannual reports to the California Public Utility Commission at https://www.socalgas.com/regulatory/A0809023.shtml.
the appendix, we report results from a more traditional difference-in-differences approach and from a specification allowing month-of-sample fixed effects to vary by deployment wave. See Table B4 and Table B3. Findings are
unchanged.
60 In
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We also estimate a variant of Equation 3 that allows treatment responses to vary by customer
type. In these specifications, we interact the treatment indicator with a wave-specific binary indicator for two distinct customer types: (i) high-use, which are customers using more than the
median level of consumption in the twelve months prior to the experiment; and (ii) high-variance,
which is an analogous indicator for customers whose variance of usage is above the median in
the pre-experiment period. The high-use indicator is a proxy for households that likely live in
larger homes, have larger families, and have more margins for adjustments to their energy usage. We use the variance of use as a crude measure of adjustment behavior undertaken by homes
before treatment. For example, we expect high-variance customers to respond stronger to exogenous factors, such as weather. Because these customers adjust usage regularly, they may be more
aware of low cost strategies to reduce consumption in response to treatment. For these reasons,
we expect both high-use and high-variance customers to respond stronger to the HER.
Table 5 presents results from five different estimations of Equation 3. In the first two columns,
we examine how customers in our two treatment groups of interest respond to the HER by comparing their use in the post-intervention period to counterparts in the control group. As noted in
column 1, the average customer in the HER Only group reduces daily electricity consumption by
about 0.26 kWh, an effect that is statistically significant at the one percent level. In relative terms,
this point estimate implies a reduction of about 1.1 percent compared to the average consumption
in the control group. To place these reductions into perspective, the estimated treatment effects
are equivalent to treated households turning off three CFL light bulbs for eight hours each day.
The magnitude of our treatment effects falls well into the range identified in prior work exploring
the effects of the HER (Allcott, 2015).
Column 2 of Table 5 examines the effect of the HER on use for households in the HER+Rewards
group. Customers in this treatment decrease their daily energy demand by 0.33 kWh or approximately 1.4 percent relative to counterparts in the control group. Compared to the reductions noted
for the HER Only group in column 1, HER+Rewards customers reduce energy demand by 0.07
kWh per day more. This difference is significant at the ten percent level and provides the first evi-
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Table 5: Impact of the Home Energy Report on Electricity Consumption
NonParticipants
(3)

Full Sample
(1)
(2)
HER Only

-0.2591***
(0.0575)

HER+Rewards

Heterogeneous
Responses
(4)
(5)
-0.1280**
(0.0552)

-0.3293***
(0.0481)

-0.3075***
(0.0483)

HER Only · High-Use

-0.2729**
(0.1136)

HER Only · High-Var
Control average
R2
Observations
Households

-0.0773
(0.0555)

-0.3525***
(0.1145)
24.4411

24.4411

24.4411

24.4411

24.4411

0.721
1,074,848
44,892

0.721
3,960,937
164,601

0.720
3,772,564
156,969

0.723
1,074,848
44,892

0.722
1,074,848
44,892

Notes: The dependent variable is average daily electricity usage (kWh) in each month. Models
are defined as in Equation 3 and always include deployment wave and month-of-sample fixed
effects. The analysis is restricted to the treatment period, i.e., March 2013 and later. We control
for pre-experiment usage by including the average daily use in the same calendar month before
treatment and we allow the effect of this control variable to differ by deployment wave. Columns
1 and 2 compare HER Only and HER+Rewards to Control customers, respectively. Column 3
repeats the estimation for the subset of HER+Rewards customers who do not participate in the
rewards program. Columns 4 and 5 examine heterogeneous responses in the HER Only group.
We estimate an interacted model that allows all effects to vary by whether a customer was below
or above the medium of average usage or variance of use in the pre-experiment period. We only
present coefficients of interest. We estimate robust standard errors that are clustered at the household level for all specifications. *** denotes significance at the 1 percent level, ** at the 5 percent
level, and * at the 10 percent level.

dence that awareness of the rewards program affects customer behavior. We conduct a more thorough comparison of the two groups in section 3.3 to understand better what drives the additional
reductions by households offered the opportunity to enroll in the rewards program.
In the third column, we estimate the same model for the subset of customers in the HER+Rewards
group who never sign up for the rewards program. The decline in the point estimate relative to
column 2 implies that participants realize larger reductions than non-participants. This result sug-
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gests that the financial incentives to conserve energy may affect behavior. Furthermore, the 0.022
kWh difference between the treatment effect for all households assigned to the HER+Rewards
group and the subset of non-participants in this group is significant at the one percent level.
Comparing column 3 to column 1, we find that treatment effects of non-participants in the
HER+Rewards group and HER Only customers do not differ at conventional levels. The lack of a
difference between these two groups is noteworthy and provides evidence that the introduction of
financial incentives does not crowd out responses to the normative appeal embedded in the HER.
This finding is at odds with a sizable literature showing that assigning a price to a socially beneficial activity can crowd out pro-social motives (Gneezy et al., 2011; Bowles and Polania-Reyes,
2012; Kamenica, 2012). In our sample, the introduction of rewards points for energy conservation does not diminish the average response to the social information contained in the HER.61
Although we are unable to determine why there is no crowd-out in our experiment, our findings
lend credence to Gneezy et al. (2011), who conjecture that the tension between intrinsic and extrinsic incentives should be less pronounced when financial incentives are provided for actions
that are unobserved by others, such as energy consumption within one’s private residence.
Finally, columns 4 and 5 examine how responses to the HER differ by pre-treatment behavior in the HER Only group. The HER Only coefficients in the two columns represent responses
by low-use and low-variance customers, respectively. Reductions in use for low-users, although
statistically significant, are approximately one-third of those observed amongst high-use counterparts in this treatment. This difference is statistically significant at the five percent level. Use in
the post-intervention period for low-variance customers does not differ from the control group.
High-variance households, however, significantly reduce use upon receipt of the HER.
As the marginal effects of high-use and high-variance customers exceed the ATE in column 1,
our data suggest that behavior in our sample conforms to the second stylized fact. Reductions in
61 We cannot directly test the so-called overjustification effect, which predicts that the shift from intrinsic to extrinsic motives after the introduction of financial rewards affects behavior after the rewards are discontinued (e.g., Deci
et al., 1999). In this experiment, we never discontinue the rewards program. However, the lack of crowd-out suggests that an overjustification effect may not be present in this setting, where customers can self-select into different
incentives types.

69

usage are predominantly driven by high-use and high-variance customers. In fact, if we estimate
our model using finer usage bins, such as deciles, we find that estimated treatment effects weakly
increase across deciles; a relationship consistent with patterns documented in Allcott (2011c) and
Ferraro and Price (2013).
3.2

Characteristics of Participants in the Rewards Program

The design of the experiment allows us to study the characteristics of customers who chose to
participate in the rewards program. As we show above, the HER has a greater impact on demand
amongst high-use and high-variance customers. From the perspective of the utility and the policy
maker, it is important to assess whether alternative policies, such as the financial rewards program, can influence the behavior of other customer types—particularly those who are less responsive to the HER. To understand participation decisions, we compare characteristics of program
participants and non-participants within the HER+Rewards group.
As a first metric, we compare customers along pre-intervention usage measures and then explore potential differences across several household characteristics.
Figure 14 visually explores the relationship between our two measures of pre-intervention
use and the decision to sign up for and participate in the financial rewards program. We plot
the difference between the proportion of participants in each decile of the distribution of preintervention use and a uniform baseline.62 A positive difference—represented by bars above the
uniform counterfactual—indicates a larger than expected number of participants from that specific decile. Bars below the zero-line imply that fewer than 10 percent of participants in the program are drawn from that decile.
As noted in Figure 14, participants are disproportionately drawn from households in the lowest deciles of both consumption measures, and this shift in the distribution is driven by customers
in the left tails of the distributions. Overall, about 4.1 percent more low-use and 5.8 percent more
low-variance customers than predicted by the uniform baseline participate in the program. If we
62 If

participation were independent of consumption, we expect ten percent of participants to be drawn from each
decile. This behavior would be reflected by a straight line at zero.
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Figure 14: Distribution of Participants in the Rewards Program
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Notes: We plot the difference between a uniform distribution and the actual distribution of participants across deciles of two usage measures: (a) average pre-experiment usage and (b) variance
of pre-experiment use. Deviations above the zero-line imply that more than 10 percent of participants are from a given decile; deviations below imply the opposite. We pool all participants in
the financial rewards program. χ2 -Tests reject the null hypothesis of equal distributions for all
comparisons at p < 0.01.

restrict the comparison to early enrollees, i.e., customers who sign up in response to encouragement message included in the HER, we find this pattern to be more pronounced. The lowest three
deciles have 9.4 (10.5) percent more customers than would be expected under a uniform baseline
for average usage (variance). We present these findings in Figure B5 in the appendix. To determine the significance of differences from a uniform baseline, we perform χ2 -Tests and find that
the distributions are significantly different from each other at the one percent level.63
In Table 6, we compare customers along several additional characteristics. To control for
differences across deployment waves, we regress each characteristic on a binary indicator for
participation, and a deployment wave fixed effect. Results confirm that participants use significantly less energy before the experiment than customers who do not enroll. For example, panel
A shows that the average participant uses about 1.15 kWh, or 4.5 percent, less per day than non63 We

also perform Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests with the full distribution of pre-intervention consumption behavior.
Results are unchanged.
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Table 6: Characteristics of Participants in the Rewards Program
Panel A: Pre-Intervention Usage Measures
Use
(1)

Use (Summer)
(2)

Use (Winter)
(3)

Variance
(4)

-1.1438***
(0.1417)

-1.2315***
(0.1821)

-1.3659***
(0.1661)

-19.5116***
(1.8664)

Non-participant avg.

25.4303

29.6103

25.3508

92.5384

R2

0.094
149,997

0.049
149,997

0.095
149,997

0.014
149,981

Participant

Households

Panel B: Other Household Characteristics
Income
(5)

Number of
Children
(6)

Number of
Adults
(7)

Home
Ownership
(8)

Green
Affinity
(9)

Home
Improvements
(10)

0.5397***
(0.0289)

-0.6933***
(0.0215)

-0.0208*
(0.0118)

-0.0024
(0.0040)

0.0357***
(0.0047)

0.0038
(0.0045)

Non-participant avg.

7.9670

1.9835

2.1793

0.8797

0.1622

0.1673

R2
Households

0.074
141,585

0.027
46,884

0.004
137,718

0.010
129,914

0.005
145,761

0.008
145,761

Participant

Notes: Regression of household characteristics on an indicator for participation in the financial
rewards program. The analysis is restricted to customers in the HER+Rewards group. We do not
observe all household characteristics for each customer. All measures are provided by the partner
utility and are based on internal records and estimates by a marketing consultancy. Income is
reported on a 15-bin scale, owner, green affinity, and home improvement are binary indicators.
We estimate robust standard errors for all specifications. *** denotes significance at the 1 percent
level, ** at the 5 percent level, and * at the 10 percent level.

participants during the pre-intervention period. Differences across types are larger, in absolute
value, if we compare consumption during either summer or winter months, when electricity demand is higher. A similar pattern arises when we examine the variance of use across participants
and non-participants. Participants’ use is substantially less variable than that of non-participants.
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Participants also differ along several other household characteristics. As noted in panel B of
Table 6, the average participant (i) is significantly wealthier than non-participating counterparts;
(ii) lives in a home with fewer adults and children; and (iii) scores higher on a green affinity index provided by a marketing consultancy.64 Interestingly, however, we find no differences in
home ownership or in the propensity to have participated in utility-sponsored home improvement
programs.
The characteristics of households that elect to participate in the rewards program are noteworthy for several reasons. First, low-use and low-variance customers are least responsive to the
HER and often excluded from utility-sponsored conservation programs.65 Second, high-use and
high-variance customers may mechanically benefit more from the incentive structure of the rewards program because they respond strongly to the HER. Given that the baseline from which
reductions were measured was based upon pre-intervention use, any changes in use driven by the
receipt of the HER would earn the household points if they elected to participate in the rewards
program. High-variance customers may further benefit from the program even in the absence of
adjustments. Fluctuations in use lead to an accumulation of rewards points because reductions
relative to the baseline are rewarded but increases in use are not penalized; hence one would
expect households with more variation in use to earn more points independent of any attempts
to conserve. Third, the costs of adjustments to consumption may differ across customer types.
On average, one would expect that households with greater baseline usage would have more (or
cheaper) margins for adjustment.
These findings are consistent with earlier work in energy economics documenting that the
“wrong” types of customers act in response to voluntary programs. For example, Hortacsu et al.
(2017) find that low-income customers are more likely to exhibit biases that prevent them from
switching to a cheaper alternative provider of residential energy. Similarly, Fowlie et al. (2015)
64 The green affinity indicator captures an estimate of how a household feels about the environment and related
green products based on household and neighborhood characteristics.
65 For example, households from the lowest quartile of pre-intervention use were excluded from the set of households who received treatment letters in Ferraro and Price (2013). The exclusion of such households was done at the
request of the partner utility who indicated that they do not target such households when promoting programs.
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show that an encouragement for a weatherization program attracted customers that had lower
expected savings than those who chose to receive weatherization in the control group. Unfortunately, we cannot provide a similar comparison because control households could not participate
in the financial rewards program.
3.3

Impact of the Rewards Program on Subsequent Use

We next study whether the financial rewards program caused significant changes in subsequent
energy use. The experiment does not provide a test of the program in isolation. However, we can
use the random encouragement design to compare the HER Only to the HER+Rewards group and
recover the marginal effect of the program for those already receiving a monthly HER.
To evaluate the impact of the program, we provide estimates using two distinct approaches.
First, we estimate an intent-to-treat (ITT) effect of being randomly assigned to the HER+Rewards
group. This approach captures the program impacts for the average customer who we encourage to participate. Given the voluntary nature of the program, this is the policy-relevant impact
measure for the implementing utility. Second, the random encouragement design provides a natural instrument for actual sign-up and a way to measure the causal effect of participation in the
rewards program on subsequent use. To do so, we estimate a two-stage least squares model and
derive the local average treatment effect (LATE) for program participants, instrumenting for their
participation decision with random assignment to the HER+Rewards group (see, for example,
Fowlie et al., 2015, 2018, for similar approaches).66

66 To

interpret our LATE estimate as causal, we must invoke an exclusion restriction that customers only change
consumption through participation in the rewards program but not directly in response to the encouragement messages themselves. As the messages are short-lived, only contain information about the rewards program, and do not
include other prompts for conservation or advice on how/why to save energy, we believe that the exclusion restriction
holds.
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Both estimation procedures capture marginal responses to the rewards program net of the
baseline effect of the HER. Unfortunately, the relatively small number of program participants
makes a precise estimation of program impacts challenging. For this reason, we restrict the analysis to a small number of relevant comparisons and rely predominantly on the ITT as a measure of
program impact.
Following the approach in section 3.1, we estimate a simple model of energy demand in the
treatment period:

Pre
Pre
Yim = α + δIT T Rewardsi + β1Yim
+ β2Yim
· ωi + ωi + µm + εim

(4)

where Rewardsi is a binary indicator for assignment of household i to the HER+Rewards
group. All other variables are defined as in Equation 3, i.e., we include controls for pre-intervention
Pre ), month-of-sample fixed effects (µ ), and a fixed effect for
use in the same calendar month (Yim
m

the second deployment wave (ωi ).67
This specification estimates the ITT effect, δˆ IT T . For the instrumental variables approach, we
use an indicator that equals one in the month of sign-up and in all following months, and zero
otherwise, SignUpim . We instrument for actual participation with Rewardsi , and estimate δˆ LAT E .
All specifications use heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors that we cluster at the household
level. The sample period is restricted to observations during and after receipt of the first encouragement message in May 2013.
Table 7 presents results. In columns 1 and 2, we report the ITT and LATE for the total sample
of HER Only and HER+Rewards customers. We find that the average customer in the HER+Rewards
group reduces demand by about 0.07 kWh above and beyond the effect of the HER in isolation.
This point estimate represents more than one-quarter of the HER’s treatment effect in the HER
Only group, an effect size that is notable given the small number of participants in the program.
However, the effect is only significant at the ten percent level meaning that the 95 percent confi67 Table

B5 in the appendix reports regression results from Equation 4 that allows month-of-sample fixed effects to
vary by deployment wave.
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Table 7: Impact of the Rewards Program on Subsequent Electricity Consumption
All HER
Recipients
ITT
LATE
(1)
(2)
HER+Rewards

-0.0664*
(0.0398)

Participation

-1.4001*
(0.8400)

First-stage F-statistic
First-stage p-value
HER Only average

5932.11
0.00
22.6537

R2
Observations
Households

22.6537

0.721
0.721
3,850,288 3,850,288
173,450
173,450

Low-Use
(3)

Heterogeneous
Treatment Effects
Low-Var
High-Use
(4)
(5)

High-Var
(6)

-0.0334
(0.0382)

-0.1000**
(0.0396)

-0.0909
(0.0685)

-0.0378
(0.0689)

22.6537

22.6537

22.6537

22.6537

0.507
1,881,555
86,103

0.643
1,921,168
86,814

0.662
1,968,733
87,340

0.694
1,929,120
86,629

Notes: The dependent variable is average daily electricity usage (kWh) in each month. Models
are defined as in Equation 4 and always include deployment wave and month-of-sample fixed
effects. The analysis is restricted to the post-rewards period, i.e., May 2013 and later. We control for pre-experiment usage by including the average daily use in the same calendar month
before treatment and we allow the effect of this control variable to differ by deployment wave.
Columns 1 and 2 directly compare the HER Only and the HER+Rewards group. We present both
an intent-to-treat (ITT) effect of being randomly assigned to the HER+Rewards group and a local
average treatment effect (LATE), where we instrument for actual participation with assignment
to the HER+Rewards group. Columns 3 and 4 estimate the ITT model separately for low-use
and low-variance customers, respectively. We only present coefficients of interest. We estimate
robust standard errors that are clustered at the household level for all specifications. *** denotes
significance at the 1 percent level, ** at the 5 percent level, and * at the 10 percent level.

dence interval includes an effect of 0. The instrumental variables approach provides an estimated
LATE of about 1.4 kWh for participants. Compared to the effect in the HER Only group, participants in the rewards program conserve significantly more energy than those exposed solely to
the HER. These reductions are realized despite drawing many low-use participants, the customer
types that are less responsive to the HER.
Before discussing the policy implications of our findings, we briefly explore heterogeneities
in responses to the rewards program in columns 3 and 4 of Table 7. To estimate the ITT effects
by customer type, we re-estimate Equation 4 for customers that are low-use and low-variance, re76

spectively. We find negative point estimates for both groups, indicating that the rewards program
affects the behavior of low users and promotes reductions in use beyond that observed by similar
counterparts in the HER Only group. We note that only the effect for low-variance customers is
significant at the ten percent level or below, however.
Revisiting our initial results comparing behavior across the HER Only and HER+Rewards
treatments, we can now draw more nuanced conclusions. The rewards program attracts specific
customer types, who differ from non-participants along several observable margins, and motivates them to reduce their energy consumption significantly. This finding provides evidence that
the two programs in conjunction can promote greater energy conservation than the HER in isolation. We also find indications that the financial rewards program serves to engage customer types
that are least responsive to the HER and frequently eschewed by utilities when promoting energy
efficiency programs.
4

Policy Implications

In this section, we expand on our empirical findings by exploring the policy implications of the
rewards program. We first use administrative data to construct a popular measure of program success: cost-effectiveness. We then conduct a partial welfare analysis considering the specific incentive structure of the program. Because the program raises the marginal price for use below the
benchmark level, the fundamental question from a welfare perspective is how the new marginal
price compares to the social cost of the marginal unit abated.
4.1

Cost-Effectiveness Calculations

Cost-effectiveness represents the cost to the utility of conserving one kWh of energy (Allcott and
Mullainathan, 2010; Ito, 2015). In the case of the rewards program, program costs consist of the
financial signup bonus and repeated subsidy payments to households that reduce energy demand
below their benchmark.68
68 Allcott

and Mullainathan (2010) show that implementing a conventional HER program costs about $7.48 per
household-year. Correspondence with Opower shows that, outside of up-front programming expenses, providing the
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Based on monthly administrative data provided by the utility, we construct a total tally of
points awarded to program participants. We then use the constant exchange rate (100 points equal
$1) to derive the monetary value of all points as a measure of total program costs in dollars. We
compare these program costs to energy savings based on estimates from section 3.3. Because we
assume a constant exchange rate and consumers receive discounts on more expensive items, our
estimate of cost-effectiveness should be considered a lower bound.
Table 8: Program Impacts and Cost-Effectiveness Calculations

Scenarios
S1
Parameters:
βˆ (kWh)
0.0664
N (Customers)
195,826
c ($)
0.741
T (Days)
570
Program Impacts:
Costs ($)
145,107
Savings (kWh)
7,411,622
Cost-Effectiveness:
¢/kWh
1.96

S2
1.4001
7,634
14.559
570
111,144
6,092,367
1.82

Notes: Overview of important assumptions and outcomes of simple cost-effectiveness calculations for two scenarios. S1: use estimated ITT and average program costs per eligible household
(c) for all customers in the experiment; S2: use estimated LATE and average program costs per
participant for all participants only. To calculate costs, we use the observed average cost in $ per
household based on a conversion rate of 1¢/point. Total savings are calculated by multiplying
ˆ and the
the number of households (N) by the corresponding average daily treatment effect (β)
average number of days in the program for participants (T ). Lastly, cost-effectiveness is derived
by dividing total costs and total savings. This measure can be interpreted as the cost to the utility
(in ¢) of reducing customer demand by one kWh.

We derive cost-effectiveness for two simple scenarios: (S1) scaling up the intervention to the
total experimental sample; and (S2) evaluating the impact of the rewards program for actual participants. The average participant accumulates about 1,455 points between May 2013 and April
marketing modules in HERs and emails was virtually costless to the utility. We do not have a measure of up-front
costs for the implementation of the rewards program and ignore these fixed costs in the calculations following the
existing literature.
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2015. In aggregate, the program cost about $111,100; $14.56 per participant; and $0.74 per eligible household. By the end of the sample period, only a small percentage (23 percent) of accumulated points had been redeemed by participants. To the extent that some consumers may fail to
redeem virtual points, our back-of-the envelope calculations might overstate actual program costs
because we assume that all points are ultimately redeemed.
To measure energy savings, we use the ITT effect for S1 and the LATE for S2 combined with
the corresponding sample sizes. We determine total savings by multiplying the conservation coˆ with the sample size (N) and scaling the resulting person-day savings by the average
efficient (β)
time in the program (T = 570). Outcomes of this exercise are reported in Table 8. Customers in
the two scenarios save about 7.4 and 6.1 million kWh, respectively. We also adjust the cost, c,
depending on the scenario. For S1, we use the average point cost per eligible household and for
S2 the cost per participant. This approach implies a cost-effectiveness of 1.95 ¢/kWh and 1.82
¢/kWh in S1 and S2, respectively. Using estimates from Allcott and Mullainathan (2010), the
cost-effectiveness of the financial rewards program compares favorably to many other energyefficiency programs, such as energy audits or technology subsidies (1.6-6.4¢/kWh) and the standard HER (2.5¢/kWh). Our estimates are also similar to Ito (2015), who derives a cost-effectiveness
measure of 2.5¢/kWh for a general rebate program in inland areas of California.
One important difficulty in extrapolating our findings to the entire experimental population or
the general population outside of the experiment is that we cannot predict behavior of customers
who did not participate in the program (Kowalski, 2016). It is likely that customers who signed
up for the rewards program are more likely to achieve (larger) reductions in subsequent consumption than customers who did not sign up. For example, Fowlie et al. (2017) and Wang and Ida
(2017) show that customers who actively chose to participate in dynamic pricing experiments responded to price changes much stronger than households who were defaulted into the programs.
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4.2

(Partial) Welfare Considerations

We next move from the perspective of the utility to that of a social planner by conducting a (partial) welfare analysis. Our experiment does not provide the necessary variation to elicit unobserved costs or benefits that may accrue to the customer (Allcott and Kessler, 2015).69 We can
use insights from previous work, however, to understand how the underlying incentive structure
likely affects social welfare. Because the rewards program implicitly increases the marginal price
(P), the short-run welfare implications depend on how the original P compares to the marginal
social cost (MSC) of electricity production.
Our partial measure of the MSC is based on Graff Zivin et al. (2014), who estimate marginal
generation costs and marginal carbon emissions for all NERC regions and each hour-of-day.70
To derive the MSC for our partner utility, we combine the unweighted average marginal generation costs for the NPCC region (Graff Zivin et al., 2014, Table A3, p. 266) with the marginal
carbon emissions (Panel A of Fig. 5, p. 259). We then translate this measure into dollar values
by using the current social cost of carbon estimates ($36 per metric ton or 1.63 ¢/lb.; EPA, 2016).
This calculation leads to a partial MSC of 8.01 ¢/kWh.71 Importantly, our MSC is a lower bound
and does not include other pollutants such as sulfur oxide and particulate matter, and other unobserved costs. Moreover, our estimate of the MSC depends crucially on the assumed social cost of
carbon.
To derive our final measure of (partial) welfare, we compare the estimated MSC to P. The
flat rate for each kWh consumed at the beginning of the intervention in March 2013 was 6.96
¢/kWh. The implied subsidy of approximately 1 ¢/kWh increases the de facto marginal price for
69 Allcott

and Kessler (2015) use multiple price lists to elicit willingness-to-pay (WTP) of customers for continued
receipt of the HER. In a revealed preference interpretation, such a measure includes otherwise unobservable indirect
costs and benefits to customers (e.g., investments, time cost, psychological costs, warm glow). Allcott and Kessler
(2015) find that, on average, WTP is positive and the HER increases social welfare. However, there is substantial
heterogeneity across recipients and non-energy costs reduce welfare gains considerably.
70 Holland et al. (2016) take a very similar approach.
71 Average unweighted marginal generation costs are 5.924 ¢/kWh and marginal carbon emissions are 2.349
¢/kWh. These values are based on data from 2007-2009 used in Graff Zivin et al. (2014). We also obtain the wholesale market prices faced by the partner utility which provide very similar measures of private costs (unweighted
average price in 2013 of 5.61 ¢/kWh; price weighted by load of 6.03 ¢/kWh) and lead to the same conclusions
throughout.
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program participants on units below the benchmark level of consumption to 7.96 ¢/kWh. From a
welfare perspective, such an increase is beneficial if the MSC is above the private cost faced by
customers. In our setting, the MSC exceeds the subsidy-inclusive marginal price, which implies
that the introduction of the rewards program narrows the gap between the MSC of electricity generation and the private cost of a unit of electricity.72 More generally, welfare conclusions depend
on the local cost structure—regions and times when MSC exceeds P imply increases, those where
P is greater than MSC before a price change imply decreases in welfare. Our conclusions could
also change over time as one would expect the utility to pass through program costs to customers
via future price increases (Boomhower and Davis, 2014; Ito, 2015).
5

Discussion

Nudges leveraging social comparisons to encourage changes in behavior have become a popular
alternative to traditional policy approaches. While such interventions have been shown to induce
behavioral change at relatively low cost, many open questions about the design and impact of
social comparisons remain. For example, within the area of residential energy and water demand,
social comparison letters have been shown an effective strategy to promote reductions in resource
use. However, energy and water savings are driven largely by high-use households and rarely
exceed a two percent threshold. Whether, and how, utilities can engage a broader set of customers
and influence the consumption of lower user groups thus remains an unanswered question and
serves to limit the effectiveness of social comparisons as a policy tool.
We use a natural field experiment to document a promising way to both increase overall conservation efforts and engage a broader set of customers. The core of our approach relies on combining Opower’s social comparison letter, the HER, with a program offering financial rewards for
reductions in household energy demand. We find that the two incentive types complement each
72 Two

other utilities operate in the state of our partner utility. In 2013, the first utility charged 7.31 ¢/kWh, which
implies welfare improvements if a similar rebate policy were to be implemented. The second utility varies its residential rates by season. From October to May, our calculations imply welfare gains from further price increases,
for the June to September season, on the other hand, P outweighs MSC and welfare would fall due to a larger gap
between private and social cost.
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other in three important ways. First, the rewards program attracts disproportionately many lowuse and low-variance participants. These customers are least responsive to the traditional HER.
Second, the rewards program induces energy savings for the average participant. Third, the introduction of financial incentives does not adversely affect responses to the HER by households who
did not participate in the rewards program but were encouraged to do so. We do not find evidence
that intrinsic motives are crowded out by the financial rewards. Thus, in our setting, a combination of the two programs increases environmental conservation compared to using the HER in
isolation.
Despite these findings, it is important to note that the introduction of the rewards program
has little effect on energy use for the average household. The main reason for the modest average
effect is low participation in the program. While opt-in policies play an important role in policy making, economists still lack a clear understanding of how we can increase participation in
voluntary programs (besides turning to defaults; e.g., Kahneman, 2003). We believe that there
is much scope for future work harnessing insights from behavioral economics to increase participation rates. Moreover, with a larger set of participating customers, encouragement designs
can be used to identify important policy parameters. For example, generalizing results from selfselected samples to a general population relies on understanding which types of customers do and
do not respond to treatment—and how voluntary participants differ from customers that were automatically enrolled (Kowalski, 2016; Fowlie et al., 2017; Wang and Ida, 2017). In our case, the
random encouragement design affords interesting insights into participation decisions. The encouragement may act as a screening device for customers interested in a specific incentive type
(e.g., Lazear et al., 2012; Fowlie et al., 2017).
More broadly, our natural field experiment provides a successful case study of how policy
makers can combine behavioral and financial programs to achieve policy goals. While different
incentive types have been shown to attenuate each other under some circumstances, the success
of our combined intervention suggests the need for a better understanding of when incentives do
and do not work well together (Gneezy et al., 2011). In a policy environment with an increas-
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ing number of small interventions, it is important to understand whether and when combining
multiple programs can be a viable alternative to one-size-fits-all approaches. Future work should
explore this question in greater detail and uncover why we find no evidence of crowding.
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IV

Chapter 3: Testing for Crowd Out in Social Nudges: Evidence from a Natural Field Experiment in the Market for Electricity

1

Introduction

Economists have traditionally advocated for market-based regulation to promote the conservation
of natural resources (Boiteux, 1960; Kahn, 1970; Montgomery, 1972; Baumol and Oates, 1988).
However, a growing body of evidence finds that interventions based on insights from social psychology and sociology, so-called social nudges, are viable alternatives that can encourage significant resource conservation at low cost (Allcott and Mullainathan, 2010; Benartzi et al., 2017).
Despite strong academic interest and major advances in our understanding of how social nudges
operate, key gaps in the literature remain.73
In this study, we consider the open question of whether social nudges fall prey to crowd out
effects. We define a crowd out effect as a situation in which the effectiveness of a social nudge is
attenuated by the earlier receipt of a different social nudge. While the existing literature shows
that social nudges can affect behavior across many settings, these studies typically only consider
the effectiveness of one nudge in isolation. In a policy environment that increasingly encourages
the use of social nudges and similar interventions, many individuals are likely exposed to multiple nudges in several different markets. If social nudges are susceptible to crowd out effects, then
earlier studies may dramatically overstate the performance of social nudges in real world regulatory regimes where individuals are nudged across multiple domains.
In this study, we assess the question of crowd out in the residential electricity market. We
estimate the effects of two distinct social nudges that are applied both in isolation and in combination within a given sample of households. Both nudges use a social comparison, where the
choices of a nudge’s recipient are compared to the behavior of similar households (Festinger,
73 Examples

of recent innovations in the energy sector include studies that investigate the underlying mechanisms
(Allcott and Rogers, 2014; Brandon et al., 2017) or welfare effects of nudges (Allcott and Kessler, 2015).
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1954).74 The first nudge, the Home Energy Report (HER), is a bimonthly mailer with a social
comparison and targets aggregate household electricity consumption. The HER has been studied
widely and has been shown to lead to reductions in use of one to three percent across dozens of
experimental sites (Allcott, 2011c; Ayres et al., 2013; Costa and Kahn, 2013; Allcott and Rogers,
2014; Allcott, 2015; Brandon et al., 2017; List et al., 2017). The second nudge, which we call the
Peak Energy Report (PER), targets household electricity consumption during peak load events,
periods with extraordinarily high demand for electricity. The PER consists of automated phone
calls that compare a household’s electricity usage during peak load events to that of similar households. Efforts to curb peak load use feature prominently in energy policy because there generally is a mismatch between wholesale and retail prices within and across days in the energy sector, and moving consumption temporally can have large effects on emissions and social welfare
(Borenstein, 2002, 2005; Joskow, 2012).75
We use data from a large natural field experiment that was conducted in Southern California
during the summer of 2014. In the experiment, 42,100 households were randomly assigned to
one of four mutually exclusive groups: (i) a control group that did not receive any communications; (ii) a group that only received the HER; (iii) a group that only received the PER; and (iv) a
group that received both the HER and PER. We combine information about the treatment assignment of each household with more than 30 million observations of hourly household electricity
consumption. Empirically, we identify the conservation effect of each social nudge in isolation
and the total effect of the combined intervention.
Our analysis focuses on estimating the extent to which the HER crowds out the conservation effect of the PER during three peak load events that occurred over a two-month period in
the summer of 2014. To assess crowd out, we compare the effect of receiving both social nudges
during these peak load events to the sum of the conservation effects caused by the HER and PER
74 Although we focus on the environmental context, social comparisons have been applied across a broad spectrum
of behaviors, including voting participation (Gerber et al., 2008; Gerber and Rogers, 2009), charitable giving (Frey
and Meier, 2004; Shang and Croson, 2009), and tax compliance (Hallsworth et al., 2017), amongst others.
75 Policies targeting peak load consumption typically focus on relative price changes (Faruqui and Sergici, 2010;
Wolak, 2011; Jessoe and Rapson, 2014). To the best of our knowledge, the sole exception studies a simple prompt to
conserve energy during peak hours (Ito et al., 2018).
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treatments in isolation. In doing so, we want to understand if the effect of the combined intervention differs from naïvely summing the treatment effects from the two nudges in isolation, information that is typically provided by existing studies. If the combined effect is less than the sum
of the isolated effects, then receipt of a social nudge crowds out the effectiveness of a subsequent
social nudge in our setting.
We find that receipt of the PER in isolation causes a 3.8 percent reduction in electricity consumption during the hours of a peak load event. Households that only receive the HER reduce
their use by around 2.1 percent, which matches the existing literature well (Allcott, 2011c, 2015).
Interestingly, when received in combination, the two social nudges cause households to reduce
their electricity consumption by approximately 6.8 percent. While this reduction is marginally
larger than the summation of the individual effects, the two effects do not differ statistically from
each other. To put these effects into perspective, the price of electricity would have to be increased by nearly 70 percent during peak load events to achieve the electricity savings of receiving both the HER and the PER (Faruqui and Sergici, 2010; Wolak, 2011; Jessoe and Rapson, 2014; Ito et al., 2018). Furthermore, these findings suggest that the effect of the PER is not
crowded out for households that have already received the HER.
This study makes several contributions. Our main contribution is that, to the best of your
knowledge, we provide the first analysis of multiple social nudges applied within the same population. We find that, if anything, there is a crowding in effect because the effect of the combined
intervention is marginally larger than that of the sum of the individual nudges. This study also
contributes to several additional strands of literature. It provides the first evidence on the hourly
heterogeneity of the HER. Our findings show that the HER affects energy consumption almost
uniformly across all hours of a day. Furthermore, this study contributes to work on so-called
demand response programs, which have largely relied on the use of dynamic pricing to encourage reductions in peak electricity use (e.g, Faruqui and Sergici, 2010; Wolak, 2011; Jessoe and
Rapson, 2014; Ito et al., 2018). Finally, this paper speaks to a growing literature aiming to empirically identify moral licensing and similar psychological phenomena in real world markets
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(DellaVigna, 2009; Tiefenbeck et al., 2013). Our findings suggest that the existence of such effects depends crucially on the context and that these phenomena may not be prevalent in all important policy environments, such as the energy markets.
The remainder of this study is organized as follows. First, we discuss the experimental design
in greater detail and assess balance in our sample. Second, we present results from a graphical
analysis and from several linear regressions. Lastly, we conclude and provide suggestions for
future research.
2

Experimental Design, Data, and Balance

In this section, we discuss details of the experimental design, which consisted of two main phases.
We then describe the data at our disposal and assess the balance in our sample based on preexperiment electricity consumption.
2.1

Experimental Design

We use data from a natural field experiment designed and implemented by the company Opower
in partnership with a water and power utility in Southern California.76 42,100 households participated in the experiment, which lasted for several years. It consisted of two phases that introduced one intervention each. Both interventions use a social comparison, the comparison of a
recipient’s behavior—in this case electricity consumption—to the behavior of similar households
(Festinger, 1954).
In the first phase, households were randomly assigned to a treatment or control group, where
the treatment group received a bimonthly Home Energy Report (HER). The contents of the HER
are illustrated in Figure 15. In the report, electricity consumption by the recipient is compared
to the average usage of 100 households in the recipient’s neighborhood group and to the average
consumption of the 20 most efficient homes in that same group. Depending on the household’s
location in the usage distribution, recipients receive an injunctive norm in the form of a smiley or
76 Opower

is a leading provider of customer engagement and energy efficiency solutions for the energy sector and
is now owned by Oracle Utilities.
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a neutral face.77 The HER is a popular social nudge that has been studied widely by economists
and has been contracted to over 100 utilities nationwide (Allcott, 2011c; Ayres et al., 2013; Costa
and Kahn, 2013; Allcott and Rogers, 2014; Allcott, 2015; Brandon et al., 2017; List et al., 2017).
The main goal of the HER is to encourage reductions in aggregate monthly energy consumption.
Previous studies show that the HER leads to average reductions in use of between one and three
percent across dozens of experimental sites and achieves these energy savings at relatively low
cost (Allcott and Mullainathan, 2010; Allcott, 2015).
Figure 15: The Home Energy Report’s (HER) Social Comparison Module

Notes: Example social comparison module of the Home Energy Report. See Appendix Figure C3
for a full report.

In the second phase, the same households were cross-randomized into another treatment or
control group. Households in the treatment group received a second social nudge called the Peak
Energy Report (PER). The PER is an intervention that mimics the contents of the HER but targets
77 The

HER also contains several other components, such as historical usage data, conservation tips, and information about utility rebate programs See Figure C3 in the appendix for an example of a full report.
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consumption during peak load events, i.e., time periods with extraordinarily high energy demand
(Wolak, 2011; Jessoe and Rapson, 2014; Ito et al., 2018). Peak load events are “called” by the
utility in response to weather and market forecasts. Typically, these events coincide with hot summer days, when HVAC systems require large amounts of electricity and energy producers rely
on peak infrastructure to meet the high demand (Borenstein, 2002; Joskow, 2012). During these
hours, the marginal cost of producing electricity increases sharply and far exceeds the residential
rate charged by most utilities.78
Figure 16: The Peak Energy Report’s (PER) Social Comparison Phone Scripts

(a) Peak Energy Report Pre-Event Call

(b) Peak Energy Report Post-Event Call

Notes: Example phone scripts of the Peak Energy Report (PER). Households receive a pre-event
phone call on the day before the peak load event and a post-event phone call on the day after the
peak load event. See Appendix Figure C4 for the scripts of phone calls households received on
the day of the first peak load event and for households in the top 5 of their comparison group.

78 A

growing number of utilities has implemented time-of-use and other dynamic pricing schedules that aim to
overcome these concerns by closer aligning wholesale and retail prices in the market for electricity (Borenstein,
2005; Faruqui and Sergici, 2010; Jessoe and Rapson, 2014).
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An example helps illustrate the content of the PER in Figure 16. To allow for content generation and delivery on short notice of a peak load event day, households received the PER via
an automated phone call to the main account holder.79 Around each event day, Opower made
two calls containing information that mimics the HER’s social comparison module. In the afternoon of the day immediately preceding a peak event, customers were notified of the upcoming
event, the hours to conserve electricity, a social comparison of their electricity consumption, and
conservation tips.80 On the day immediately following the peak load event, customers received
another call that provided a social comparison of their electricity consumption during the preceding peak load event. Figure 16 provides example scripts for these calls. In the summer of 2014,
peak load events were called by the utility on August 28, September 5, and September 16. On
all three days, the PER targeted electricity consumption from 1 pm to 6 pm, the “peak load event
window”.
Figure 17: Overview of Treatment Assignment in the Experiment

79 Some

customers also received an email version that contained similar content. The email was delivered to the
main contact email, if an email address was on file at the beginning of August 2014. In our analyses, we control for
whether a household received both a phone call and an email. If the customer did not pick up the phone, the automated call was left as a voice mail. Unfortunately, we do not observe whether a call was answered or if the voice
mail was accessed by a customer. Thus, the treatment effects we discuss should be interpreted as intent-to-treat
effects.
80 Customers in the top 5 of their comparison group received calls in which this achievement was specifically highlighted (see Appendix Figure C4). All other content was identical. Furthermore, because the social rank was based
on past peak event behavior, social rank information was unavailable for the first call.
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We summarize the resulting treatment assignment from both phases of the experiment in
Figure 17. In the first phase, households were either assigned to receipt of the HER or a control group (No HER). In the second phase, households in both initial HER treatment arms were
cross-randomized into receipt of the PER or a control group (No PER). Households assigned to
the PER treatment arm received the PER on all three days with peak load events. Each household was randomly assigned to one of four mutually exclusive groups that we name according
to the social nudges households in each group received: (i) a Control Group that did not receive
any correspondence; (ii) a PER Group that only received the PER(iii); an HER Group that only
received the HER; and (iv) an HER+PER Group that received both social nudges.
Henceforth, we refer to the reports themselves as the HER and PER and households that received these reports as members of the HER Group, PER Group, or HER+PER Group.
Figure 18: Overview of Timeline and Procedures in the Experiment
First
HER

Welcome
Postcard

Nov 2009 or

Aug 1,

Jul 2011

2014

Event 1

Event 2

Event 3

Aug 28

Sep 5

Sep 18

End-of-Season
Postcard

Sep 30,
2014

bimonthly HER
peak load event
pre-event call
post-event call

Notes: The random assignment to a bimonthly HER took place in November 2009 or July 2011.
In the summer of 2014, households were randomly assigned to the PER within each treatment
arm. The PER is delivered around the three days with peak load events in the summer of 2014.
Each PER consists of three elements: (i) a pre-event call on the day before the event; (ii) the
peak load event day itself; and (iii) a post-event call on the following day. Additional documents
include a welcome postcard (Appendix Figure C1) on August 1 and an end-of-season postcard
(Appendix Figure C2) on September 30. HERs were delivered bimonthly throughout.
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Finally, we visualize the timing of the experiment in Figure 18. The first phase took place in
November 2009 or July 2011 with two deployment waves of the HER.81 From the time of their
phase one treatment assignment, households in the HER Group and HER+PER Group had been
receiving bimonthly HERs and continued receiving reports throughout the summer of 2014. The
second phase of the experiment started on August 1, 2014, when households in the PER Group
and the HER+PER Group received a welcome postcard notifying them of the new peak load program. Thereafter, these households received the PER–with its pre-event and post-event calls—on
three peak load event days that occurred during August and September of 2014. On September
30, 2014, households in the PER Group and the HER+PER Group received an end-of-season
postcard that informed them about their performance during the three preceding peak load events.
We show all additional materials in the appendix, Figure C1 and Figure C2.
2.2

Data, Sample, and Balance

Our data set consists of administrative data and rich consumption data for all 42,100 households
in the experiment.82 Households in the experiment were not made aware of their participation in
a study or experiment and never learned about other treatment groups. In addition to data on the
treatment assignment of households, we also have access to hourly electricity consumption from
August 1, 2014, to September 30, 2014. While we observe a remarkably fine level of consumption data for households in our sample, we do not observe additional cross-sectional covariates
that may influence energy usage, such as income or property size. However, these unobservable
characteristics should be balanced across treatment groups because households were randomly
assigned to each group. Unfortunately, we cannot assess the balance of these variables formally
but we establish balance in terms of pre-experiment electricity usage below.
81 Because

of administrative constraints, Opower used two deployment waves of the HER. The intervention and
all experimental communications were identical across the two waves. We empirically control for potential baseline
differences by including deployment wave fixed effects in all specifications.
82 Following Opower’s standard eligibility test, the experiment only contains households with at least 12 months of
pre-experiment consumption data. This rule is intended to ensure that neighborhood comparisons can be constructed
reliably and pre-experiment usage is used to balance treatment groups.
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One caveat is that we do not observe consumption data before August 1, 2014. Thus, while
we observe electricity consumption decisions before the PER is administered, we do not observe
the choices of households before their receipt of the HER. Households in the HER Group and
HER+PER Group received HERs for several years before our observation period. As a result, our
examination of Opower’s randomization focuses exclusively on the assignment of households
to the PER in the second phase of the experiment. We are primarily interested in comparing the
combined effect of both interventions to the effects of the two social nudges in isolation. Thus,
as long as households in the HER Group and HER+PER Group respond in the same way to receipt of the HER and households in the Control Group and the PER Group do not differ from
each other before the first PER, we can identify the effects of interest.
We establish balance during the baseline period before the first peak load event, from August
1 to August 27, 2014, in Table 9. In Panel A, we show the average consumption in kilowatt hours
for each treatment group and the corresponding standard deviations. We see that households in
the Control Group and the PER Group have almost identical consumption in the baseline period.
In contrast, households in the HER Group and the HER+PER Group, which have been receiving the HER, use significantly less energy. Panel B presents the differences between the Control
Group and the two groups receiving the HER more formally. Cell entries represent the raw difference, its standard error, and statistical significance based on a simple t-test. For both groups,
the HER effect is significant at conventional levels, confirming that the HER causes reductions in
electricity use (Allcott, 2011c, 2015; List et al., 2017).
In Panel C of Table 9, we conduct balance tests for the two treatment pairs. We first compare the Control Group and the PER Group, which differ only by a statistically insignificant
amount. We then focus on the two groups receiving the HER and show that the HER Group and
the HER+PER Group are statistically indistinguishable from each other before the first PER is
administered.
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Table 9: Summary Statistics, Effect of the HER, and Balance
Peak
Hours
(1pm-6pm)

Shoulder
Hours
(10am-1pm,
6pm-9pm)

Off-Peak
Hours
(12am-1am,
6pm-12am)

All
Hours

Panel A: Average Hourly Usage During Pre-Event Period [µ, (σ)]
Control Group
PER Group
HER Group
HER+PER Group

1.277
(1.196)
1.276
(1.175)
1.244
(1.182)
1.228
(1.155)

0.989
(0.845)
0.980
(0.820)
0.955
(0.823)
0.946
(0.804)

0.712
(0.573)
0.702
(0.534)
0.687
(0.537)
0.682
(0.529)

0.829
(0.673)
0.822
(0.644)
0.803
(0.649)
0.795
(0.636)

Panel B: Effect of the HER Druing Pre-Event Period [∆, (SE)]
HER Group
HER+PER Group

−0.033
(0.021)
−0.049
(0.019)∗∗

−0.034
(0.014)∗∗
−0.043
(0.013)∗∗∗

−0.025
(0.009)∗∗∗
−0.030
(0.009)∗∗∗

−0.026
(0.011)∗∗
−0.034
(0.011)∗∗∗

−0.010
(0.010)
−0.005
(0.006)

−0.007
(0.012)
−0.008
(0.008)

Panel C: Balance During Pre-Event Period [∆, (SE)]
Control vs. PER Group
HER vs. HER+PER Group

−0.001
(0.022)
−0.016
(0.014)

−0.009
(0.016)
−0.009
(0.010)

Notes: Average electricity consumption in the baseline period from August 1 to August 27.
In Panel A, we report the average hourly consumption in kilowatt hours (kWh) and the corresponding standard deviation in parantheses for each treatment group. In Panel B, we report the
treatment effect of the HER, i.e., the difference between the Control Group and the two groups
that received the HER (HER Group and HER+PER Group). In Panel C, we establish the balance
in our sample by presenting differences in the average hourly baseline consumption across the
treatment groups that did not receive the HER (Control Group and PER Group) and those that
did (HER Group and HER+PER Group). Parantheses report the standard error of the difference
in means for Panel B and Panel C. *** denotes significance at the 1 percent level, ** at the 5
percent level, and * at the 10 percent level.
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Figure 19: Treatment Balance in Baseline Electricity Consumption during Peak Hours
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Notes: Log electricity consumption in the baseline period, from Aug 1 to Aug 27, 2014, for the
peak hours from 1-6 pm. Bar labels represent the averages and we report corresponding standard
deviations in parantheses.

Figure 19 provides a visual representation of the balance tests for the period of interest. We
plot the average electricity consumption in log kilowatt hours (log kWh) during peak hours for
each treatment group, the main dependent variable in our empirical specifications. Our findings
match the discussion above. Additionally, Figure 5 highlights the effect of the HER on electricity
consumption during the baseline period. In particular, comparing the HER Group and HER+PER
Group to the Control Group, we see the HER caused a 3 to 4 percent reduction in electricity consumption.
We use a third approach to test balance by closer investigating the high-frequency nature of
our data. While we have shown that the average hourly consumption within treatment pairs is
identical before the first peak load event, treatment groups may differ during specific hours. Because the PER targets usage from 1 pm to 6 pm, such imbalances could raise concerns about our
95

−.1

Log Hourly Use
−.08 −.06 −.04 −.02

0

.02

Figure 20: Hourly Treatment Effects of the HER before the first Peak Load Event
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Notes: We plot the differences in the log of electricity use between each treatment group and
the Control Group during the last baseline week, from August 20 to August 26. Vertical lines
indicate the peak hours from 1-6pm.

identification of the main treatment effects. Figure 20 presents the average hourly difference in
log electricity consumption between each treatment group and the Control Group during the
last week of the baseline period, from August 20 to August 26, 2014. While there is small variation in the magnitude of the differences, with the largest differences from early morning to late
evening when households actively use electricity, the effect of the HER is observable during all
24 hours. Previous work has not studied the hourly dynamics of the HER (Allcott, 2011c; Allcott
and Rogers, 2014). Our data suggest that the HER affects consumption almost uniformly across
time. We also see that the lines for the HER Group and the HER+PER Group overlap almost perfectly.
Based on the evidence presented in this section, we conclude that Opower’s randomization
was successful. In the absence of the PER, we would expect that both treatment pairs continue
using the same amount of electricity throughout the summer of 2014.
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3

Empirical Results

In this section, we discuss the main results for the three days with peak load events in the summer
of 2014. We first present a graphical analysis of consumption decisions by households in all treatment groups on those days. We then complement this analysis with a more formal estimation of
average treatment effects. Finally, we conclude the section by highlighting interesting additional
results from auxiliary specifications.
3.1

Main Findings

The PER was administered on three days in the summer of 2014: August 28; September 5; and
September 18. To understand whether prior exposure to the HER crowds out responses to the
PER, we first focus on a graphical analysis of consumption decisions on those three days. Households in the HER Group and the HER+PER Group continue receiving bimonthly HERs throughout the summer of 2014. Thus, we expect the HER effect to remain detectable during peak load
events. Households in the PER Group and the HER+PER Group receive a PER targeted at consumption between 1 pm and 6 pm on all three days. If the PER works as intended, we should observe reductions in consumption during the targeted time window.83 Intuitively, if behavior in this
experiment is consistent with crowd out of treatment effects, our data should show that the treatment effect for households in the HER+PER Group is smaller than the summation of the effects
we observe for households in the HER Group and the PER Group, which only receive one of the
two social nudges in isolation. In this section, we focus on identifying this comparison.
Figure 21 presents the average difference between the Control Group and each treatment
group on the three days with peak load events. Panel A of Figure 21 plots these differences in
log kWh for all groups. Several trends emerge. First, the PER appears to cause substantial reductions in consumption during the peak load event window. Households assigned to the PER Group
and Control Group start and end their day in the same way. However, during the peak load event
83 There

is also the possibility that the PER may affect consumption outside of the peak load window (Faruqui
and Sergici, 2010; Wolak, 2011; Jessoe and Rapson, 2014; Ito et al., 2018). We assess temporal substitution and
spillovers in section 3.3.
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Hourly Electricity Consumption (log kWh)

Figure 21: Treatment Effects on Days with Peak Load Events
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(b) Visual Test of Crowd-Out

Notes: In panel (a), we plot the differences in the log of electricity use between each treatment
group and the Control Group on the three days with peak load events. In panel (b), we compare
the difference between the Control Group and the HER+PER Group with the summation of the
individual differences between the Control Group and the HER Group and PER Group. Vertical
lines indicate the peak hours from 1-6pm.

98

window, from 1 pm to 6 pm, the PER Group consumes approximately 2 to almost 4 percent less
electricity than the Control Group. We can see this effect by the downward shift of the blue line.
Second, the HER delivers electricity savings over the entire course of the peak load event day,
with the HER Group consuming about 2 to 4 percent less electricity than the Control Group.
Third, and most importantly, the combined intervention achieves reductions in consumption
that resemble the effects of both social nudges in isolation. Households in the HER+PER Group
use around 2 to 4 percent less than the Control Group at the start and end of a peak load event
day, which closely matches behavior in the HER Group. During the targeted time window, savings in the HER+PER Group increase to almost 8 percent, mirroring the reduction in usage of
households in the PER Group.
In Panel B of Figure 21, we visualize our thought experiment. We plot the effect of the combined intervention, the HER+PER Group, against the summation of the individual effects of the
HER Group and the PER Group. The extent to which these two lines track one another is remarkable, suggesting that there is no significant crowd out in this experiment. If anything, inspection
of the graph shows a marginally larger effect during the peak load event window, which may indicate crowd in.
We next turn to a more formal analysis of these effects. We use data from the baseline period
and the three days with peak load events to estimate a simple difference-in-differences model of
log hourly electricity consumption. Equation 5 shows the main estimating equation, which we
estimate using ordinary least squares.

Ln(Elecit ) =

∑

βT TrtiT +

T∈
HER,
PER,
HER+PER

∑

δT TrtiT Eventt + γi + ωi + τt + εit

(5)

T∈
HER,
PER,
HER+PER

where the dependent variable, Ln(Elecit ), is the natural log of electricity consumption by
households i in hour t in the sample. We use the natural log to account for positive outliers typical for energy demand and to allow for an interpretation of treatment effects as approximate per-
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centage changes relative to control.84 We estimate two main effects: (i) a baseline effect, βT , i.e.,
the average difference between the Control Group and treatment group T ∈ {HER, PER, HER+PER}
from August 1 to August 27, 2014; and (ii) the marginal effect on days with peak load events, δT ,
which describes the differential change in behavior during peak load events. The total treatment
effect on days with peak load events for a given treatment group is βT + δT .
We also control for several time-varying and time-invariant characteristics to increase the precision of our estimates. Our model features fixed effects for the medium of delivery of the PER,
γi , the deployment wave of the HER, ωi , and for each hour in the sample, τt . To conduct inference on these estimates, we utilize standard errors that are robust to heteroskedasticity and arbitrary within-household autocorrelations (Cameron and Miller, 2015).
Table 10 reports regression results. Panel A and Panel B present the estimates directly obtained from Equation 5. We focus on the peak load window from 1 pm to 6 pm in the following discussion. Beginning with Panel A, we can confirm the relationships in the raw data for the
baseline period. Households in the HER Group and the HER+PER Group use significantly less
electricity than the Control Group, on average, before the first PER is delivered. The treatment
effect of the HER ranges from around 3 to 4 percent and is generally statistically significant at
conventional levels. The PER Group, on the other hand, does not differ from the Control Group
before the first PER.

84 To

obtain exact percentages, we can exponentiate the regression coefficient exp(β j ) − 1. Because we generally find negative coefficients, i.e., reductions in usage, the exact percentages are slightly smaller than the reported
quantities.
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Table 10: Treatment Effects and Crowd-Out
Peak
Hours
(1pm-6pm)

Shoulder
Hours
(10am-1pm,
6pm-9pm)

Off-Peak
Hours
(12am-1pm,
6pm-12am)

All
Hours

Panel A: Pre-Event Period (8/1/14-8/27/14)
HER Group
PER Group
HER+PER Group

−0.029
(0.016)∗
−0.003
(0.017)
−0.039
(0.015)∗∗∗

−0.032
(0.013)∗∗
−0.011
(0.014)
−0.040
(0.013)∗∗∗

−0.029
(0.012)∗∗
−0.012
(0.013)
−0.035
(0.011)∗∗∗

−0.029
(0.012)∗∗
−0.010
(0.013)
−0.036
(0.012)∗∗∗

Panel B: Marginal Effect on Peak-Event Days (8/28/14, 9/5/14, 9/16/14)
HER Group
PER Group
HER+PER Group

0.008
(0.008)
−0.035
(0.009)∗∗∗
−0.029
(0.008)∗∗∗

0.004
(0.006)
−0.001
(0.007)
−0.003
(0.006)

0.006
(0.005)
0.005
(0.005)
0.004
(0.004)

0.006
(0.005)
−0.003
(0.005)
−0.003
(0.005)

Panel C: Total Effect on Peak-Event Days (8/28/14, 9/5/14, 9/16/14)
HER Group
PER Group
HER+PER Group

−0.021
(0.018)
−0.038
(0.019)∗∗
−0.068
(0.017)∗∗∗

−0.027
(0.015)∗
−0.012
(0.016)
−0.043
(0.014)∗∗∗

−0.023
(0.013)∗
−0.007
(0.014)
−0.032
(0.012)∗∗∗

−0.023
(0.013)∗
−0.013
(0.014)
−0.039
(0.012)∗∗∗

Panel D: Test of HER+PER Group vs. HER Group + PER Group [∆, (SE)]
H0 : No Crowd-Out

−0.009
(0.022)

−0.004
(0.019)

−0.001
(0.016)

−0.003
(0.017)

Notes: Regression of log hourly electricity consumption on treatment indicators and controls for
each hour in the sample, the HER deployment wave, and the medium used to communicate the
PER. We report regression coefficients and corresponding estimated standard errors in Panel A
and Panel B. In Panel C, we estimate the total effect on days with peak load events, i.e., the summation of the baseline effect (Panel A) and the marginal effect on peak load events (Panel B) for
each treatment group. Finally, in Panel D we test the null-hypothesis (H0 ) of no crowd-out, i.e.,
we test whether the total effect in the HER+PER Group equals the summation of the total effects
of the HER Group and the PER Group. For this test, we report the difference in means and the
estimated standard error of the difference. Robust standard errors are clustered at the household
level. *** denotes significance at the 1 percent level, ** at the 5 percent level, and * at the 10
percent level.
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In Panel B, we estimate the marginal effects on days with peak load events. In other words,
the regression coefficients show how households change their behavior on peak event days relative to the baseline period. We find that households in the PER Group and the HER+PER Group
respond strongly to receipt of the PER during the targeted peak load event window. On average,
treated households reduce their consumption by about 3 to 3.5 percent. These coefficient estimates show strong evidence that the PER works as intended. During all other hours, including
hours immediately before and after the target window, so-called shoulder hours, we do not see
any differential behavior. We discuss this observation in more detail in section 3.3.
To highlight the total effect on days with peak load events, we present the summation of the
coefficient estimates we just discussed in Panel C. This panel allows us to make the comparisons of interest. Households in the HER Group, for which peak load events do not differ from
any other day, reduce their consumption by more than 2 percent compared to the Control Group
during the peak load event window. The estimated effect of the HER lines up well with other
estimates in the literature, which report HER effects ranging between 1 and 3 percent (Allcott,
2011c; Ayres et al., 2013; Costa and Kahn, 2013; Allcott and Rogers, 2014; Allcott, 2015; Brandon et al., 2017; List et al., 2017). Reductions increase to almost 4 percent in the PER Group,
which received treatment specifically targeted at consumption during this time period. While
there is no corresponding body of evidence on the effect of the PER, both the HER and PER
compare favorably with market-based interventions that promote energy conservation during
peak load events. For example, pricing experiments find an own-price elasticity around -0.1 (Faruqui
and Sergici, 2010; Wolak, 2011; Jessoe and Rapson, 2014; Ito et al., 2018). To mirror reductions
in consumption caused by the isolated effect of the HER and PER, short run prices during peak
load events would have to be increased by 20 to 40 percent. Lastly, households in the combined
intervention use around 6.8 percent less electricity than the Control Group. To match the reductions in the HER+PER Group, short-run electricity prices would have to be raised by nearly 70
percent.
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We compare the total effects more formally in Panel D, where we test the null hypothesis
(H0 ) of no crowd out. Intuitively, if there is no crowd out we would expect that the total effect for
households in the HER+PER Group and the summation of the effects we estimate for the HER
Group and the PER Group do not differ. Indeed, the difference between those two effects is only
small and statistically insignificant, indicating that the total effects in this thought experiment are
identical. Thus, our data are not consistent with crowd out.
Figure 22: Treatment Effects in Electricity Consumption during Peak Hours
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Notes: Average treatment effects during peak hours (1-6pm) from a regression of log electricity
use on treatment indicators and controls for each hour in the sample, the HER deployment wave,
and the medium used to communicate the PER. We plot the total treatment effects on the three
days with peak load events in the summer of 2014. Bar labels represent the point estimates and
we report corresponding standard errors in parentheses. We also test the hypothesis of no crowdout by comparing the treatment effect of the HER+PER Group and a summation of the treatment
effects of the HER Group and the PER Group. We report the difference and corresponding standard error.

Figure 22 visualizes the estimated treatment effects. We focus on the total effects during
peak hours as reported in Panel C. The final two bar charts contain the comparison of interest.
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We show the total hypothetical effect from a summation of the HER Group and the PER Group,
which reflects the insights we would have gained from conducting separate experiments with
each social nudge in isolation. This effect is compared to the treatment effect we estimate for the
HER+PER Group. We see that the two effects do not differ statistically but the total effect in the
HER+PER Group exceeds the sum of the HER and PER effects for the HER Group and the PER
Group. If anything, this comparison suggests crowd in, as opposed to crowd out.
3.2

Robustness of Main Findings

The results we discussed above are based on raw data and simple regression analysis that relies
on several assumptions about the underlying data. To show robustness of these results to alternative assumptions and data subsets, we conduct and describe four robustness checks in this section. The formal regression output is featured in Appendix Table C1, Table C2, Table C3, and
Table C4.
First, we re-estimate the main model with the level of hourly electricity consumption in kilowatt hours (kWh) instead of log usage. The interpretation of estimates with a level dependent
variable is more difficult in the case of energy usage and level specifications are often susceptible to outliers common to energy data. However, we arguably care most about the overall impact
in terms of kWh rather than relative reductions as reported above. Results from this estimation
in Table C1 show that all main findings are robust to this alternative definition of the dependent
variable. While estimated coefficients for the HER Group are less precise, we derive the same
general conclusions.
Second, we account for a source of attrition in our sample. As is common with long-term
studies in energy economics, some households move out of their treated homes during the experiment (Allcott, 2011c; Brandon et al., 2017). In our sample, approximately 10 percent of households moved and we observe consumption data only until the day of move for those households.
In Table C2, we exclude all movers from the main specification. Point estimates only change
slightly and all main conclusions hold.
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Third, we make different assumptions about the underlying data structure by using an alternative set of the fixed effects in the estimation. In particular, we explicitly consider that the two deployment waves of the HER may differ along other dimension than just their baseline consumption. In Table C3, we allow the fixed effects for the current hour in the sample and the medium
used to communicate the PER to differ by HER deployment wave. After interacting the control
variables accordingly, all estimates are virtually unchanged.
Fourth, we employ two empirical strategies to account for time-invariant household characteristics. The main intuition is to use consumption as a proxy for other characteristics of a
household. Our main specifications did not include household fixed effects because inclusion
of such controls does not allow us to estimate the baseline effect of the HER. The reason for this
shortcoming is that we do not have variation in the exposure to the HER because we only observe consumption after the HER was administered. In Panel A of Table C4, we estimate a standard difference-in-differences model with household fixed effects. This model can identify the
marginal effects during the peak load window. We also estimate a similar model that uses the average consumption in the pre-intervention period, from August 1 to August 27, as a linear control
variable. This approach provides an alternative way to account for household-level behavior. We
present results in Panel B of Table C4. The main conclusions are robust to both alternative specifications.
In summary, the reported findings are not sensitive to specific model assumptions and are robust to a host of additional specifications and assumptions.
3.3

Additional Findings

In this section, we expand on the discussion of the main effects and summarize additional results
that emerge from several auxiliary models. We focus on four dimensions that contribute to the
existing literature: (i) potential intertemporal substitution of electricity use in response to the
PER; (ii) persistence of the PER’s treatment effects after the third and final peak load event; (iii)
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heterogeneous patterns in use across the three days with peak load events; and (iv) heterogeneous
responses to the treatments based on observable household characteristics.
The first important question is whether the PER causes overall reductions in electricity consumption or merely prompts households to intertemporally substitute their electricity consumption. For example, households may delay energy-intensive uses until after the targeted peak window or they may take action before the time window, such as pre-cooling their homes. Such substitution effects have been found in response to peak load pricing experiments (Faruqui and Sergici, 2010; Wolak, 2011; Jessoe and Rapson, 2014; Ito et al., 2018). Columns 2 and 3 of Table 10
show that such dynamics do not exist during hours outside of the peak load window on days with
peak load events. We do not see any marginal effect in the PER Group or the HER+PER Group
during shoulder hours or off-peak hours. We also investigate whether the PER affects consumption on days without a peak load event. Table C5 presents the evidence from our main specification estimated for all days between the first and last peak load event. Again, we see no evidence
of temporal substitution.
A related question is whether the effects of a social nudge persist beyond the time frame of an
intervention. Persistence could be caused by habit formation or adoption of more energy-efficient
technology (Brandon et al., 2017). Recent studies have found that the HER causes reductions in
electricity consumption even years after the last report was delivered (Allcott and Rogers, 2014;
Brandon et al., 2017). Evidence for demand response programs also shows that critical peak pricing interventions can cause persistent changes in behavior (Jessoe and Rapson, 2014; Ito et al.,
2018). To test for persistence of the PER, we estimate our main specifications for all days after
the last peak load event, i.e., September 17 to September 30, 2014. Estimates in Table C6 suggest
that the PER does not affect consumption significantly after the last peak event. In our experiment, effects of the PER do not persist in the long run. This lack of persistence may be caused by
the small number of peak load events or by the type of the intervention (Ito et al., 2018).
The experiment contained three peak load event days in the summer of 2014. Our data allow
us to consider the heterogeneity in treatment effects across these days. The previous literature
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Figure 23: Treatment Effects across Days with Peak Load Events

Hourly Electricity Consumption (log kWh)
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Notes: Average treatment effects during peak hours (1-6pm) from a regression of log electricity
use on treatment indicators and controls for each hour in the sample, the HER deployment wave,
and the medium used to communicate the PER. We plot the total treatment effects on each day
with a peak load event in the summer of 2014. Bar labels represent the point estimates and we
report corresponding standard errors in parantheses.

does not provide conclusive evidence. For example, Allcott and Rogers (2014) show that the energy savings caused by the HER increase with repeated exposure. Ito et al. (2018), on the other
hand, show that a moral prompt for reductions in use during peak load events causes strong initial
treatment effects that fade quickly despite continued treatment. In Figure 23, we plot treatment
effects by event day for all groups of interest. There is no clear trend suggesting either reductions
or increases in usage. The total effects are remarkably stable in the HER+PER Group and only
fluctuate between approximately 6.5% and 7.4% of control consumption.
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As a final piece of evidence, we investigate whether different customer types respond differently to the two social nudges. Previous work highlights important differences in responses to
the HER, where households with high baseline consumption typically respond much stronger
to treatment than customers with low baseline use (Allcott, 2011c; Ferraro and Price, 2013; List
et al., 2017). Table C7 reports results from our main specification extended by including interactions of all treatment indicators with a binary indicator for households above our sample’s median
baseline electricity consumption. Across all hours in Panel A, we confirm the findings in the previous literature. High-use households exposed to the HER respond stronger to treatment than
low-use households, although the difference is not significant at conventional levels. Focusing
on peak hours in Panel B, we find that low-use households respond strongly to the PER, despite
the PER’s similarities to the HER. One interpretation may be that all households have sufficient
margins for adjustment during short time windows with extraordinarily high usage. Estimates
also show some suggestive evidence of increased reductions in usage of high-use households, although the difference again is not statistically significant. Thus, it appears as if the PER affects
all customer types whereas the HER mainly promotes energy savings by high-usage households.
4

Discussion

In this study, we consider a field experiment in which individuals are exposed to one or two social
nudges aimed at reducing electricity consumption during peak load events. We focus on estimating the conservation effect of the two social nudges in isolation and in combination. By comparing a hypothetical summation of the individual effects of the two nudges to the effect of the
combined intervention, we provide the first insights into whether social nudges exhibit crowd out
effects.
We find that social nudges play an important role in shaping household demand for electricity during peak load events. The interventions we study cause reductions in consumption of 2.1
to 6.8 percent. The magnitude of these energy savings depends on details of the program implementation. Importantly, we find no evidence of crowd out. If anything, our data suggest a com-
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plementarity or crowd in effect as the effect of the two social nudges in combination marginally
exceeds the combined effect of the two social nudges in isolation.
It would be naïve, however, to assume that this dynamic would hold over any possible combination of nudges. Further research will be needed to uncover the scale at which social nudging
leads to diminishing marginal returns and whether the types of behaviors that are being nudged
influence how social nudges interact. Moreover, our results suggest that more research is warranted to understand the underlying mechanisms predicting crowding in and crowding out, as it
could have large implications to future policies aimed at securing a sustainable energy system.
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V

Conclusion

Utility-sponsored energy conservation programs play an important role in modern energy policy
and are widely encouraged by state and federal regulators. Central to these efforts is an increasingly large suite of policy instruments that includes interventions using price changes, insights
from the behavioral sciences, information campaigns, and many other approaches. Based on this
first generation of conservation programs, academics have generated important insights into how
households consume energy and what tools best mitigate inefficiencies in the energy market.
Considering the results from this dissertation, we can revisit the main open questions raised in
the introduction. I argued that, while having made large strides, the literature lacks a fundamental
understanding of several important elements of energy conservation efforts. First, programs vary
in terms of the incentives used, the implementation details, and customer types participating in
a study. To fully appreciate the insights generated from dozens of empirical studies, we should
aim to develop a framework that can help us understand when and why programs cause energy
savings. The why is also important for estimating program impacts beyond energy savings, such
as consumer welfare. Second, existing work does not draw a clear picture of when we should
expect the effects of a program to persist over time. Third, despite growing support for the use
of new interventions, we know little about how these programs interact with each other and with
more traditional regulatory approaches.
While any study in isolation may not provide sufficient insights to inform a general theory,
the collective body of work in this literature now supports broader conclusions. In an attempt to
synthesize findings and organize thoughts, my co-authors and I have developed a simple framework elsewhere (Brandon et al., 2017). The cornerstone of the framework is a model of household demand for energy that I will use to interpret the results of this dissertation.
In the model, households allocate their income, m, between a composite consumption good
that is purchased in the market, c, and inputs for household production of an energy-intensive
consumption good, z. The household production function for z is intended to illustrate that energy
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is used as an input in the production of household services, such as consumer electronics and
heating and cooling. Household production is described by an increasing and concave function,
z = f (e, k), with energy, e, and a stock of technology, k, as the inputs. Households can purchase
one unit of energy from their utility at a fixed price of pe . Furthermore, households can invest in
more energy-efficient technology, I, altering the existing stock of technology, k0 , according to a
standard capital accumulation function.
The final element of the model is an additional term, s, that captures moral or pro-social motives for the consumption of energy, such as altruism, warm glow, or social image (see, e.g., Becker,
1974; Andreoni, 1990; Bénabou and Tirole, 2006). Technically, s operates as a shadow tax or
subsidy on energy use (Allcott, 2011c; Ferraro and Price, 2013; Brent et al., 2017b). One useful
interpretation of this term considers moral utility costs (s < 0) that arise when a household uses
more energy. For example, households may consider the impact of their energy consumption on
the environment. Similarly, households’ utility may decline if they receive information showing that their consumption exceeds the energy use of their neighbors (Brandon et al., 2017; Brent
et al., 2017b). Pro-social utility depends on the level of energy used and a metapreference parameter, a, with the relationship described by s = g(e, a) (Becker and Murphy, 1993). Intuitively, a
represents a demand shifter that can be affected by energy conservation programs that operate
through any form of moral channel, such as the HER’s neighborhood comparison.
Formally, we consider a household maximizing a single-period utility function that is increasing in its three arguments, the numeraire, c, household production of an energy-intensive good, z,
and pro-social utility, s.
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max u(c, z, s)
c,e,I

s.t.

m = c + pI I + pe e
z = f (e, k)
k = k0 + I
s = g(e, a)

The model setup differs slightly from the existing literature. The main difference is the explicit account of technology investments. There is growing evidence of an important relationship
between technology and energy use. For example, Jessoe and Rapson (2014) show that in-home
displays affect how households respond to price changes. Similar findings are reported in Harding and Lamarche (2016), who compare different technologies and find heterogeneous effects.
Using a colorful orb to indicate high-price periods, Allcott (2011b) finds that crude information
about price changes strengthens the response to critical peak pricing substantially. These observations motivated us to explicitly model k. In Brandon et al. (2017), we use the resulting framework
to generate predictions about the persistence of reductions in consumption typically observed for
the HER. However, the model is flexible enough to interpret model parameters in light of many
conservation programs.
In the context of this dissertation, different programs exogenously affect the realization of
one or several of the model parameters. For example, receipt of the HER may shift the metapreference parameter, a, making salient how a household’s usage compares to its neighbors’ consumption and “taxing” consumption above the reference level at a higher rate. Similarly, we
could introduce information uncertainty over the price, pe , or the quantity of energy consumed,
e. Interventions like the BTA aim to alleviate these uncertainties by providing better or more frequent feedback about consumer behavior. The model can also account for changes in the opportunity cost of energy introduced by the financial rewards program in the second chapter or sim112

ilar interventions. Financial rewards for reductions in consumption increase the marginal price,
pe , below the household’s undisclosed baseline. In response to a price increase, we would expect households to use less energy. We could also model differences between rewards and direct
price changes. Both incentive structures change pe but may trigger different behavioral responses
(Pate Offenberg, 2007).85
In the current formulation of the model, I only consider one decision period. By indexing parameters and decision variables for different time periods, we can also think about the temporal
dynamics of a program. One important decision variable for policy makers is whether an intervention should be established in perpetuity or only temporarily. We have strong evidence that
the HER—which is typically administered over a long period of time—causes reductions in use
that grow with repeated treatment even years into the intervention (Allcott and Rogers, 2014).
When treatment is discontinued, the effects of the program decline substantially, suggesting that
at least some fraction of energy savings relies on continued treatment (Allcott and Rogers, 2014;
Brandon et al., 2017). One possible explanation for the proportion of the effect that persists even
after the last treatment message, which can be derived directly from the model, is that households
make behavioral adjustments in the short-run but transition to more lasting changes, either in the
form of habit capital or energy-efficient technology in the longer run (Allcott and Rogers, 2014;
Brandon et al., 2017).
Finally, a useful extension of the framework could consider how multiple interventions affect energy demand when used in combination. A sizable literature in economics and social psychology suggests that multiple programs—and incentive types—may reinforce or diminish each
other’s effects (Gneezy et al., 2011; Dolan and Galizzi, 2015). One way to account for this interaction would be to allow a to have several components that may be related in different ways.
Similarly, a could vary depending on other policy instruments the households are exposed to.
85 In addition, the model allows us to include other details in the implementation of a program that go beyond the
choice of incentives. For example, by varying the delivery channel or the frequency of treatment, the realization of
the metapreference parameter, a, could be modeled to differ. Households may be less responsive to digital communication than physical mailers. Or overly frequent delivery of a treatment may cause choice fatigue (Iyengar and
Lepper, 2000; Levav et al., 2010; Augenblick and Nicholson, 2016) or information overload (Eppler and Mengis,
2004; Anderson and de Palma, 2009, 2012) because of “spam”.
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With this framework established, we can reassess and interpret the main contributions of this
dissertation. In the first chapter, I study an intervention that provided weekly information about a
household’s expenditure on natural gas. The backdrop for this type of intervention is a growing
consensus in the literature that households are not well-informed about the quantity of energy
they are consuming or the current marginal incentives (Borenstein, 2009; Attari et al., 2010; Ito,
2014; Jessoe and Rapson, 2014; Wichman, 2014).
We can illustrate uncertainty over prices in the framework by introducing a perceived price,
p̃ = θp (Chetty et al., 2009; Wichman, 2017). Intuitively, households make choices as if the perceived price were true. If a household’s perception differs from the true price, i.e., θ 6= 1, consumption decisions may deviate from the theoretical ideal. In cases where households underestimate the true price, that is θ < 1, they use too much energy. If such households receive an
intervention that provides information about the true value of p, we would expect reductions in
subsequent use after households re-optimize based on the new p̃0 > p̃. My findings are broadly
consistent with the literature and show that the provision of simple information causes energy
savings in the natural gas sector, suggesting that households were overconsuming energy relative to their private optimum (Ehrhardt-Martinez et al., 2010; Allcott, 2011b; Houde et al., 2013;
Kahn and Wolak, 2013).
The findings from the BTA experiment can also be explained by a second mechanism. Households may be rationally inattentive to their natural gas consumption because the time and effort
costs outweigh the benefits of making optimal decisions for a good that is only a small portion
of the typical household budget (Sallee, 2014). In that case, we may interpret the BTA as acting
like a typical nudge and affecting consumption by shifting a and subsequently moral utility, s.
While both mechanisms can predict reductions in consumption, they may have very different implications for the welfare of customers. For example, nudging households to pay more attention
to energy consumption can crowd out limited attention from other, potentially more important
goods.
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The second chapter assesses how the HER interacts with financial rewards for reductions in
energy use. We explore three questions that are motivated by insights from the framework. First,
in the absence of any interaction between the policy instruments, we would expect further reductions in usage because both the HER and the financial rewards make using energy relatively more
costly. Receipt of the HER increases the moral cost through changes in a, whereas the financial
rewards directly increase pe . Second, as explained above, there may be an interaction between
financial rewards and interventions operating through the moral utility component. For example, we could allow a to depend on other factors, such as pe , i.e., a(pe ). In the paper, we show
that a appears to be independent of price changes. The introduction of financial rewards does not
crowd out responses to the HER. As we point out, this relationship may be driven by the voluntary nature of the rewards program. Third, we assess important heterogeneities in the response to
treatment. The HER has been found to primarily affect households with a high level of baseline
consumption (Allcott, 2011c; Ferraro and Price, 2013). One reason for this heterogeneity may be
that high-use households are farther away from the comparison level introduced by the HER, on
average (Brent et al., 2017b). In that case, such households may face greater moral utility cost, s.
Another contributing factor may be that high-use households have more (or cheaper) margins for
adjustments in use. We show that financial incentives also affect consumption of low-use households, indicating that the two mechanisms affect different usage margins and customer types.
The third chapter makes three main contributions. First, we introduce a new policy instrument
that uses a neighborhood comparison to affect consumption during hours with extraordinarily
high energy demand. Typically, price changes are used to reduce such peak load. Several studies
have assessed the effects of sizable increases in pe (Wolak, 2010; Jessoe and Rapson, 2014). We
show that a social nudge designed to shift moral utility, s, can lead to energy savings equivalent
to price increases of up to 70%. Second, we empirically identify the interaction between two social nudges. We achieve this goal by comparing energy consumption of households who received
two nudges to the effects we obtain from two separate groups of households who only received
one nudge each. Intuitively, we can think of the metapreference parameter, a, as a function of all
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nudges a household is exposed to, i.e., a = f (a1 , . . . , an ). We show that the energy savings for
both nudges are identical to the summation of the energy savings achieved by the two nudges in
isolation. Thus, there does not appear to be an interaction between the interventions in our setting.
Finally, the experiment provides insights into program dynamics. In contrast to related interventions, such as the HER, policy tools that target peak load are typically only administered infrequently. We have evidence that substantial increases in pe during targeted hours lead to stable
reductions in use that persist with repeated treatment (Wolak, 2011; Jessoe and Rapson, 2014;
Ito et al., 2018). A moral suasion intervention in Ito et al. (2018), on the other hand, only reduced consumption on the first few treatment days before fading quickly. Similarly, Brent et al.
(2017b) show that different nudges can induce different levels of persistence. In their experiment,
a nudge highlighting financial savings caused more persistent reductions in use than a modified
social comparison. In contrast to Ito et al. (2018), we do not find evidence that the effect of the
PER declines over time. This finding suggests that some moral appeals may only shock a in the
short run, while other interventions lead to a lasting shift in the metapreference parameter. The
“strength” and content of the appeal can thus affect the longevity of behavioral change.
The next generation of studies, which is well underway, can address questions that follow directly from the current state of the literature. First, the proposed framework is only a first step in
modeling complex energy consumption decisions. Carefully designed empirical studies can isolate the underlying causal mechanisms and shed more light on what is causing changes in energy
consumption. Establishing a closer link between theory and program designs is important for refining the framework further. The BTA experiment in the first chapter provides a useful example.
As pointed out earlier, my findings could be explained by two channels that I cannot distinguish
between with the current experimental design: (i) information provision; and (ii) salience. Future
experiments could systematically vary the content of the messages across treatment to identify to
impact of different information elements. Similarly, we could introduce a new message that only
affects the salience channel without providing useful information. Another example is Brandon
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et al. (2017), who set forth to empirically isolate a specific adjustment mechanism by using an
identification strategy that blocks out the alternative channel. The authors show that technology
investments are responsible for at least one third of the persistent reductions in use caused by the
HER.
Second, few studies consider how existing interventions affect consumer welfare. Conservation programs are largely evaluated based on the cost of achieving reductions in consumption
(Allcott and Mullainathan, 2010). Cost-effectiveness may ignore important indirect costs or benefits of programs. For example, if the HER induces households to adopt more energy-efficient
technology, impact estimates should account for the private cost of these investments (Brandon
et al., 2017). Similarly, energy savings in response to receipt of the HER may cause time, comfort, and psychological costs that are unaccounted for in typical impact evaluations. Allcott and
Kessler (2018) use multiple price lists to estimate the willingness-to-pay of customers for the
HER. The authors find that accounting for additional costs reduces welfare estimates substantially, although the program remains welfare-enhancing. It would be useful to study the welfare
implications of other energy conservation programs, which may depend crucially on the underlying mechanism causing changes in behavior.
Third, studies typically assess one energy conservation program in isolation or compare the
effects of different programs that were administered across different household groups. This approach offers insights about the (relative) performance of a specific program, but it may ignore
important interactions among different interventions. In a policy environment fostering the use
of energy conservation programs that rely on a range of incentives, such interactions need to be
taken seriously. The second and third chapter provide an important first step towards an understanding of program interactions in the energy sector.
This dissertation paints an optimistic picture for the future use of energy conservation programs in the residential sector. Building on new insights from my work, future studies should aim
to establish a closer link between theory and empirics, set forth to understand the whole policy
toolbox, and help academics and practitioners improve social welfare.
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Appendix A:

Chapter 1
Figure A1: Bill Tracker Alert (Text Message)

Notes: By default, SoCalGas delivers the BTA to the email address of the main account holder
(see Figure 1). Customers can actively switch to delivery by text message or both channels.
About 10 percent of customers changed their delivery channel, with 6 percent of customers only
receiving text messages and 4 percent of customers receiving both emails and text messages.
The content of the BTA is almost identical across the delivery channels. The only difference is
that the text message does not include the days elapsed in the current billing cycle because of a
160-character limit for text messages. This information can be inferred from the content of the
text message, however.
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Figure A2: Location of Customers in the Sample

Notes: Entries show the locations of properties in our sample. Blue crosses describe treatment
homes; red circles represent control houses. The locations are determined by the roll-out of
SoCalGas’s Advanced Meter project. The majority of homes is located in a relatively small
geographic region in the Los Angeles metropolitan area.
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Figure A3: Welcome Email

Congratulations!
You are now registered for SoCalGas® Bill Tracker Alerts. These weekly alerts will help you better
manage your monthly gas bill. By monitoring your gas costs throughout the billing cycle, you could avoid
surprises at the end of the month.
Your Bill Tracker Alerts will include:

•
•
•
•

Bill-to-Date
Projected Next Bill
Last Month's Bill; Same Month Last Year Bill
Days Elapsed and Remaining in the Current Billing Cycle

Take advantage of all of this information to help reduce your gas usage and save money. If you would
like to receive Bill Tracker Alerts through text messages, log in to My Account and go to the "Manage My
Account" tab.
Thank you for being a valued customer.

Notes: Customers in all BTA treatment groups received this welcome email on November 1,
2015.
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Figure A4: Welcome Letter in November

WELCOME TO BILL
TRACKER ALERTS
SEE HOW YOU CAN SAVE MONEY!

INTRODUCING BILL TRACKER ALERTS
Congratulations, you are now registered for SoCalGas® Bill Tracker Alerts. These weekly alerts can help
you better manage your monthly natural gas bill. By monitoring your natural gas costs throughout the
billing cycle, you’ll help avoid surprises at the end of the month!

HOW DOES IT WORK?
• Bill-to-date		

• Last month’s bill; same month from last year’s bill

• Projected next bill

• Days elapsed and remaining in the current billing cycle

If you would like to receive Bill Tracker Alerts through text messages, log in to myaccount.socalgas.com
and go to the “Manage My Account” tab to manage your preferences. If you no longer want to receive
Bill Tracker Alerts, simply log in to your SoCalGas My Account or call 1-800-427-2200.

© 2015 Southern California Gas Company.All rights reserved. E Printed on recycled paper. N15C0111B 0915 75K

12702_SCG_PTA.indd 2

10/16/15 7:30 PM

Notes: Customers in the two BTA treatment groups with supplemental materials received this
letter by mail in November 2015.
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Figure A5: January Letter

October 23, 2015
Albert Johnstonson
C/O SoCalGas
GT20B2
555 W 5th St.
Los Angeles, CA 90013-1010

SAVING MORE IS WITHIN REACH
VISIT MY ACCOUNT NOW

1/0081 613

RE: Service Address
Dear First Name Last Name,

SoCalGas® is committed to helping you save.
To understand your usage even better, set up your energy-savings
goals by visiting “Ways to Save” —our personalized interactive tool
through myaccount.socalgas.com.
• Set savings goals and get tips on how to achieve them.
• Create a personalized energy profile.
• View your daily and hourly gas usage.
• Analyze your monthly bill history to understand how
different factors affect your natural gas usage.
Bill Tracker Alerts are also available via text message. Log in
to myaccount.socalgas.com and go to the “Manage My Account”
tab to change or add your preferences.

Sincerely,

Jeffery L. Walker
Director, Advanced Meter Project

If you no longer want to receive Bill Tracker Alerts, simply log into your SoCalGas My Account or call 1-800-427-2200.

E Printed on recycled paper.   
  N15C0137B  1115  XX

© 2015 Southern California Gas Company. All copyright and trademark rights reserved.

Notes: Customers in the two BTA treatment groups with supplemental materials received this
letter by mail in January 2016.
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Figure A6: January Insert

USE OUR NEW ONLINE TOOLS
TO SAVE EVEN MORE!

3

Visit My Account Ways to Save, your
online savings tool.  

EASY WAYS TO SAVE
THIS WINTER:

• Set savings goals and get tips on how to achieve them.
• Create a personalized energy profile for your home.
• View your daily and hourly natural gas usage.

1 HOME STRUCTURE
• Caulk cracks around windows, doors and other
openings.

• Identify and repair leaky or disconnected ducts.

2 APPLIANCES
• Perform routine maintenance recommended by
the manufacturer, according to the owner’s manual.
This includes replacing dirty filters and cleaning
intake screens, condenser coils, supply registers
and return grills.
• Have a qualified, licensed technician test, clean
and adjust equipment.
• If you’re considering new natural gas equipment,
SoCalGas® has rebates and other financial
incentives available to help with your purchase.

3 WINTERIZE YOUR HOME
• Keep your programmable thermostat set to turn
heating on 30 minutes before you arrive and off
30 to 60 minutes before you leave. Set it no higher
than 68 degrees Fahrenheit during occupied
periods in the winter.

New Ways to Save Tools

• Close curtains, shades and blinds at night and
during unoccupied periods to help your home retain
heat.  Keep them open on sunny days.

Please visit socalgas.com.
socalgas.com

(Continued on back)

1-800-427-2000

© 2015 Southern California Gas Company. All rights reserved.

(a) Front

N15C0138B  1115

(b) Back

Notes: SoCalGas delivered this insert with the January letter to customers in the two BTA treatment groups with supplemental materials.
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Figure A7: January and March Email

Bill Tracker Alerts
For account number: XXX-XXX-98564

Tools and tips to help you save energy and
money
Weekly Bill Tracker Alerts help you monitor your natural gas usage costs and with our
Ways to Save online tools, you'll have even more help saving energy and money.
Simply log into My Account.
•

Set a savings goal and receive conservation tips to help achieve it.

•

Take your quick online energy survey to discover new ways to save.

•

Compare your home's usage to similar size homes in your neighborhood.

Get started saving energy and money today!
Log in to My Account and click on Ways to Save.

Log In

Notes: Customers in the two BTA treatment groups with supplemental materials received this
email in January and March 2016.
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Figure A8: February Letter

ENERGY & MONEY SAVINGS
ARE JUST A CLICK AWAY.
VISIT SOCALGAS.COM TODAY.

«Customer_Name»
«Customer_Mailing_Address»
«Customer_Mailing_City_State_ZIP»
«

/9999999990/»

Dear «Customer Name»,
Along with your weekly Bill Tracker Alerts to help you monitor your natural gas usage costs,
you also have several online tools available to help you save energy and money.
Visit socalgas.com, log into My Account and click on Ways to Save where you can:
• Set a savings goal and receive conservation tips to help achieve them.
• Discover where you might be able to save through our online energy survey.
• See how your home’s usage compares to similar size homes in your neighborhood.
• Review your daily and hourly usage information.

My Account Daily Usage Sample

My Account Annual Cost Comparison

Get started saving energy and money today!
Sincerely,

Jeffrey L. Walker
Director, Advanced Meter Project
P.S. Bill Tracker Alerts are available via text message and email. If you’d like to receive alerts
in your inbox as well as your wireless phone, log in to myaccount.socalgas.com and go to the
Manage My Account tab to change your preferences.

© 2016 Southern California Gas Company. All copyright and trademark rights reserved. 

E Printed on recycled paper. N16C0006B 0116 40K

Notes: Customers in the two BTA treatment groups with supplemental materials received this
email in February 2016.
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Figure A9: Daily Treatment Effects in the First Winter Heating Season
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Notes: Average treatment effects based on Equation 1 for each day between October 2015 and
April 2016. Red diamonds represent the point estimates, gray bars the corresponding 95 percent
confidence intervals. The navy solid line expresses effects as percentage reductions relative to
the average consumption in the control group in the same period. Vertical dashed lines denote the
first (November 1) and last day (March 31) of the first winter heating season.
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Figure A10: Monthly Treatment Effects
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Notes: Average treatment effects based on Equation 1 for each month in our sample. Red diamonds represent the point estimates, gray bars the corresponding 95 percent confidence intervals.
The navy solid line expresses effects as percentage reductions relative to the average consumption in the control group in the same period. Vertical dashed lines denote the first (November)
and last month (March) of the two winter heating seasons during the treatment period.
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Table A1: Summary Statistics by Treatment Group
Old BTA
Material
(N =
20, 000)

Old BTA
No Material
(N =
20, 000)

New BTA
Material
(N =
20, 000)

New BTA
No Material
(N =
20, 000)

0.7014
(0.6022)
38.9545
(26.1115)
47.9026
(32.0809)

0.7006
(0.5772)
39.0400
(25.4638)
48.0601
(31.4934)

0.6994
(0.5881)
38.7797
(24.8711)
47.7270
(30.7624)

0.7019
(0.6072)
38.7678
(25.2761)
47.6704
(31.0676)

0.7056
(0.6105)
39.0022
(26.1860)
47.9769
(32.2837)

1.0552
(0.0133)
0.0401
(0.1963)
0.6688
(0.4706)
0.1440
(0.3511)
13.32
(10.76)

1.0554
(0.0136)
0.0415
(0.1995)
0.6733
(0.4690)
0.1471
(0.3542)
13.30
(10.77)

1.0554
(0.0166)
0.0398
(0.1955)
0.6680
(0.4709)
0.1457
(0.3528)
13.19
(10.65)

1.0555
(0.0137)
0.0376
(0.1902)
0.6683
(0.4708)
0.1482
(0.3553)
13.20
(10.62)

1.0553
(0.0131)
0.0374
(0.1896)
0.6665
(0.4715)
0.1419
(0.3489)
13.35
(10.81)

0.9887
(0.1055)
0.8493
(0.3578)
0.9481
(0.2219)

0.9895
(0.1017)
0.8465
(0.3604)
0.9497
(0.2186)

0.9888
(0.1052)
0.8485
(0.3585)
0.9470
(0.2241)

0.9877
(0.1100)
0.8439
(0.3629)
0.9454
(0.2272)

0.9883
(0.1078)
0.8520
(0.3552)
0.9485
(0.2211)

Control
(N =
74, 202)
Panel A: Usage Behavior and Billing
Daily Usage
Monthly Usage
Total Bill
Panel B: Account Details
Billing Factor
1(Level Pay)
1(Paperless Billing)
1(Account Closure)
Account Tenure (Years)
Panel C: Property Characteristics
1(Individually Metered)
1(Single Dwelling)
1(Property in Climate Zone 1)

Notes: Summary statistics by treatment group. We report means and the corresponding standard
deviations in parantheses. Column 2 reports averages and standard deviations for control customers; columns 3 to 6 report the same measures for customers in each BTA treatment group.
With the exception of the billing factor, differences among the treatment groups are statistically
insignificant at the 10 percent level for all variables.
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Table A2: Average Treatment Effects of the BTA [Difference-in-Differences]
All Months
(1)
(2)
Daily
Monthly

Winter Months
(3)
(4)
Daily
Monthly

Other Months
(5)
(6)
Daily
Monthly

Treatment x Post

-0.0121***
(0.0031)

-0.4191***
(0.1601)

-0.0199***
(0.0050)

-0.6566***
(0.2169)

-0.0044**
(0.0020)

-0.1766
(0.1263)

Control Average
Percent of Control

1.44
0.840

48.56
0.863

2.04
0.975

67.36
0.977

0.84
0.524

29.37
0.601

0.435
117112095

0.277
6,161,331

0.487
70,015,656

0.280
4,753,187

0.275
70,434,412

0.215
4,723,517

R2
N

Notes: The dependent variable is daily natural gas usage from smart meter reads (in therms) in
columns 1, 3, and 5, and monthly natural gas consumption from billing data (in therms) in column 2, 4, and 6. We estimate a traditional difference-in-differences model with day-of-sample
or month-of-sample and customer fixed effects. The post-treatment period begins on November
1, 2015. Columns 1 and 2 use all observations. Columns 3 and 4 estimate the same model for
winter months only (November to March), and columns 5 and 6 present estimates for all other
months. Monthly billing cycles and calendar months do not overlap perfectly. We report robust standard errors that are clustered at the household level for all specifications. *** denotes
significance at the 1 percent level, ** at the 5 percent level, and * at the 10 percent level.
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Table A3: Average Treatment Effects of the BTA [Exclusion of Movers]
All Months
(1)
(2)
Daily
Monthly
Treatment (τ)
Usage Control
Control Average
Percent of Control

R2
N

Winter Months
(3)
(4)
Daily
Monthly

Other Months
(5)
(6)
Daily
Monthly

-0.0127***
(0.0033)
0.8849***
(0.0100)

-0.3771***
(0.0748)
0.8689***
(0.0058)

-0.0194***
(0.0054)
0.8658***
(0.0129)

-0.5489***
(0.1090)
0.8922***
(0.0068)

-0.0060***
(0.0020)
0.9037***
(0.0093)

-0.2018***
(0.0652)
0.8086***
(0.0079)

1.47
0.864

48.98
0.770

2.09
0.928

68.23
0.805

0.86
0.698

29.74
0.679

0.350
80,210,593

0.697
2,635,830

0.283
39,925,307

0.667
1,317,476

0.207
40,285,286

0.562
1,318,354

Notes: The dependent variable is daily natural gas usage from smart meter reads (in therms)
in columns 1, 3, and 5, and monthly natural gas consumption from billing data (in therms) in
columns 2, 4, and 6. Models are defined as in Equation 1 and include day-of-sample or monthof-sample fixed effects. The analysis is restricted to the treatment period, i.e., November 2015
and later. We exclude households that deactive their account between June 2015 and June 2017
from the analysis. We control for the average pre-experiment usage at the customer level (“Usage Control”). Columns 1 and 2 use all observations in the treatment period. Columns 3 and 4
estimate the same model for winter months only (November to March), and columns 5 and 6
present estimates for all other months. We report robust standard errors that are clustered at the
household level for all specifications. *** denotes significance at the 1 percent level, ** at the 5
percent level, and * at the 10 percent level.
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Table A4: Average Treatment Effects of the BTA [Log(Usage)]
All Months
(1)
(2)
Daily
Monthly
Treatment (τ)
Usage Control

R2
N

Winter Months
(3)
(4)
Daily
Monthly

Other Months
(5)
(6)
Daily
Monthly

-0.0055***
(0.0017)
0.4209***
(0.0055)

-0.0057***
(0.0016)
0.0094***
(0.0001)

-0.0091***
(0.0022)
0.3075***
(0.0040)

-0.0077***
(0.0017)
0.0079***
(0.0001)

-0.0019
(0.0019)
0.5336***
(0.0072)

-0.0038**
(0.0019)
0.0136***
(0.0002)

0.440
93,049,055

0.635
2,828,458

0.321
46,392,733

0.589
1,430,663

0.245
46,656,322

0.447
1,397,795

Notes: The dependent variable is the natural log of daily natural gas usage from smart meter
reads (in therms) in columns 1, 3, and 5, and monthly natural gas consumption from billing data
(in therms) in columns 2, 4, and 6. Models are defined as in Equation 1 and include day-ofsample or month-of-sample fixed effects. The analysis is restricted to the treatment period, i.e.,
November 2015 and later. We control for the average pre-experiment usage at the customer level
(“Usage Control”). Columns 1 and 2 use all observations in the treatment period. Columns 3 and
4 estimate the same model for winter months only (November to March), and columns 5 and 6
present estimates for all other months. We report robust standard errors that are clustered at the
household level for all specifications. *** denotes significance at the 1 percent level, ** at the 5
percent level, and * at the 10 percent level.
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Table A5: Average Treatment Effects of the BTA [Monthly Usage Control]

Treatment (τ)
Usage Control (Month)
Control Average
Percent of Control

R2
N

All Months
(1)
Daily

Winter Months
(2)
Daily

Other Months
(3)
Daily

-0.0103***
(0.0027)
0.0176***
(0.0002)

-0.0173***
(0.0039)
0.0172***
(0.0002)

-0.0034
(0.0022)
0.0184***
(0.0003)

1.44
0.715

2.04
0.848

0.84
0.405

0.371
93,771,022

0.342
46,674,890

0.165
47,096,132

Notes: The dependent variable is daily natural gas usage from smart meter reads (in therms)
in columns 1, 3, and 5, and monthly natural gas consumption from billing data (in therms) in
columns 2, 4, and 6. Models are defined as in Equation 1 and include day-of-sample or monthof-sample fixed effects. The analysis is restricted to the treatment period, i.e., November 2015
and later. We control for average pre-experiment usage in the same month-of-year between January 2014 and October 2015. (“Usage Control (Month)”). Columns 1 uses all observations in
the treatment period. Columns 2 estimates the same model for winter months only (November to
March), and column 3 presents estimates for all other months. We report robust standard errors
that are clustered at the household level for all specifications. *** denotes significance at the 1
percent level, ** at the 5 percent level, and * at the 10 percent level.
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Table A6: Treatment Effects by Campaign Year [Daily Usage Reads]
Both Years
(1)
(2)
Winter
Spring
Treatment (τ)
Usage Control
Control Average
Percent of Control

R2
N

Year 1

Year 2

(3)
Winter

(4)
Spring

(5)
Winter

(6)
Spring

-0.0198***
(0.0050)
0.8682***
(0.0125)

-0.0062***
(0.0024)
0.9244***
(0.0111)

-0.0188***
(0.0051)
0.9057***
(0.0127)

-0.0068***
(0.0025)
0.9333***
(0.0120)

-0.0207***
(0.0054)
0.8303***
(0.0139)

-0.0056*
(0.0029)
0.9154***
(0.0125)

2.04
0.971

0.92
0.674

2.03
0.926

0.93
0.731

2.05
1.010

0.92
0.609

0.267
46,677,359

0.174
28,031,676

0.280
23,420,907

0.189
14,018,284

0.253
23,256,452

0.161
14,013,392

Notes: The dependent variable is daily natural gas usage from smart meter reads (in therms).
We estimate Equation 1 for different time periods. Columns 1 and 2 use all observations in the
treatment period for winter months (November to March) and spring months (April to June),
respectively. In columns 3 and 4, we restrict the sample to observations from the first year of the
treatment; in columns 5 and 6 we only use observations from the second year of the campaign.
We report robust standard errors that are clustered at the household level for all specifications.
*** denotes significance at the 1 percent level, ** at the 5 percent level, and * at the 10 percent
level.

133

Table A7: Treatment Effects by Campaign Year [Monthly Usage Reads]
Both Years
(1)
(2)
Winter
Spring
Treatment (τ)
Usage Control
Control Average
Percent of Control

R2
N

Year 1

Year 2

(3)
Winter

(4)
Spring

(5)
Winter

(6)
Spring

-0.5996***
(0.1051)
0.8776***
(0.0068)

-0.2896***
(0.0798)
0.7896***
(0.0092)

-0.5185***
(0.1094)
0.9197***
(0.0083)

-0.2907***
(0.0862)
0.7988***
(0.0107)

-0.6853***
(0.1302)
0.8313***
(0.0078)

-0.2879***
(0.0994)
0.7796***
(0.0100)

67.36
0.890

33.76
0.858

67.13
0.772

33.63
0.864

67.60
1.014

33.90
0.849

0.651
1,437,735

0.532
840,541

0.682
752,238

0.554
439,502

0.614
685,497

0.510
401,039

Notes: The dependent variable is monthly natural gas consumption from billing data (in therms).
We estimate Equation 1 for different time periods. Columns 1 and 2 use all observations in the
treatment period for winter months (November to March) and spring months (April to June),
respectively. In columns 3 and 4, we restrict the sample to observations from the first year of the
treatment; in columns 5 and 6 we only use observations from the second year of the campaign.
We report robust standard errors that are clustered at the household level for all specifications.
*** denotes significance at the 1 percent level, ** at the 5 percent level, and * at the 10 percent
level.
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Table A8: Heterogeneous Treatment Effects based on Household Characteristics

Treatment (τ)
Treatment x Variable
Usage Control
Control Average (chari = 0)
Percent of Control (chari = 0)
Control Average (chari = 1)
Percent of Control (chari = 1)

R2
N

Above Median User
(1)

Paperless Billing
(2)

Level Pay Plan
(3)

-0.0092***
(0.0034)
-0.0058
(0.0062)
0.8924***
(0.0124)

-0.0065
(0.0056)
-0.0071
(0.0068)
0.8837***
(0.0102)

-0.0116***
(0.0031)
-0.0079
(0.0148)
0.8796***
(0.0101)

1.20
0.767
1.67
0.898

1.46
0.445
1.43
0.951

1.43
0.811
1.50
1.300

0.331
93,773,205

0.337
86,489,384

0.331
93,773,205

Notes: The dependent variable is daily natural gas usage from smart meter reads (in therms).
We estimate Equation 2 for three different binary indicators of pre-experiment customer characteristics: (i) an indicator for customers above the median pre-experiment usage; (ii) customers
who receive paperless bills at the end of the sample period; and (iii) customers who are on SoCalGas’s Level Pay Plan at the end of the sample period, a payment plan that distributes natural
gas charges uniformly over 12 months. We only observe the end-of-sample characteristics and
cannot determine when or whether customers opted in or out of the utility programs. We report
robust standard errors that are clustered at the household level for all specifications. *** denotes
significance at the 1 percent level, ** at the 5 percent level, and * at the 10 percent level.
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Appendix B:

Chapter 2
Figure B1: Geographic Location of Experimental Population

Notes: The map presents the locations of all households in the experiment. ZIP codes are shaded
according to the number of households within the ZIP code’s boundaries in the experiment;
darker colors imply a larger number of more households in each ZIP. ZIP codes without any
households in the experiment are left uncolored. Blue markers indicate locations of weather stations and red lines match these stations to ZIP codes. We use the geographic center of each ZIP
code and match it to the closest weather station in terms of direct distance.
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Figure B2: Raw Data: HER vs. Control Households

Sep−14

Dec−14

Mar−15

Sep−14

Dec−14

Mar−15

Jun−14

Mar−14

Dec−14

Sep−13

Jun−13

Mar−13

Dec−12

Sep−12

Jun−12

Mar−12

15

17.5

Daily Usage
20 22.5 25

27.5

30

(a) Deployment Wave (Experiment) 1

Control
HER Only

Jun−14

Mar−14

Dec−14

Sep−13

Jun−13

Mar−13

Dec−12

Sep−12

Jun−12

Mar−12

Daily Usage
22.5 25 27.5 30 32.5 35 37.5 40

(b) Deployment Wave (Experiment) 2

Control
HER Only

Notes: We plot average daily usage for every month in the sample. The light gray line represents
all customer in the Control group; the dark gray line represents HER Only customers. The vertical dashed line depicts the date of the first HER in March 2013. Because baseline usage differs
by deployment wave of the experiment, we report averages separately for each wave.
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Figure B3: Raw Data: Participants vs. Non-Participants

Sep−14

Dec−14

Mar−15

Sep−14

Dec−14

Mar−15

Jun−14

Mar−14

Dec−14

Sep−13

Jun−13

Mar−13

Dec−12

Sep−12

Jun−12

Mar−12

15

17.5

Daily Usage
20 22.5 25

27.5

30

(a) Deployment Wave (Experiment) 1

Non−Participants
Participants

Jun−14

Mar−14

Dec−14

Sep−13

Jun−13

Mar−13

Dec−12

Sep−12

Jun−12

Mar−12

Daily Usage
20 22.5 25 27.5 30 32.5 35 37.5 40

(b) Deployment Wave (Experiment) 2

Non−Participants
Participants

Notes: We plot average daily usage for every month in the sample. The light gray line represents usage by all non-participants in the HER+Rewards group; the dark gray line represents all
participants. The vertical dashed line depicts the date of the first encouragement message and
the first month of the rewards program in May 2013. Messages encouraging participation in the
rewards program are delievered between May and August 2013. Because baseline usage differs
by deployment wave of the experiment, we report averages separately for each wave.
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Figure B4: Example of Customer Rewards Portal

Notes: The screenshot presents an example of the rewards portal available to participating customers. Several goods are available at any point in time. In addition, users can view a history of
purchases and have access to the current tally of rewards points. Source: Opower.
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Figure B5: Heterogeneity in Use: Deciles of Pre-Experiment Usage and Variance of Use
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Notes: We plot the difference between a uniform distribution and the actual distribution of participants across deciles of two usage measures: (a) average pre-experiment usage and (b) variance
of pre-experiment use. We plot results by timing of signup. Participants that signed up in response to the encouragement message contained in the first HER (“HER Participants”) and
“Email Participants” who signed up in one of three months during which encouragement emails
were delivered (June, July, August). The reference level is the uniform distribution across deciles,
i.e. 10% of observations in each decile. χ2 -Tests reject the null hypothesis of equal distributions
for all comparisons at p < 0.01.
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Table B1: Summary Statistics and Balance Tests (Deployment Wave 1)
Summary Statistics
(2)
(3)
HER
Control
Only
HER+Rew
(1)

Average Usage
Average Usage (Summer)
Average Usage (Winter)
1(Owner)
Income Level
Number of Children
Number of Adults
1(Green Affinity)
1(Home Improvement)
Households

19.99
(11.66)
24.69
(15.53)
18.69
(12.03)
0.83
(0.37)
7.03
(2.81)
1.92
(1.16)
2.09
(1.06)
0.13
(0.33)
0.13
(0.33)

19.86
(11.89)
24.52
(15.93)
18.56
(12.14)
0.84
(0.37)
6.98
(2.79)
1.92
(1.20)
2.08
(1.05)
0.13
(0.34)
0.12
(0.33)

19.83
(11.79)
24.49
(15.80)
18.53
(12.01)
0.84
(0.37)
7.04
(2.80)
1.85
(1.23)
2.09
(1.06)
0.13
(0.34)
0.12
(0.33)

7,769

18,063

52,999

(4)

Balance Tests
(5)

(6)

∆(1):(2)

∆(1):(3)

∆(2):(3)

0.13
(0.41)
0.17
(0.42)
0.13
(0.42)
-0.01
(0.80)
0.05
(0.34)
0.00
(0.00)
0.01
(0.48)
0.00
(0.20)
0.01
(0.40)

0.16
(0.24)
0.20
(0.31)
0.16
(0.27)
-0.01
(0.77)
-0.01
(0.67)
0.07
(0.00)
0.00
(0.75)
0.00
(0.25)
0.01
(0.75)

0.03
(0.72)
0.03
(0.87)
0.03
(0.77)
0.00
(0.98)
-0.06
(0.26)
0.07
(0.00)
-0.01
(0.76)
0.00
(0.68)
0.00
(0.39)

Notes: Summary statistics for the first deployment wave of the experiment. We report means
across treatment groups and the corresponding standard deviations in parentheses. Columns
4 to 6 report the differences in raw means among the treatment groups and the p-values of a
two-sample t-Test or χ2 -Test in parentheses.
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Table B2: Summary Statistics and Balance Tests (Deployment Wave 2)
Summary Statistics
(2)
(3)
HER
Control
Only
HER+Rew
(1)

Average Usage
Average Usage (Summer)
Average Usage (Winter)
1(Owner)
Income Level
Number of Children
Number of Adults
1(Green Affinity)
1(Home Improvement)
Households

28.37
(13.36)
32.20
(16.84)
28.97
(17.26)
0.91
(0.29)
8.54
(2.44)
2.09
(1.24)
2.23
(1.06)
0.18
(0.39)
0.19
(0.39)

28.43
(13.19)
32.26
(16.85)
29.04
(16.89)
0.90
(0.30)
8.52
(2.41)
2.04
(1.25)
2.23
(1.05)
0.19
(0.39)
0.19
(0.39)

28.41
(13.33)
32.32
(16.89)
28.98
(17.07)
0.90
(0.29)
8.53
(2.40)
1.95
(1.29)
2.23
(1.05)
0.18
(0.39)
0.19
(0.39)

9,999

9,998

96,998

(4)

Balance Tests
(5)

(6)

∆(1):(2)

∆(1):(3)

∆(2):(3)

-0.06
(0.77)
-0.06
(0.78)
-0.07
(0.77)
0.01
(0.24)
0.02
(0.07)
0.05
(0.00)
0.00
(0.96)
-0.01
(0.43)
0.00
(0.97)

-0.04
(0.75)
-0.12
(0.49)
-0.01
(0.95)
0.01
(0.46)
0.01
(0.09)
0.14
(0.00)
0.00
(0.19)
0.00
(0.75)
0.00
(0.92)

0.02
(0.94)
-0.06
(0.75)
0.06
(0.74)
0.00
(0.40)
-0.01
(0.76)
0.09
(0.00)
0.00
(0.40)
0.01
(0.46)
0.00
(0.96)

Notes: Summary statistics for the second deployment wave of the experiment. We report means
across treatment groups and the corresponding standard deviations in parentheses. Columns
4 to 6 report the differences in raw means among the treatment groups and the p-values of a
two-sample t-Test or χ2 -Test in parentheses.
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Table B3: Impact of the Home Energy Report on Use [FEs differ by Wave]
NonParticipants
(3)

Full Sample
(1)
(2)
HER Only

-0.2599***
(0.0576)

HER+Rewards

Heterogeneous
Responses
(4)
(5)
-0.1243**
(0.0552)

-0.3301***
(0.0481)

-0.3082***
(0.0483)

HER Only · High-Use

-0.2791**
(0.1136)

HER Only · High-Var
Control average

R2
Observations
Households

-0.0800
(0.0555)

-0.3489***
(0.1145)
24.4411

24.4411

24.4411

24.4411

24.4411

0.722
1,074,848
44,892

0.721
3,960,937
164,601

0.721
3,772,564
156,969

0.724
1,074,848
44,892

0.723
1,074,848
44,892

Notes: The dependent variable is average daily electricity usage (kWh) in each month. Models
are defined as in Equation 3 except the inclusion of deployment-wave-by-month-of-sample fixed
effects. The analysis is restricted to the treatment period, i.e., March 2013 and later. We control
for pre-experiment usage by including the average daily use in the same calendar month before
treatment and we allow the effect of this control variable to differ by deployment wave. Columns
1 and 2 compare HER Only and HER+Rewards to Control customers, respectively. Column 3
repeats the estimation for the subset of HER+Rewards customers who do not participate in the
rewards program. Columns 4 and 5 examine heterogeneous responses in the HER Only group.
We estimate an interacted model that allows all effects to vary by whether a customer was below
or above the medium of average usage or variance of use in the pre-experiment period. We only
present coefficients of interest. We estimate robust standard errors that are clustered at the household level for all specifications. *** denotes significance at the 1 percent level, ** at the 5 percent
level, and * at the 10 percent level..
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Table B4: Impact of the Home Energy Report on Use [Customers FEs]

Full Sample
(1)
(2)
Post x HER Only

-0.2862***
(0.0563)

Post x HER+Rewards
Control average

R2
Observations
Households

NonParticipants
(3)

-0.3097***
(0.0472)

-0.2966***
(0.0473)

24.4411

24.4411

24.4411

0.723
1,625,962
44,892

0.707
5,978,429
164,601

0.706
5,698,154
156,969

Notes: The dependent variable is average daily electricity usage (kWh) in each month. Models
are a more traditional difference-in-differences variant of Equation 3. We include customer and
month-of-sample fixed effects. Columns 1 and 2 compare HER Only and HER+Rewards to Control customers, respectively. Column 3 repeats the estimation for the subset of HER+Rewards
customers who do not participate in the rewards program. We only present coefficients of interest. We estimate robust standard errors that are clustered at the household level for all specifications. *** denotes significance at the 1 percent level, ** at the 5 percent level, and * at the 10
percent level.
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Table B5: Impact of the Rewards Program on Subsequent Use [FEs differ by Wave]
All HER
Recipients
ITT
LATE
(1)
(2)
HER+Rewards

-0.0662*
(0.0398)

Low-Use
(3)

Heterogeneous
Treatment Effects
Low-Var
High-Use
(4)
(5)

High-Var
(6)

-0.0331
(0.0382)

-0.0998**
(0.0396)

-0.0912
(0.0686)

-0.0389
(0.0690)

Sign-Up

-1.3962*
(0.8406)

First-stage F-statistic
First-stage p-value
HER Only average

22.6537

5932.04
0.00
22.6537

22.6537

22.6537

22.6537

22.6537

0.722
3,850,288
173,450

0.722
3,850,288
173,450

0.508
1,881,555
86,103

0.644
1,921,168
86,814

0.663
1,968,733
87,340

0.695
1,929,120
86,629

R2
Observations
Households

Notes: The dependent variable is average daily electricity usage (kWh) in each month. Models
are defined as in Equation 4 except for the inclusion of deployment-wave-by-month-of-sample
fixed effects. The analysis is restricted to the post-rewards period, i.e., May 2013 and later. We
control for pre-experiment usage by including the average daily use in the same calendar month
before treatment and we allow the effect of this control variable to differ by deployment wave.
Columns 1 and 2 directly compare the HER Only and the HER+Rewards group. We present both
an intent-to-treat (ITT) effect of being randomly assigned to the HER+Rewards group and a local
average treatment effect (LATE), where we instrument for actual participation with assignment
to the HER+Rewards group. Columns 3 and 4 estimate the ITT model separately for low-use
and low-variance customers, respectively. We only present coefficients of interest. We estimate
robust standard errors that are clustered at the household level for all specifications. *** denotes
significance at the 1 percent level, ** at the 5 percent level, and * at the 10 percent level..
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Appendix C:

Chapter 3
Figure C1: Welcome Postcard

Notes: Customers in the the PER Group and the HER+PER Group receive this postcard prior to
the 2014 summer season around August 1.
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Figure C2: End-of-Season Postcard

Notes: Customers in the the PER Group and the HER+PER Group receive this postcard after the
2014 summer season around September 30.
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Figure C3: Home Energy Report (HER)

(b) Back

(a) Front

Notes: Example full Home Energy Report (HER). HERs are delivered to customers in the HER
Group and the HER+PER Group bimonthly by mail beginning in 2009 or 2011. The design of
the mailers is identical across the two HER deployment waves and both treatment groups.
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Figure C4: Peak Energy Report (First Event and Top 5)

(a) Before First Event

(b) Pre-Event Call (Top 5)

(c) Post-Event Call (Top 5)

Notes: Peak Energy Reports (PERs) are delivered to households in the PER Group and the
HER+PER Group by automated phone call around three days with peak load events in the summer of 2014. Households receive a pre-event phone call on the day before the peak load event
and a post-event phone call on the day after the peak load event. Before the first peak load event
day, households cannot receive a neighborhood comparison because the necessary data to generate the comparison are missing. Customers in the top 5 of their neighborhood comparison group
receive a different call highlighting their accomplishment.
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Table C1: Treatment Effects and Crowd-Out [Electricity Consumption in kWh]
Peak
Hours
(1pm-6pm)

Shoulder
Hours
(10am-1pm,
6pm-9pm)

Off-Peak
Hours
(12am-1pm,
6pm-12am)

All
Hours

Panel A: Pre-Event Period (8/1/14-8/27/14)
HER Group
PER Group
HER+PER Group

−0.026
(0.020)
−0.001
(0.022)
−0.043
(0.019)∗∗

−0.030
(0.014)∗∗
−0.011
(0.015)
−0.039
(0.013)∗∗∗

−0.022
(0.009)∗∗
−0.011
(0.010)
−0.028
(0.009)∗∗∗

−0.023
(0.011)∗∗
−0.009
(0.012)
−0.031
(0.011)∗∗∗

Panel B: Marginal Effect on Peak-Event Days (8/28/14, 9/5/14, 9/16/14)
HER Group
PER Group
HER+PER Group

0.003
(0.012)
−0.066
(0.013)∗∗∗
−0.066
(0.012)∗∗∗

−0.004
(0.009)
−0.010
(0.010)
−0.022
(0.009)∗∗

−0.001
(0.005)
−0.001
(0.006)
−0.009
(0.005)∗

0.000
(0.006)
−0.014
(0.007)∗∗
−0.021
(0.006)∗∗∗

Panel C: Total Effect on Peak-Event Days (8/28/14, 9/5/14, 9/16/14)
HER Group
PER Group
HER+PER Group

−0.023
(0.027)
−0.066
(0.029)∗∗
−0.109
(0.026)∗∗∗

−0.034
(0.020)∗
−0.021
(0.021)
−0.061
(0.019)∗∗∗

−0.024
(0.013)∗
−0.012
(0.014)
−0.036
(0.012)∗∗∗

−0.023
(0.015)
−0.023
(0.016)
−0.051
(0.014)∗∗∗

Panel D: Test of HER+PER Group vs. HER Group + PER Group [∆, (SE)]
H0 : No Crowd-Out

−0.019
(0.034)

−0.006
(0.025)

−0.001
(0.016)

−0.005
(0.019)

Notes: Regression of hourly electricity consumption (in kWh) on treatment indicators and controls for each hour in the sample, the HER deployment wave, and the medium used to communicate the PER. We report regression coefficients and corresponding estimated standard errors
in Panel A and Panel B. In Panel C, we estimate the total effect on days with peak load events,
i.e., the summation of the baseline effect (Panel A) and the marginal effect on peak load events
(Panel B) for each treatment group. Finally, in Panel D we test the null-hypothesis (H0 ) of no
crowd-out, i.e., we test whether the total effect in the HER+PER Group equals the summation of
the total effects of the HER Group and the PER Group. For this test, we report the difference in
means and the estimated standard error of the difference. Robust standard errors are clustered at
the household level. *** denotes significance at the 1 percent level, ** at the 5 percent level, and
* at the 10 percent level.
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Table C2: Treatment Effects and Crowd-Out [without Movers]
Peak
Hours
(1pm-6pm)

Shoulder
Hours
(10am-1pm,
6pm-9pm)

Off-Peak
Hours
(12am-1pm,
6pm-12am)

All
Hours

Panel A: Pre-Event Period (8/1/14-8/27/14)
HER Group
PER Group
HER+PER Group

−0.025
(0.016)
−0.001
(0.017)
−0.034
(0.015)∗∗

−0.031
(0.014)∗∗
−0.009
(0.015)
−0.036
(0.013)∗∗∗

−0.030
(0.012)∗∗
−0.009
(0.013)
−0.032
(0.011)∗∗∗

−0.029
(0.012)∗∗
−0.007
(0.013)
−0.032
(0.012)∗∗∗

Panel B: Marginal Effect on Peak-Event Days (8/28/14, 9/5/14, 9/16/14)
HER Group
PER Group
HER+PER Group

0.004
(0.008)
−0.042
(0.008)∗∗∗
−0.038
(0.007)∗∗∗

0.004
(0.006)
−0.007
(0.006)
−0.008
(0.005)

0.005
(0.004)
−0.001
(0.004)
−0.002
(0.004)

0.005
(0.004)
−0.010
(0.004)∗∗
−0.009
(0.004)∗∗

Panel C: Total Effect on Peak-Event Days (8/28/14, 9/5/14, 9/16/14)
HER Group
PER Group
HER+PER Group

−0.021
(0.018)
−0.043
(0.019)∗∗
−0.072
(0.017)∗∗∗

−0.028
(0.015)∗
−0.015
(0.016)
−0.044
(0.014)∗∗∗

−0.025
(0.012)∗∗
−0.010
(0.013)
−0.033
(0.012)∗∗∗

−0.024
(0.013)∗
−0.017
(0.014)
−0.041
(0.012)∗∗∗

Panel D: Test of HER+PER Group vs. HER Group + PER Group [∆, (SE)]
H0 : No Crowd-Out

−0.008
(0.023)

−0.001
(0.019)

0.002
(0.016)

0.000
(0.017)

Notes: Regression of log hourly electricity consumption on treatment indicators and controls for
each hour in the sample, the HER deployment wave, and the medium used to communicate the
PER. We exclude households that moved out of their homes during the experiment. We report
regression coefficients and corresponding estimated standard errors in Panel A and Panel B. In
Panel C, we estimate the total effect on days with peak load events, i.e., the summation of the
baseline effect (Panel A) and the marginal effect on peak load events (Panel B) for each treatment
group. Finally, in Panel D we test the null-hypothesis (H0 ) of no crowd-out, i.e., we test whether
the total effect in the HER+PER Group equals the summation of the total effects of the HER
Group and the PER Group. For this test, we report the difference in means and the estimated
standard error of the difference. Robust standard errors are clustered at the household level. ***
denotes significance at the 1 percent level, ** at the 5 percent level, and * at the 10 percent level.
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Table C3: Treatment Effects and Crowd-Out [FEs differ by Wave]
Peak
Hours
(1pm-6pm)

Shoulder
Hours
(10am-1pm,
6pm-9pm)

Off-Peak
Hours
(12am-1pm,
6pm-12am)

All
Hours

Panel A: Pre-Event Period (8/1/14-8/27/14)
HER Group
PER Group
HER+PER Group

−0.028
(0.016)∗
−0.003
(0.017)
−0.039
(0.015)∗∗∗

−0.032
(0.013)∗∗
−0.011
(0.014)
−0.040
(0.013)∗∗∗

−0.029
(0.012)∗∗
−0.012
(0.013)
−0.035
(0.011)∗∗∗

−0.029
(0.012)∗∗
−0.010
(0.013)
−0.036
(0.012)∗∗∗

Panel B: Marginal Effect on Peak-Event Days (8/28/14, 9/5/14, 9/16/14)
HER Group
PER Group
HER+PER Group

0.008
(0.008)
−0.035
(0.009)∗∗∗
−0.029
(0.008)∗∗∗

0.005
(0.006)
−0.001
(0.007)
−0.003
(0.006)

0.006
(0.005)
0.005
(0.005)
0.004
(0.004)

0.006
(0.005)
−0.003
(0.005)
−0.003
(0.005)

Panel C: Total Effect on Peak-Event Days (8/28/14, 9/5/14, 9/16/14)
HER Group
PER Group
HER+PER Group

−0.021
(0.018)
−0.038
(0.019)∗∗
−0.068
(0.017)∗∗∗

−0.027
(0.015)∗
−0.012
(0.016)
−0.043
(0.014)∗∗∗

−0.023
(0.013)∗
−0.007
(0.014)
−0.031
(0.012)∗∗∗

−0.022
(0.013)∗
−0.013
(0.014)
−0.039
(0.012)∗∗∗

Panel D: Test of HER+PER Group vs. HER Group + PER Group [∆, (SE)]
H0 : No Crowd-Out

−0.009
(0.022)

−0.004
(0.019)

−0.002
(0.016)

−0.003
(0.017)

Notes: Regression of log hourly electricity consumption on treatment indicators and controls
for each hour in the sample and the medium used to communicate the PER. We allow these
control variables to vary by the HER deployment wave. We report regression coefficients and
corresponding estimated standard errors in Panel A and Panel B. In Panel C, we estimate the
total effect on days with peak load events, i.e., the summation of the baseline effect (Panel A)
and the marginal effect on peak load events (Panel B) for each treatment group. Finally, in Panel
D we test the null-hypothesis (H0 ) of no crowd-out, i.e., we test whether the total effect in the
HER+PER Group equals the summation of the total effects of the HER Group and the PER
Group. For this test, we report the difference in means and the estimated standard error of the
difference. Robust standard errors are clustered at the household level. *** denotes significance
at the 1 percent level, ** at the 5 percent level, and * at the 10 percent level.
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Table C4: Treatment Effects on Peak Event Days with Household-Level Controls

Peak
Hours
(1pm-6pm)

Shoulder
Hours
(10am-1pm,
6pm-9pm)

Off-Peak
Hours
(12am-1pm,
6pm-12am)

All
Hours

Panel A: Difference-in-Differences Model with Household Fixed Effects
HER Group
PER Group
HER+PER Group

0.009
(0.008)
−0.033
(0.009)∗∗∗
−0.027
(0.008)∗∗∗

0.006
(0.006)
0.000
(0.007)
−0.002
(0.006)

0.008
(0.005)∗
0.007
(0.005)
0.004
(0.004)

0.008
(0.005)∗
−0.002
(0.005)
−0.002
(0.005)

Panel B: Intervention Period only with Household Average Pre-Intervention Consumption
HER Group
PER Group
HER+PER Group

0.007
(0.012)
−0.026
(0.013)∗
−0.031
(0.012)∗∗∗

−0.002
(0.010)
−0.001
(0.010)
−0.009
(0.009)

−0.001
(0.008)
0.003
(0.009)
−0.002
(0.007)

0.000
(0.008)
−0.003
(0.009)
−0.008
(0.008)

Notes: We present coefficients from two regressions that include control variables for householdlevel behavior. In both panels, we regress log hourly electricity consumption on treatment indicators and controls for each hour in the sample. In panel A, we estimate a difference-in-differences
model using the pre-intervention period and all three days with peak load events. We include
household fixed effects and interactions of the treatment indicators with an indicator for days
with peak load events. In panel B, we estimate a model on the three days with peak load events
only. In addition to treatment indicators, we control for the average hourly consumption of each
household in the pre-intervention period. Robust standard errors are clustered at the household
level. *** denotes significance at the 1 percent level, ** at the 5 percent level, and * at the 10
percent level.
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Table C5: Spillover of Treatment Effects to Days Between Peak Load Events

Peak
Hours
(1pm-6pm)

Shoulder
Hours
(10am-1pm,
6pm-9pm)

Off-Peak
Hours
(12am-1pm,
6pm-12am)

All
Hours

Panel A: Pre-Event Period (8/1/14-8/27/14)
HER Group
PER Group
HER+PER Group

−0.029
(0.016)∗
−0.003
(0.017)
−0.039
(0.015)∗∗∗

−0.032
(0.013)∗∗
−0.011
(0.014)
−0.040
(0.013)∗∗∗

−0.029
(0.012)∗∗
−0.012
(0.013)
−0.035
(0.011)∗∗∗

−0.029
(0.012)∗∗
−0.010
(0.013)
−0.036
(0.012)∗∗∗

Panel B: Marginal Effect on Non-Peak-Event Days from 8/29/14-9/15/14)
HER Group
PER Group
HER+PER Group

0.011
(0.006)
−0.002
(0.007)
0.006
(0.006)

0.004
(0.005)
0.003
(0.006)
0.007
(0.005)

0.002
(0.004)
0.004
(0.005)
0.005
(0.004)

0.004
(0.005)
0.002
(0.005)
0.005
(0.004)

Notes: Regression of hourly electricity consumption (in kWh) on treatment indicators and controls for each hour in the sample, the HER deployment wave, and the medium used to communicate the PER. We restrict the sample to the baseline period and days between the first and last
peak load event, excluding peak load event days. We report regression coefficients and corresponding estimated standard errors in Panel A and Panel B. Robust standard errors are clustered
at the household level. *** denotes significance at the 1 percent level, ** at the 5 percent level,
and * at the 10 percent level.
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Table C6: Spillover of Treatment Effects to Days After the Intervention

Peak
Hours
(1pm-6pm)

Shoulder
Hours
(10am-1pm,
6pm-9pm)

Off-Peak
Hours
(12am-1pm,
6pm-12am)

All
Hours

Panel A: Pre-Event Period (8/1/14-8/27/14)
HER Group
PER Group
HER+PER Group

−0.029
(0.016)∗
−0.003
(0.017)
−0.040
(0.015)∗∗∗

−0.032
(0.013)∗∗
−0.011
(0.014)
−0.040
(0.013)∗∗∗

−0.029
(0.012)∗∗
−0.012
(0.013)
−0.036
(0.011)∗∗∗

−0.029
(0.012)∗∗
−0.010
(0.013)
−0.036
(0.012)∗∗∗

Panel B: Marginal Effect on Post-Peak-Event Days (9/17/14-9/30/14)
HER Group
PER Group
HER+PER Group

−0.006
(0.007)
−0.009
(0.007)
−0.007
(0.007)

0.001
(0.006)
0.004
(0.006)
0.007
(0.005)

0.001
(0.005)
0.005
(0.005)
0.005
(0.005)

−0.001
(0.005)
0.002
(0.005)
0.002
(0.005)

Notes: Regression of hourly electricity consumption (in kWh) on treatment indicators and controls for each hour in the sample, the HER deployment wave, and the medium used to communicate the PER. We restrict the sample to the baseline period and days after the last peak load event.
We report regression coefficients and corresponding estimated standard errors in Panel A and
Panel B. Robust standard errors are clustered at the household level. *** denotes significance at
the 1 percent level, ** at the 5 percent level, and * at the 10 percent level.
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Table C7: Treatment Effect Heterogeneity by Baseline Electricity Consumption

Peak
Hours
(1pm-6pm)

Shoulder
Hours
(10am-1pm,
6pm-9pm)

Off-Peak
Hours
(12am-1pm,
6pm-12am)

0.001
(0.012)
−0.004
(0.013)
−0.008
(0.011)
−0.032
(0.018)∗
−0.018
(0.019)
−0.029
(0.017)∗

−0.005
(0.011)
−0.007
(0.013)
−0.012
(0.011)
−0.020
(0.016)
−0.014
(0.018)
−0.019
(0.016)

All
Hours

Panel A: Pre-Event Period (8/1/14-8/27/14)
HER Group
PER Group
HER+PER Group
HER Group · High-User
PER Group · High-User
HER+PER Group · High-User

0.006
(0.014)
−0.002
(0.015)
−0.009
(0.013)
−0.031
(0.021)
−0.008
(0.022)
−0.021
(0.020)

−0.003
(0.011)
−0.006
(0.013)
−0.011
(0.011)
−0.023
(0.016)
−0.012
(0.018)
−0.019
(0.015)

Panel B: Marginal Effect on Peak-Event Days (8/28/14, 9/5/14, 9/16/14)
HER Group
PER Group
HER+PER Group
HER Group · High-User
PER Group · High-User
HER+PER Group · High-User

−0.001
(0.012)
−0.025
(0.013)∗
−0.025
(0.012)∗∗
0.018
(0.016)
−0.018
(0.017)
−0.007
(0.015)

−0.009
(0.010)
−0.007
(0.010)
−0.009
(0.009)
0.029
(0.013)∗∗
0.011
(0.014)
0.013
(0.012)

0.001
(0.007)
0.003
(0.008)
0.006
(0.007)
0.012
(0.009)
0.005
(0.010)
−0.002
(0.009)

0.000
(0.008)
−0.003
(0.008)
−0.001
(0.007)
0.014
(0.010)
0.000
(0.010)
−0.003
(0.009)

Notes: Regression of log hourly electricity consumption on treatment indicators and controls
for each hour in the sample, the HER deployment wave, and the medium used to communicate
the PER. In addition, we interact all effects with a binary indicator for high-users in the baseline
period, i.e., households with above-median average consumption before the first peak load event.
We report regression coefficients and corresponding estimated standard errors in Panel A and
Panel B. We omit the coefficients associated with the high-use indicators in the regression output.
Robust standard errors are clustered at the household level. *** denotes significance at the 1
percent level, ** at the 5 percent level, and * at the 10 percent level.
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